Annex B – Recommendations of Prior Reviews
The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians 2021 Annual Report
Special report into the allegations associated with Prime Minister Trudeau’s official visit to India in February 2018
Description
A special report on the allegations raised in the context of the Prime Minister’s trip to India in February 2018 relating to foreign interference in Canadian political affairs, risks to the security of the Prime Minister, and the inappropriate use of intelligence.
Recommendations
Foreign interference
R1.
In the interest of national security, members of the House of Commons and the Senate should be briefed upon being sworn-in and regularly thereafter on the risks of foreign interference and extremism in Canada. In addition, Cabinet Ministers should be reminded of the expectations described in the Government’s Open and Accountable Government, including that Ministers exercise discretion with whom they meet or associate, and clearly distinguish between official and private media messaging, and be reminded that, consistent with the Conflict of Interest Act, public office holders must always place the public interest before private interests. ***
R2.
The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should consider revising the *** to include a formal role for the National Security and Intelligence Advisor. The information provided to the Committee demonstrates that the NSIA played a significant role ***. The Committee believes that the NSIA has a legitimate role to provide advice as coordinator of the security and intelligence community and advisor to the Prime Minister. ***
Security
R3.
Drawing on the Committee’s finds, an interdepartmental review should be undertaken to identify key lessons learned following these events.
R4.
The Government should develop and implement a consistent method of conducting background checks by all organizations involved in the development of proposed guest lists for foreign events with the Prime Minister.
The use of intelligence
R5.
The Prime Minister should review the role of the NSIA in the area of countering threats to the security of Canada. The Committee already made one recommendation with respect to the role of the NSIA in the area of ***. The Committee notes that a number of other government departments and agencies have statutory authority to take measures to protect Canada from threats to its security. The role of the NSIA should be clarified for those organizations, as well.
Status
The Committee will seek a status update in 2022.
Review of the Process for Setting Intelligence Priorities
Description
A review of the Government of Canada’s process for establishing the national intelligence priorities, focusing on the governance of the process, the participation of the organizations involved, and performance measurement and resource expenditures.
Recommendations
R1.
The National Security and Intelligence Advisor, supported by the Privy Council Office, invest in and take a stronger managerial and leadership role in the process for setting intelligence priorities to ensure organizational responses to the intelligence priorities are timely and consistently implemented.
R2.
The security and intelligence community develop a strategic overview of the Standing Intelligence Requirements to ensure Cabinet is receiving the best information it needs to make decisions.
R3.
Under the leadership of the National Security and Intelligence Advisor and supported by the Privy Council Office, the security and intelligence community develop tools to address the coordination and prioritization challenges it faces in relation to the Standing Intelligence Requirements.
R4.
The security and intelligence community, in consultation with the Treasury Board Secretariat, develop a consistent performance measurement framework that examines how effectively and efficiently the community is responding to the intelligence priorities, including a robust and consistent resource expenditure review.
Status
The Committee will seek a status update in 2022.
Review of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Intelligence Activities
Description
A review of the intelligence activities of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. The Committee examined the scope of these activities, their legal authorities and the existing oversight mechanisms for their control and accountability.
Recommendations
R1.
The Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) review and strengthen its administrative framework governing defence intelligence activities, particularly with respect to the Ministerial Directive on Defence Intelligence, to ensure that it meets its own obligations on governance and reporting to the Minister of National Defence, and is properly tracking the implementation of those obligations. In particular:
- devise a standard process, or principles, for determining a nexus between a defence intelligence activity and a legally authorized mission;
- document its compliance with obligations in the Directive, including in areas of risk specified in the Directive not currently included in annual reports to the Minister; and
- implement a standardized process for interdepartmental consultations on the deployment of defence intelligence capabilities, including minimum standards of documentation.
R2.
The Government amend Bill C-59, An Act respecting national security matters, to ensure that the mandate of the proposed National Security and Intelligence Review Agency includes an explicit requirement for an annual report of DND/CAF activities related to national security or intelligence.
R3.
Drawing from the Committee’s assessment and findings, the Government give serious consideration to providing explicit legislative authority for the conduct of defence intelligence activities.
Status
The Mandate Letter sent to the Minister of Defence on December 13, 2019, included:
With the support of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, introduce a new framework governing how Canada gathers, manages and uses defence intelligence, as recommended by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians.
The Committee recognizes that recommendation R2 was overtaken by events.
The Committee will seek a status update in 2022.
Diversity and Inclusion in the Security and Intelligence Community
Description
A review that provides a baseline assessment of the degree of representation of women, Aboriginal peoples, members of visible minorities and persons with disabilities within the security and intelligence community, and examines the goals, initiatives, programs and measures that departments and agencies have taken to promote diversity and inclusion.
Recommendations
R1.
The Committee conduct a retrospective review in three to five years to assess the security and intelligence community’s progress in achieving and implementing its diversity goals and inclusion initiatives, and to examine more closely the question of inclusion, including issues of harassment, violence and discrimination, through closer engagement with employees.
