Annex B: Outstanding recommendations of prior reviews
Annual Report 2024

Special report into the allegations associated with Prime Minister Trudeau’s official visit to India in February 2018

Description

A special report on the allegations raised in the context of the Prime Minister’s trip to India in February 2018 relating to foreign interference in Canadian political affairs, risks to the security of the Prime Minister, and the inappropriate use of intelligence.

Recommendations

Foreign interference

R1.

In the interest of national security, members of the House of Commons and the Senate should be briefed upon being sworn-in and regularly thereafter on the risks of foreign interference and extremism in Canada. In addition, Cabinet Ministers should be reminded of the expectations described in the Government’s Open and Accountable Government, including that Ministers exercise discretion with whom they meet or associate, and clearly distinguish between official and private media messaging, and be reminded that, consistent with the Conflict of Interest Act, public office holders must always place the public interest before private interests.

R2.

The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should consider revising the *** to include a formal role for the National Security and Intelligence Advisor. The information provided to the Committee demonstrates that the NSIA played a significant role ***. The Committee believes that the NSIA has a legitimate role to provide advice as coordinator of the security and intelligence community and advisor to the Prime Minister. ***

Security

R3.

Drawing on the Committee’s findings, an interdepartmental review should be undertaken to identify key lessons learned following these events.

R4.

The Government should develop and implement a consistent method of conducting background checks by all organizations involved in the development of proposed guest lists for foreign events with the Prime Minister.

The use of intelligence

R5.

The Prime Minister should review the role of the NSIA in the area of countering threats to the security of Canada. The Committee already made one recommendation with respect to the role of the NSIA in the area of ***. The Committee notes that a number of other government departments and agencies have statutory authority to take measures to protect Canada from threats to its security. The role of the NSIA should be clarified for those organizations, as well.

Status

For the 2024 Annual Report, the government provided a response and status update on the implementation of these recommendations.

Response to R1:

CSIS has conducted joint briefings on foreign interference to all parliamentary caucuses in the House of Commons in conjunction with CSE/CCCS, PS, and the RCMP.

In 2024, the NSIA sent a letter to opposition leaders notifying them of her intent to offer regular intelligence-informed briefings to support their role in helping define party positions; this work will remain ongoing.

Response to R2:

As noted in the Leblanc-Charette report (2023), “steps have been taken to further strengthen the national security governance framework to ensure that the NSIA maintains awareness of ongoing threats and mitigation measures, including those related to foreign interference.” These steps included the creation of the Deputy Ministers Committee on Intelligence Response, recently renamed the Deputy Ministers Committee on Intelligence Action.

Response to R3:

A list of key lessons learned and action items stemming from the discussion was developed and disseminated for awareness and follow-up as required.

Response to R4:

PCO has committed to screening foreign guest lists should PMO share these lists, including relevant, reliable information in advance of foreign events with the Prime Minister.

Response to R5:

On November 25, 2024, the Prime Minister issued and published a mandate letter to the NSIA. The mandate letter makes the Prime Minister’s expectations for the NSIA more transparent and establishes specific priorities and areas of responsibility.

Review of the Process for Setting Intelligence Priorities

Description

A review of the Government of Canada’s process for establishing the national intelligence priorities, focusing on the governance of the process, the participation of the organizations involved, and performance measurement and resource expenditures.

Recommendations

R1.

The National Security and Intelligence Advisor, supported by the Privy Council Office, invest in and take a stronger managerial and leadership role in the process for setting intelligence priorities to ensure organizational responses to the intelligence priorities are timely and consistently implemented.

R2.

The security and intelligence community develop a strategic overview of the Standing Intelligence Requirements to ensure Cabinet is receiving the best information it needs to make decisions.

R3.

Under the leadership of the National Security and Intelligence Advisor and supported by the Privy Council Office, the security and intelligence community develop tools to address the coordination and prioritization challenges it faces in relation to the Standing Intelligence Requirements.

R4.

