Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions
Annual Report 2024
14. On June 3, 2024, a revised version of NSICOP’s Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions was tabled in both Houses of Parliament. The report was concurrently made available to the public on the Committee’s website. The report includes eight findings and six recommendations.
15. Representing the third time the Committee has reviewed the government’s response to threats of foreign interference, this report builds on the Committee’s more expansive 2019 review. To avoid duplication, it narrowly focuses on the specific threat to Canada’s democratic processes and institutions as a subset of the larger foreign interference challenge.
16. It is clear to the Committee that foreign actors continue to carry out interference activities in Canada. The key threat actors, including their motivations, tactics, and techniques, largely remain the same, although this review describes what has evolved and provides examples of what intelligence agencies reported in the time period in question. Moreover, the mandates and legislative authorities of the departments and agencies responsible for responding to foreign interference are also largely unchanged.
17. This review examined information from September 1, 2018 to March 15, 2024, and included ten organizations. In support of the review, the Committee requested material from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Communications Security Establishment Canada (CSE), the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), Public Safety Canada (PS), Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and the Privy Council Office (PCO). It also relied on Secretariat briefings and departmental responses to written questions. Senior officials appeared before the Committee, sometimes more than once.
18. The Committee found that the government was aware in 2018 that the reforms implemented under the Plan to Protect Democracy were insufficient to address foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions. Indeed, the Prime Minister has acknowledged publicly that the government needed to do a better job of following up on the Committee’s previous recommendations. Footnote 2 In the Committee’s view, this delay contributed in part to the crisis in which several unauthorized leaks of intelligence raised significant concerns about the state of foreign interference in Canada and in our democratic processes and institutions.
19. The Committee noted that the government must ensure that legislation keeps pace with this evolving threat so that the security and intelligence community has the tools it needs to respond to the threat in a way that discourages future interference efforts. It must clearly define thresholds for response and clarify the roles and mandates of governance bodies to support a coherent and coordinated response to instances of foreign interference, and the accountabilities of Ministers. The government must also address deficiencies in how intelligence is distributed, assessed and used internally, and in doing so build a culture where officials and Ministers alike are seized with and accountable for identifying challenges and taking decisions to address them.
20. Obstacles identified in the report include outdated legislation governing the sharing of classified information, the absence of mechanisms to engage other orders of government, and stalled initiatives to inform the Canadian public and other key stakeholders. The Committee underscored that briefing Parliamentarians on the threat is imperative. The report draws attention to the important role that Parliamentarians have to play. The Committee called on Parliamentarians to carefully consider all ethical and legal ramifications of their engagement with foreign officials or their proxies, and act to reduce their own vulnerabilities. A heightened awareness of the threat is necessary.
21. The Committee is encouraged by Bill C-70, which addressed some of the recommendations made by the Committee. However, work still needs to be done to address other challenges such as how the threat is interpreted, how intelligence reporting is disseminated and acted upon, and how threats are communicated to vulnerable stakeholders, particularly Parliamentarians.
22. The Committee recognizes the considerable amount of work being undertaken through other processes to understand foreign interference in Canada’s democratic institutions and processes. As a committee of parliamentarians, the Committee appreciates having had the opportunity to bring its viewpoint to this important and timely issue.