Annex A: List of Findings
National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Annual Report 2018

Chapter 3

F1.

The process for setting intelligence priorities has a solid foundation and overall participation by the community has made it more rigorous, inclusive, and systematically applied.

F2.

Coordinating the timing and consistency of Ministerial Directions to organizations involved in the intelligence priorities process would add rigour to the process, strengthen the development of the Standing Intelligence Requirements, and increase the accountability of ministers.

F3.

The great number of Standing Intelligence Requirements, particularly at the highest priority level, makes it difficult for the community to ensure that Cabinet has the information it needs on the significance of identified gaps in collection and assessment.

F4.

In general, the internal processes that NSICOP examined were effective and enforced.

F5.

The delay by CSIS in updating its internal Intelligence Requirements Document to incorporate the new intelligence priorities and SIRs in a timely manner undermined the accountability of both the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and Cabinet, and weakened the accountability of the overall system to support those priorities.

F6.

The National Intelligence Expenditure Review methodology is not applied consistently by organizations to provide Cabinet with complete and comparable information on how organizational resources are used across government to respond to the intelligence priorities.

F7.

Performance measurement for the security and intelligence community is not robust enough to give Cabinet the context it needs to understand the efficiency and effectiveness of the security and intelligence community.

Chapter 4

F8.

The development and use of defence intelligence activities involve inherent risks, and require robust measures of control and accountability. The Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) has implemented an internal administrative system of governance for the defence intelligence program that includes specific internal oversight bodies, ministerial direction, special authorizations by the Minister of National Defence for the employment of specific intelligence capabilities, and functional direction across its intelligence program.

F9.

The governance of the defence intelligence program is lacking in the following areas:

• DND/CAF does not have a standardized process or principles to determine a nexus between an authorized mission and an intelligence activity (paragraph 200);
• the principal internal governance body for defence intelligence, the Defence Intelligence Management Committee, did not fulfill its mandate to enable the Chief of Defence Intelligence to bring forward issues related to sensitive defence intelligence capabilities and relationships to the Deputy Minister and Chief of the Defence Staff (paragraph 216);
• DND/CAF has made limited efforts to measure and document compliance with the obligations of the Ministerial Directive on Defence Intelligence. The new Directorate of Intelligence Review, Compliance and Disclosure and the Defence Intelligence Oversight Board will be important in this respect (paragraph 217);
• the annual reports to the Minister of National Defence on defence intelligence activities do not report on challenges or gaps in the oversight of defence intelligence, and are silent on compliance with respect to key aspects of the Ministerial Directive on Defence Intelligence that deal with identified areas of risk (paragraphs 215-217); and
• DND/CAF does not have a standardized process for interdepartmental consultations (paragraph 233).

F10.

The defence intelligence program has been subject to internal audits and evaluations, which have resulted in recommendations that have been implemented by DND/CAF. There is, however, no dedicated, external and ongoing review of DND/CAF defence intelligence activities. Neither NSICOP, nor the proposed NSIRA, is required to conduct regular reviews of DND/CAF defence intelligence activities.

F11.

In Canada's legislative framework for national security and intelligence, DND/CAF is an anomaly in conducting its intelligence activities under the Crown prerogative. Those activities are similar in kind, risk, and sensitivity to those conducted by other Canadian security and intelligence organizations, which operate under and benefit from clear statutory authorities, limitations and requirements for ongoing review, tailored to the requirements of their specific mandates.