Chapter 6: Thematic Issues
Special Report on the Federal Policing Mandate of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Intelligence

174. The RCMP describes its function as “intelligence-led policing.” According to the RCMP, “[i]ntelligence-led policing acknowledges that research, analysis and evidence-based decision making are critical to effective and efficient policing. Using data and intelligence helps us identify patterns and linkages that assist in solving investigations and predicting and preventing future crime.” Footnote 301 Federal Policing is responsible for most intelligence functions and resources in the RCMP, both domestic and international.

175. The RCMP identifies three kinds of intelligence: tactical, operational and strategic. Tactical intelligence supports investigations through, for example, identifying suspects and conducting surveillance. Operational intelligence involves information from different investigations and divisions to identify emerging trends in criminality. Strategic intelligence identifies trends and threats at a national and international level and is used by senior executives for decision-making on policies, priorities and plans. Footnote 302

176. Intelligence within the RCMP has gone through many changes in recent years. The latest realignment was undertaken to address gaps in governance which have “prevented the optimization of criminal intelligence services across the RCMP and prevented anything close to true intelligence-led policing from materializing structurally across the Force.” Footnote 303 This resulted in the creation of a governance framework in 2019 for all intelligence within the RCMP and a more clearly defined structure.

177. Within the RCMP, the Director General National Intelligence is responsible for the delivery of the Federal Policing National Intelligence Program. The Director General National Intelligence reports to the Executive Director/Assistant Commissioner of Federal Policing Intelligence and International Policing. Although the Director General National Intelligence is functionally accountable through Federal Policing, the distribution of intelligence resources throughout the RCMP mean that their responsibilities span across the RCMP's mandates and extend into Divisions. Of the 532 intelligence personnel in the RCMP, approximately 90 (17%) report to the Director General National Intelligence. Footnote 304

178. The Federal Policing National Intelligence Program is comprised of three sections: the Strategic Intelligence Directorate, the Operational Intelligence Analysis Group and the Intelligence Support Group. The first two focus on intelligence analysis at the strategic, operational and tactical levels and include areas of examination such as ideologically motivated criminality, cybercrime and economic integrity. Footnote 305 The Operational Intelligence Directorate is also responsible for the Global Initiatives Program. Based at RCMP Headquarters, this program is responsible for 14 criminal intelligence analysts deployed internationally. While most of these analysts are based in Canadian missions, three are embedded with strategic partners in Washington (Drug Enforcement Administration), the Hague (Europol), and Canberra (Australian Federal Police). Footnote 306 Their presence in “key locations and embedded with critical partners is essential to Federal Policing National Intelligence’s mandate to provide strategic and operational criminal intelligence reporting on emerging global criminal threats as well as to identify targeting opportunities for investigation and disruption.” Footnote 307

179. The third section, the Intelligence Support Group, is responsible for governance and standardization and all other areas that fall under the Federal Policing National Intelligence Program. This Group houses the Intelligence Standards and Program Development unit, which is responsible for establishing and maintaining a professional criminal intelligence program within the RCMP. This unit works to ensure that all intelligence functions, including staffing, quality assurance, evaluation and training, are governed by standardized policies, guidelines and methodologies. Footnote 308

180. In 2019, the RCMP implemented a new governance framework for intelligence to make it more centralized. While most intelligence resources are located within divisions, intelligence analysts responsible for tactical, operational and strategic intelligence now fall under the authority of a Division Intelligence Officer within each division. Footnote 309 Previously, some divisions did not have a Divisional Intelligence Officer so intelligence personnel were managed by investigative units. Footnote 310 With the new framework, in most Divisions, Footnote 311 the Divisional Intelligence Officer is now responsible for both the intelligence function and the fiscal control of intelligence activities at the divisional level.

181. The RCMP is also the steward of the Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC). CISC was founded in 1970 to connect the criminal intelligence community at all levels: municipal, provincial and federal. The mandate of CISC is to “lead the strategic and operational intelligence initiatives to combat organized crime and serious crimes related to it in Canada and help ensure the timely production and exchange of criminal information and intelligence among the law enforcement community, in support of the Canadian Law Enforcement Strategy on Organized Crime.” Footnote 312 It produces an annual National Threat Assessment on Organized and Serious Crime in Canada, which is used to set priorities and to detect, disrupt and prevent serious and organized crime in Canada.

