Annex A: Findings and recommendations of the Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Processes and Institutions
Annual Report 2024

Findings

F1.

Foreign states conduct sophisticated and pervasive foreign interference specifically targeting Canada’s democratic processes and institutions, occurring before, during and after elections and in all orders of government. These activities continue to pose a significant threat to national security, and to the overall integrity of Canada’s democracy. The PRC and India are the most active perpetrators.

F2.

The government was aware in 2018 that the reforms implemented under the Plan to Protect Democracy were insufficient to address foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions. It has yet to implement an effective response to foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions. This is despite a significant body of intelligence reporting, the completion of foundational policy work, public consultations and having been called to do so by this Committee.

F3.

Significant differences persist in how Ministers, departments and agencies interpret the gravity and prevalence of the threat, including the threshold for response.

• The intelligence community increased its reporting to the government on the threat of foreign interference in Canada’s democratic processes and institutions in response to Canada’s intelligence priorities.
• Policy departments (Privy Council Office, Global Affairs Canada, and Public Safety) did not adequately consider intelligence reporting or assessments, or develop policy advice to address specific cases of foreign interference.
• Ministers accountable for national security did not request policy advice in response to intelligence reporting and the government was slow to put in place governance structures to consider intelligence and take decisions.

F4.

The roles, mandates and accountabilities of the National Security Council and supporting governance committees are unclear.

F5.

Canada’s current legal framework does not enable the security and intelligence community or law enforcement to respond effectively to foreign interference activities. This impedes the federal government’s ability to engage other orders of government and law enforcement with respect to sharing and use of classified intelligence, respectively.

F6.

While departments and agencies conducted operations to disrupt or deter foreign interference, tangible results with respect to the level of actual threat reduction were difficult to measure.

F7.

The government continues to lack an effective approach to engage with the Canadian public and other orders of government. While it has increased engagement with some Parliamentarians, political parties and electoral candidates, its efforts have been time- bound (i.e., election-focused), narrowly targeted, often reactive and the information provided too general. It has also repeatedly failed to implement a comprehensive approach to engaging federal Parliamentarians.

F8.

The government’s ability to address vulnerabilities in political party administration is limited.

Recommendations

R1.

The government table legislation before the next federal election to address gaps in Canada’s legal framework with respect to foreign interference, specifically to:

1. Create a foreign influence transparency registry;
2. Amend the Criminal Code and the Security of Information Act to define foreign interference and introduce relevant offences;
3. Modernize the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, including to facilitate wider sharing of classified information;
4. Address the intelligence and evidence challenge; and,
5. Reduce vulnerabilities in political nomination processes, including leadership conventions.

R2.

The government engage political parties to determine whether party nomination processes and leadership conventions be included within the framework of the Canada Elections Act, and work with Parliament to determine whether the statute governing the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner and the Senate Ethics Officer be revised to include foreign interference.

R3.

The government review and renew legislation, strategies and funding to ensure they keep pace with the evolution of foreign interference activities and other national security threats, and regularly include and respect legislative review provisions in national security legislation.

R4.

The government ensure that the roles, mandates and accountabilities of the National Security Council and supporting governance committees are clear and publicly communicated to improve transparency and performance.

R5.

The security and intelligence community develop consistent definitions and thresholds for action with respect to foreign interference, and organizations responsible for intelligence collection and those responsible for providing policy advice, respectively, regularly collaborate to provide the government timely and comprehensive assessments of threats and advice for action.

R6.

The government immediately implement and report annually on the briefings for Parliamentarians on the threat of foreign interference.

Status

For the 2024 Annual Report, the government provided a response to recommendations 4 and 6.

Additionally, on June 3, 2024, the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs issued a statement in which he agreed that all parliamentarians must be part of the solution. He highlighted the government’s Bill C-70, An Act respecting countering foreign interference, and Bill C-65, An Act to amend the Canada Elections Act, as positive steps in combatting foreign interference and protecting Canada’s democracy and institutions.

Response to R4:

The Government has made the mandate and membership of the National Security Council available to all Canadians online.

A national security governance review was initiated in the fall of 2023, and the new governance structure was launched in late 2024.

Response to R6:

In 2024, CSIS conducted joint briefings on foreign interference to all parliamentary caucuses in the House of Commons in conjunction with CSE/CCCS, PS, and the RCMP.

Also in 2024, the NSIA sent a letter to opposition leaders notifying them of her intent to offer regular intelligence-informed briefings to support their role in helping define party positions; this work is ongoing.