The security and intelligence community, in consultation with the Treasury Board Secretariat, develop a consistent performance measurement framework that examines how effectively and efficiently the community is responding to the intelligence priorities, including a robust and consistent resource expenditure review.

Status

For the 2024 Annual Report, the government provided a response and status update on the implementation of these recommendations.

Response to R1:

Measures have been developed to strengthen the leadership role of the NSIA; and the NSIA is now the responsible Deputy Minister for the Intelligence Priorities.

Response to R2:

Results and delivery information has been enhanced, including a new ‘End Cycle Update’ that provides Ministers with clear indications of successes and gaps within identified Intelligence Priorities.

Response to R3:

Criteria have been developed to rank intelligence requirements. These criteria are used to prioritize collection and assessment activities. In addition, prioritization methodologies for Intelligence Requirements have been reviewed and refined periodically.

Response to R4:

Steps were taken in 2020 and 2021 to update and clarify the National Intelligence Expenditure Report (NIER), and TBS assisted PCO in developing an updated NIER methodology.

Review of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Intelligence Activities

Description

A review of the intelligence activities of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. The Committee examined the scope of these activities, their legal authorities and the existing oversight mechanisms for their control and accountability.

Recommendations

R1.

The Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) review and strengthen its administrative framework governing defence intelligence activities, particularly with respect to the Ministerial Directive on Defence Intelligence, to ensure that it meets its own obligations on governance and reporting to the Minister of National Defence, and is properly tracking the implementation of those obligations. In particular:

  • devise a standard process, or principles, for determining a nexus between a defence intelligence activity and a legally authorized mission;
  • document its compliance with obligations in the Directive, including in areas of risk specified in the Directive not currently included in annual reports to the Minister; and
  • implement a standardized process for interdepartmental consultations on the deployment of defence intelligence capabilities, including minimum standards of documentation.

R2.

The Government amend Bill C-59, National Security Act, 2017, to ensure that the mandate of the proposed National Security and Intelligence Review Agency includes an explicit requirement for an annual report of DND/CAF activities related to national security or intelligence.

R3.

Drawing from the Committee’s assessment and findings, the Government give serious consideration to providing explicit legislative authority for the conduct of defence intelligence activities.

Status

For the 2024 Annual Report, the government provided a response and status update on the implementation of these recommendations.

The Committee recognizes that recommendation R2 was overtaken by events when Bill C-59, the National Security Act, 2017 received Royal Assent on June 21, 2019, and did not include a requirement for NSIRA to produce an annual report of DND/CAF activities related to national security or intelligence.

Response to R1:

DND/CAF has reviewed and strengthened its administrative framework governing defence intelligence activities, including the Ministerial Directive on Defence Intelligence, to ensure that it meets its obligations on governance and reporting to the Minister of National Defence, and is tracking implementation of those obligations as appropriate.

Response to R3:

Taking into account the Committee’s assessment and findings, DND/CAF undertook a study of its authorities for its defence intelligence activities. The department will continue to update policies and internal practices as required.

Diversity and Inclusion in the Security and Intelligence Community

Description

A review that provides a baseline assessment of the degree of representation of women, Aboriginal peoples, members of visible minorities and persons with disabilities within the security and intelligence community, and examines the goals, initiatives, programs and measures that departments and agencies have taken to promote diversity and inclusion.

Recommendations

R2.

The security and intelligence community adopt a consistent and transparent approach to planning and monitoring of employment equity and diversity goals, and conduct regular reviews of their employment policies and practices (that is, employment systems reviews) to identify possible employment barriers for women, Aboriginal peoples, members of visible minorities and persons with disabilities.

R3.

The security and intelligence community improve the robustness of its data collection and analysis, including GBA+ assessments of internal staffing and promotion policies and lustering analyses of the workforce. In this light, the Committee also highlights the future obligation for organizations to investigate, record and report on all occurrences of harassment and violence in the workplace.

R4.

The security and intelligence community develop a common performance measurement framework, and strengthen accountability for diversity and inclusion through meaningful and measurable performance indicators for executives and managers across all organizations.