182. The intelligence function within the Federal Policing program faces a number of challenges which limit its effectiveness. The first challenge is that it has long been a decentralized function within the RCMP. In 2019, the RCMP noted that,

Intelligence activities across RCMP mandates within National Headquarters currently have limited national oversight and governance. Federal Policing priorities are currently set through operational governance with no independent process to set intelligence priorities. This results in confusing enforcement priorities with intelligence priorities, which are distinct and serve a different purpose.” Footnote 313

As a result, intelligence resources of Federal Policing are managed at the Divisional level by authorities who report to both Federal Policing and to provincial and territorial authorities. While the creation of the strategic framework for intelligence in 2018 and the governance framework in 2019 have addressed some issues, Footnote 314 primarily around standardization and professionalization, gaps persist. As the Deputy Commissioner Federal Policing stated to the Committee, he currently has very little visibility over intelligence resources in the divisions and he believes they are used primarily on provincial and territorial priorities. Footnote 315

183. The second challenge arises as a consequences of problems with Federal Policing data. Intelligence is used to develop leads, identify trends and set priorities. As noted earlier, the RCMP has a number of information management and data integrity issues. If information is incomplete, incorrect, or inaccessible, it undermines the production and quality of the intelligence used by the RCMP. Other challenges arise with the use of PRIME, a proprietary system of the government of British Columbia. Although an investigation may have been identified as a tiered priority, Federal investigators in British Columbia will often continue to populate PRIME as their primary operational database despite a requirement to use the Federal classified database (SPROS). Footnote 318 Because access to PRIME is controlled, intelligence analysts at RCMP headquarters may be unable to produce analysis and advice on short notice and on time-sensitive investigations as they await approval; this in turn limits the information available to senior decision-makers. Finally, some investigative units keep operational data on stand- alone systems or personal hard drives, preventing intelligence analysts and planners from accessing data relevant to their work. Footnote 317 While the FOYER interface was created to mitigate challenges such as these (paragraph 154), compliance has been very low and problems persist.

184. The third challenge is that the intelligence function lacks a centralized repository. Intelligence assessments and reports are held in a variety of systems across the RCMP and are not accessible to other analysts. The Federal Policing program noted:

With governance challenges and criminal intelligence products being stored in a myriad of different locations across operational and divisional boundaries, it makes it difficult to consolidate all available criminal intelligence knowledge into one centralized system, and use that system to support structured and unstructured research and analysis techniques. Footnote 318

This undermines the ability of intelligence analysts to make connections between investigations nationally and can cause duplication of effort.

185. Finally, the RCMP struggles with the role that intelligence should play in the organization. As RCMP officials noted in 2022, “the RCMP does not have a culture of intelligence, meaning that it is often not seen as a tool to assist decision-makers, but rather meant to directly assist investigators and other front-line law enforcement (i.e., that it becomes evidence).” Footnote 319

186. The Committee addresses intelligence issues in its Assessment.

Other horizontal studies of relevance

[*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] Two other studies have highlighted some of the challenges identified in this report, notably the lack of appropriate training and inadequate information technologies, and the importance of recognizing disruption as a viable means of countering threats in certain areas. The first of these studies was a joint RCMP and CSIS study of the U.K.’s counter-terrorism model. Conducted in 2018, this review sought to derive observations, lessons learned and recommendations to assist in the reshaping of the Canadian counter-terrorism model, with specific focus on CSIS and the RCMP. Of note, the study made observations with respect to investigative training for Canadian counter-terrorism professionals, case management tools and the use of disruption as a means of mitigating threats. The study made recommendations in some of these areas. Footnote 320

The second study, known as the Operational Improvement Review, was an independent review conducted by defence attorney Anil Kapoor, who was previously appointed Commission Counsel to the Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182. Mr. Kapoor conducted the review between May 2018 and March 2019 at the behest of the RCMP Commissioner and the Director of CSIS. The review assessed the RCMP-CSIS relationship in national security criminal investigations and made 76 recommendations. While the review did not assess the technical capabilities of the RCMP, it stressed that the RCMP did not have a single workable, searchable database in the national security realm. It also recommended that Federal Policing National Security and the RCMP's Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams must accept that a criminal prosecution is not the “gold standard” in national security investigations. Instead, it suggested that relying on a range of tools, including disruption, allows organizations to be nimble in their respective approaches to upholding public safety. Footnote 321