R2.
The security and intelligence community adopt a consistent and transparent approach to planning and monitoring of employment equity and diversity goals, and conduct regular reviews of their employment policies and practices (that is, employment systems reviews) to identify possible employment barriers for women, Aboriginal peoples, members of visible minorities and persons with disabilities.
R3.
The security and intelligence community improve the robustness of its data collection and analysis, including GBA+ assessments of internal staffing and promotion policies and clustering analyses of the workforce. In this light, the Committee also highlights the future obligation for organizations to investigate, record and report on all occurrences of harassment and violence in the workplace.
R4.
The security and intelligence community develop a common performance measurement framework, and strengthen accountability for diversity and inclusion through meaningful and measurable performance indicators for executives and managers across all organizations.
Status
The Committee will seek a status update in 2022.
The Government Response to Foreign Interference
Description
A review of the breadth and scope of foreign interference in Canada; the government’s response; the implicated organizations and their response capabilities; the extent of coordination and collaboration among these organizations; the degree to which the government works with other levels of government and targets of foreign interference; and government engagement with allies abroad.
Recommendations
R1.
The Government of Canada develop a comprehensive strategy to counter foreign interference and build institutional and public resiliency. Drawing from the Committee’s review and findings, such a strategy should:
- identify the short- and long-term risks and harms to Canadian institutions and rights and freedoms posed by the threat of foreign interference;
- examine and address the full range of institutional vulnerabilities targeted by hostile foreign states, including areas expressly omitted in the Committee’s review;
- assess the adequacy of existing legislation that deals with foreign interference, such as the Security of Information Act or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, and make proposals for changes if required;
- develop practical, whole-of-government operational and policy mechanisms to identify and respond to the activities of hostile states;
- establish regular mechanisms to work with sub-national levels of government and law enforcement organizations, including to provide necessary security clearances;
- include an approach for ministers and senior officials to engage with fundamental institutions and the public; and
- guide cooperation with allies on foreign interference.
R2.
The Government of Canada support this comprehensive strategy through sustained central leadership and coordination. As an example of a centralized coordinating entity to address foreign interference, the Committee refers to the appointment and mandate of the Australian National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator.
The Committee reiterates its recommendation from its Special report into the allegations associated with Prime Minister Trudeau’s official visit to India in February 2018:
In the interest of national security, members of the House of Commons and Senate should be briefed upon being sworn-in and regularly thereafter on the risks of foreign interference and extremism in Canada. In addition, Cabinet Ministers should be reminded of the expectations described in the Government’s Open and Accountable Government, including that Ministers exercise discretion with whom they meet or associate, and clearly distinguish between official and private media messaging, and be reminded that, consistent with the Conflict of Interest Act, public office holders must always place the public interest before private interests.
Status
The Committee will seek a status update in 2022.
The Canada Border Services Agency’s National Security and Intelligence Activities
Description
A review of the national security and intelligence activities of the Canada Border Services Agency, focusing on CBSA’s governance over national security and intelligence activities in CBSA’s Enforcement and Intelligence Program; CBSA’s conduct of sensitive national security and intelligence activities; and CBSA’s relations with its key partners in the areas of national security and intelligence.
Recommendations
R1.
The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness provide written direction to the Canada Border Services Agency on the conduct of sensitive national security and intelligence activities. That direction should include clear accountability expectations and annual reporting obligations.
R2.
The Canada Border Services Agency establish a consistent process for assessing and reporting on the risks and outcomes of its sensitive national security and intelligence activities.
Status
On February 16, 2022, the Minister of Public Safety issued the Ministerial Direction to the Canada Border Services Agency on Surveillance and Confidential Human Sources, which directs it to establish risk management and reporting mechanisms related to surveillance and confidential human sources.
Special Report on the Collection, Use, Retention and Dissemination of Information on Canadians in the context of the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces Defence Intelligence Activities
Description
A special report on the collection, use, retention and dissemination of information on Canadian citizens by the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces in the conduct of defence intelligence activities, focusing on the operational context, legal framework, the CANCIT Function Directive, and the treatment of this information before the Directive.
Recommendations
The Committee makes the following recommendations:
R1.
The Department of National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) rescind the Chief of Defence Intelligence Functional Directive: Guidance on the Collection of Canadian Citizen Information and, in consultation with the Privacy Commissioner, review all of its functional directives and other DND/CAF policy instruments that are relevant to the collection, use, retention and dissemination of information about Canadians to ensure consistent governance of these activities.
R2.
To resolve the issue of the extraterritorial application of the Privacy Act, the Minister of National Defence should ensure DND/CAF complies with the letter and spirit of the Privacy Act in all of its defence intelligence activities, whether they are conducted in Canada or abroad.
R3.
The Minister of National Defence introduce legislation governing DND/CAF defence intelligence activities, including the extent to which DND/CAF should be authorized to collect, use, retain and disseminate information about Canadians in the execution of its authorized missions.
Status
The Committee will seek a status update in 2022.