Status

For the 2024 Annual Report, the government provided a response and status update on the implementation of these recommendations.

Response to R2:

All departments now reconcile self-identification data annually with Treasury Board, and each is required to develop Employment Equity Plans.

Where the workforce analysis reveals under-representation, departments are required to conduct an Employment Systems Review, as listed under the Employment Equity Regulations, to determine whether there are barriers to the representation of designated group members.

Departments and agencies continue to supplement this governmental approach to equity and diversity goals with individual initiatives linked to their own particular circumstances. Most recently, in April 2024 the Clerk of the Privy Council asked deputy heads to summarize their progress in implementing the “Call to Action on Anti-Racism, Equity, and Inclusion in the Federal Public Service.” The results were published on the PCO website in August.

Response to R3:

The security and intelligence community participates fully in all government efforts at data collection on diversity and inclusion. They also abide by TBS guidance to investigate, record and report on all occurrences of harassment and violence in the workplace.

A diversity and inclusion lens tool was developed and presented as a party of the Joint Labour/Management Task Force on Diversity and Inclusion. Departments and agencies have adopted the use of this tool.

Departments and agencies continue to supplement this governmental approach to data collection with individual initiatives linked to their own particular circumstances, such as evergreen dashboards. Most recently, in April 2024 the Clerk of the Privy Council asked deputy heads to summarize their progress in implementing the “Call to Action on Anti-Racism, Equity, and Inclusion in the Federal Public Service.” The results were published on the PCO website in August 2024.

The Canada Border Services Agency’s National Security and Intelligence Activities

Description

A review of the national security and intelligence activities of the Canada Border Services Agency, focusing on CBSA’s governance over national security and intelligence activities in CBSA’s Enforcement and Intelligence Program; CBSA’s conduct of sensitive national security and intelligence activities; and CBSA’s relations with its key partners in the areas of national security and intelligence.

Recommendations

R1.

The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness provide written direction to the Canada Border Services Agency on the conduct of sensitive national security and intelligence activities. That direction should include clear accountability expectations and annual reporting obligations.

R2.

The Canada Border Services Agency establish a consistent process for assessing and reporting on the risks and outcomes of its sensitive national security and intelligence activities.

Status

For the 2024 Annual Report, the government provided a response and status update on the implementation of these recommendations.

Response to R1:

The Minister of Public Safety approved and issued a Ministerial Direction to CBSA in February 2022.

Response to R2:

The Confidential Human Source and Surveillance policies have been updated to include formal risk assessments as part of the approval processes.

Special Report on the Collection, Use, Retention and Dissemination of Information on Canadians in the context of the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces Defence Intelligence Activities

Description

A special report on the collection, use, retention and dissemination of information on Canadian citizens by the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces in the conduct of defence intelligence activities, focusing on the operational context, legal framework, the CANCIT Function Directive, and the treatment of this information before the Directive.

Recommendations

R1.

The Department of National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) rescind the Chief of Defence Intelligence Functional Directive: Guidance on the Collection of Canadian Citizen Information and, in consultation with the Privacy Commissioner, review all of its functional directives and other DND/CAF policy instruments that are relevant to the collection, use, retention and dissemination of information about Canadians to ensure consistent governance of these activities.

R2.

To resolve the issue of the extraterritorial application of the Privacy Act, the Minister of National Defence should ensure DND/CAF complies with the letter and spirit of the Privacy Act in all of its defence intelligence activities, whether they are conducted in Canada or abroad.

R3.

The Minister of National Defence introduce legislation governing DND/CAF defence intelligence activities, including the extent to which DND/CAF should be authorized to collect, use, retain and disseminate information about Canadians in the execution of its authorized missions.

Status

For the 2024 Annual Report, the government provided a response and status update on the implementation of these recommendations.

Response to R1:

DND/CAF completed a review of all functional direction and other relevant policy instruments; and based on this review, it issued a revised Functional Directive, Guidance on the Handling and Protection of Canadian Citizen Information.

Response to R2:

To ensure compliance with the Privacy Act, DND/CAF continues to implement Functional Directives, performs privacy impact assessments, and consults with its legal services prior to conducting activities.

Response to R3:

Taking into account the Committee’s assessment and findings, DND/CAF undertook a study of its authorities for its defence intelligence activities. The department will continue to update policies and internal practices as required.

Special Report on the National Security and Intelligence Activities of Global Affairs Canada

Description

The report provides an overview of the nature and scope of the national security and intelligence activities at Global Affairs Canada. It examines the authorities under which the Department conducts those activities and how it governs them to support the accountability of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. It describes the structures the Department has in place to try to ensure that the activities and policies of other organizations with security and intelligence responsibilities align with Canada’s foreign policy objectives. Finally, the report highlights areas where the Department plays a leadership role in the government, including two recent case studies of terrorist hostage takings abroad.

Recommendations

R1.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs work with the Minister of National Defence to put in place proactive, regular and comprehensive consultation mechanisms to ensure that Canada’s defence policies and military operations are aligned with its foreign policy objectives.

R2.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs provide written direction to the Department on its national security and intelligence activities. That direction should include clear accountability expectations and regular reporting requirements.

R3.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs put in place comprehensive governance mechanisms for the Department’s security and intelligence activities and for those that it supports or contributes to at partner organizations. Those mechanisms should better document processes and decision points to strengthen accountability and institutional memory.

R4.

The Government of Canada establish a clear framework to respond to terrorist hostage takings, including to establish principles to guide the Government’s response, identify triggers for Ministerial direction and engagement, establish leadership for whole of government responses to specific incidents, and provide sufficient resources to support operational requirements during critical incidents.

Status

For the 2024 Annual Report, the government provided a response and status update on the implementation of these recommendations.

Response to R1:

GAC’s Defence and Security Relations Division works with DND to ensure foreign and defence policy coherence. This collaboration ranges from monthly ADM-level meetings through the Joint Consultative Mechanism to weekly meetings between relevant divisions.

GAC and DND/CAF are developing a Memorandum of Understanding that will govern this type of collaboration and are finalizing an interdepartmental consultation framework on CAF-led cyber operations.

Response to R2:

The Minister of Foreign Affairs approved and issued a Ministerial Direction to GAC on its national security and intelligence activities in May 2022.

Response to R3:

GAC has established a unit within the Intelligence Bureau that includes the responsibilities for developing and updating operational policy on GAC’s intelligence activities. Through this unit, GAC is continuing to put in place new and updated governance mechanisms for the Department’s security and intelligence activities, including with partners.

Special Report on the Federal Policing Mandate of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police

Description

An overview of the RCMP’s national security and intelligence activities found in its Federal Policing mandate. It examines the Federal Policing mandate’s programs, activities, structures, authorities and accountabilities. The report also examines the capabilities and results of the mandate’s programs and activities and how the RCMP prioritizes and conducts federal criminal investigations in areas of national security, complex crimes and major organized crime. Finally, the report highlights the role played by key domestic and international partnerships.

Recommendations

R1.

The Minister of Public Safety provide clear and regular direction to the RCMP to strengthen Federal Policing, including in areas of governance; financial controls; human resources, recruiting and training; and information management. In each of these areas, this direction should include the Minister’s expectations, clear interim and final objectives, and clear performance measures.

R2.

The Government recognize that Federal Policing resources are insufficient to fulfil its various mandates and put in place measures to ensure Federal resources are appropriated fully to Federal priorities.

R3.

The Government ensure that Federal Policing has the sufficient level of autonomy to fulfill its mandates and implement any organizational changes necessary to do so.

R4.

As part of its deliberations, the Government consider amendments to the RCMP Act, including to define police independence and provide reporting obligations for the Federal Policing mandate (similar to the CSIS Act).

R5.

Federal Policing develop appropriate performance measures that better reflect the complexity of its operations and outcomes. These measures should be fully supported internally by data collection, analysis and reporting.

Status:

The government provided a response to this report in May 2024. The response, submitted by the Minister of Public Safety, is reproduced below.

Response to R1:

The Government of Canada supports this recommendation.

The Government recognizes the critical role of the Minister of Public Safety in supporting democratic accountability and transparency with respect to the RCMP, including by providing clear direction to the Commissioner of the RCMP as provided for in the Royal Canadian Mounted Police Act. Any ministerial direction provided, either via Ministerial Directives or as part of the RCMP Commissioner’s mandate commitments, must respect the operational independence of the police in performing their law enforcement functions of investigation, arrest, laying charges, etc. Ministerial Direction must also respect the Commissioner’s powers and responsibilities as a Deputy Head, as conferred by the Financial Administration Act and various Treasury Board policies.

This recommendation aligns with recommendations made by the Mass Casualty Commission specifically that, “the Minister of Public Safety establish clear priorities for the RCMP, retaining the tasks that are suitable to a federal policing agency, and identifying what responsibilities are better reassigned to new or other policing agencies (including, potentially to new policing agencies). This may entail a reconfiguration of policing in Canada and a new approach to federal financial support for provincial and municipal policing services.” The Government of Canada acknowledges the need to provide clear and ongoing direction to the RCMP and establish national priorities, expectations, objectives and performance measures, particularly in areas where federal policing faces challenges in fulfilling its mandate. As such, consideration will be given to this matter as the Government of Canada explores options to enhance the oversight and governance of the RCMP, and build a more sustainable and accountable policing model that better meets the needs of Canadians and the communities it serves.

Response to R2:

The Government of Canada supports this recommendation.

The Government agrees that having a well-resourced national police service is a priority. The Committee noted a decline in the RCMP’s capacity to effectively execute its federal policing mandate and responsibilities, including its ability to keep pace with the evolving threat environment in recent years. The Committee also noted that federal policing resources are often used to support provincial and territorial policing priorities through the contract policing program. Contract policing partners, within the context of the assessment of contract policing, have also noted similar concerns regarding diminishing RCMP federal policing capacity, and RCMP human resource management challenges, more broadly. Some jurisdictions have noted that these capacity challenges have impacted the RCMP’s ability to undertake organized crime and money laundering investigations as identified in British Columbia’s Cullen Commission report.

The RCMP has taken steps to manage federal policing capacity challenges, including work to ensure that federal policing resources are deployed to the highest priority investigations and to better align the footprint of federal resources with the criminal threat environment. The RCMP is also piloting a new approach to recruiting investigators, the Federal Policing Recruit Development Program, designed to stream new recruits directly into federal policing. However, more work is needed. This includes providing clarity around the RCMP’s federal and contract mandates, prioritization of resources, and establishing appropriate operational and governance structures, along with recruitment and training strategies to attract and develop the specialized skills needed to support federal policing operations and investigations.

The Government of Canada recognizes that, in addition to diminished capacity, demands on the RCMP to support increasingly complex and intersecting federal policing priorities has resulted in resourcing constraints across all investigative streams, creating workload pressures, and leading ultimately to fewer complex federal policing investigations. Currently, the RCMP must reallocate resources to be able to respond to new threats and priorities.

The RCMP will continue to consider how best to prioritize its available federal resources (i.e., financial and human) to areas of responsibility that are uniquely entrusted to the federal government, such as national security, the most serious and complex transnational organized crime threats and protective policing, in order to ensure the safety and security of Canadians, our democracy, critical infrastructure, and economy.

Response to R3:

The Government of Canada supports this recommendation.

The RCMP’s Federal Policing Program does what no other police of jurisdiction in Canada is mandated to do: target the highest-level criminal threats to Canada, Canadians and Canadian interests both at home and abroad. Informed by extensive reviews, the program has advanced a number of changes to fulfill its mandate to maximum effect. Progress has been made in scoping the federal policing mandate and associated activities, and defining roles and responsibilities between the federal and contract mandates. Further changes to enhance accountability are in progress, including realigning federal resources under the Deputy Commissioner of Federal Policing rather than under the Divisional Commanding Officers, as well as taking steps to implement a regional model of federal policing wherein resources are located where the highest threats are present. Implementation of these proposed changes would require further work and engagement to be successful. When fully implemented, these measures will move the program in the right direction. However, work remains to address the challenges it faces within the current organizational and threat environment.

The Government of Canada recognizes the importance of ensuring that federal policing is strongly positioned to respond to the challenges it faces in an evolving criminal landscape and that changes are needed to ensure the program is able to fulfill its mandate to protect Canada and Canadians. The federal government directly contributes to policing in Canada largely through the provision and delivery of RCMP federal, contract and national policing services. While efficiencies exist with this model (e.g., economies of scale, sharing of specialized resources, agility to redeploy resources for emergencies or special events), the delivery of front-line contract policing services through provincial, territorial and municipal Police Service Agreements also creates challenges for the RCMP.

The Police Service Agreements are complex to administer and present unique challenges in areas including funding and governance. In particular, the current contracts do not reflect the full and true cost of service delivery and, as noted by the NSICOP report, meeting contract obligations can constrain the organization’s ability to deliver other mandates including federal policing.Further, given contractual obligations, resources to address local policing demands often must be prioritized over federal policing and other activities, including in the context of budget restraint and reduction exercises. This has resulted in diminished capacity for federal policing and critical enabling national police services. The Government of Canada recognizes that a better balance is required to ensure the RCMP is resourced to deliver on its important mandates.

Response to R4:

The Government of Canada acknowledges this recommendation and is committed to considering it in concert with related recommendations made in the final reports of the Mass Casualty Commission and the Public Order Emergency Commission.

The Committee noted that there is no federal statutory definition of police independence, but that the concept – and indeed the relationship between the Minister and police – has thus far been defined through case law and informed by commissions of inquiry. Both the Mass Casualty Commission’s Final Report and the Public Order Emergency Commission Final Report contained related recommendations.

While not a statutory requirement, the RCMP has taken steps to support increased transparency and accountability, developing its first annual report on its federal policing activities in 2021. The RCMP Federal Policing Annual Report provides a comprehensive account of federal policing’s unique mandate within the RCMP and key achievements from 2021. The 2022 Federal Policing Annual Report is forthcoming.

The accountability and transparency of the police is of critical importance for our democratic institutions and for community safety. Consideration will be given to the various mechanisms and models, including those similar to the CSIS Act, that could be used to increase these elements of RCMP governance and reporting, especially as the Government continues to advance its mandate to enhance the oversight mechanisms for the RCMP.

Response to R5:

The Government of Canada supports this recommendation.

Federal policing continually seeks to develop and improve its performance measures and the data on which they rely. Today, data must be viewed as a strategic asset and managed accordingly to support effective and informed decision making including at the operational level. The complex investigations and the rapidly shifting operational environment that characterize the federal mandate can be difficult to quantify. The RCMP requires a comprehensive solution to its growing data management requirements that will allow it to measure performance, and assess return on investment for complicated investigative and enforcement work across the wide range of federal priorities and responsibilities.

The RCMP recognizes the need for accurate, reliable operational data as a crucial and foundational component of effective performance measurement, and is seeking opportunities to invest in modern data management systems that meet the needs of the federal policing mandate, and the RCMP more broadly, in a 21st century context.Modern policing is data-driven, and the federal mandate requires dedicated enterprise solutions for information management that can capture critical operational data in a cohesive, consistent, and accessible manner across federal policing, as well as facilitate information and intelligence sharing with domestic and international partners. Performance measurement for federal policing has improved substantially in recent years, with multiple initiatives under way to connect performance indicators with outcomes, improve data integrity, and enhance analysis and reporting. For example, federal policing has developed a Major Project Prioritization Dashboard based on detailed analysis of operational plans, allowing for constant real time assessment of the highest priority files to inform operational resource allocation decisions. Moving forward, investments in data systems, data integrity and data analytics will increasingly represent investments in the future of policing.