Weapons of Mass Destruction
National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Annual Report 2020
Overview
97. The Committee identified weapons of mass destruction and the proliferation of dual-use materials and technologies as a national security threat in its 2018 annual report. These weapons have the potential to cause indiscriminate and mass casualties, and significant and long-term environmental and economic damage. These weapons and their proliferation have not posed an increased threat to Canada in the past two years. However, a number of trends, described below, may affect this assessment. These trends include: the global nuclear disarmament regime has weakened since 2018 and the continued used of chemical weapons by state and non-state actors has undermined international norms; and technological advancements have increased the accessibility of dual-use materials and facilitated the development and delivery of chemical and biological weapons. Moreover, Canada remains a target of illicit and covert procurement of dual-use technologies by several state actors. At the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed significant vulnerabilities in state economies, health sectors and response systems.
Description of the threat
98. The development, use and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction poses a threat to the security of Canada and its allies. These chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons have the potential to cause indiscriminate and mass casualties, and significant and long-term environmental and economic damage. Footnote 157 The proliferation of materials and technology that couId facilitate foreign states or non-state actors in the development and use of these weapons - notably delivery systems and dual-use items, including their associated intellectual property - is another issue of concern. Footnote 158
99. The disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been a priority of the UN since its inception. An international treaty seeking to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and eventually eliminate them, as well as conventions preventing the development, transfer or use of chemical and biological weapons, have received almost universal acceptance. Footnote 159
100. Canada is an active participant in international disarmament fora and has developed an interdepartmental counter-proliferation framework to prevent the illicit acquisition, export or diversion of items of concern. Footnote 160 Canadian business and research institutions are active in nuclear energy, biotechnology and chemical sectors, rendering them targets for proliferators and other malicious actors. Footnote 161 The security and intelligence community works to address the proliferation threat through the administration of laws to prevent the export of dual-use technologies, reviews of investments that may be injurious to national security, and investigations of individuals or companies suspected of illicit activities in this area. The RCMP, conducted *** investigation(s) related to this issue between July 2018 and September 2020. Footnote 162 In this same period, CSIS conducted warranted investigation(s) related to weapons of mass destruction against *** target(s) and*** organization(s). Footnote 163
101. Disarmament and non-proliferation have been relatively effective since the arms control regime governing these weapons has been in place. Only four states have acquired nuclear weapons since the coming into force of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1970, the total inventories of nuclear warheads throughout the world has declined, and nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since 1945. Footnote 164 Since relevant conventions came into force, there have been no significant large-scale biological weapons attacks and 96 percent of declared chemical weapons stockpiles have been eliminated. Footnote 165 However, developments over the past several years suggest these trends may be reversing. According to the Privy Council Office, the degradation of global arms control frameworks, the development of new weapons systems by several nuclear-armed states, and the continued targeting of Canada by state and non-state actors for dual-use technologies for new weapons development are cause for concern. Footnote 166
Nuclear Weapons
102. In January 2020, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists concluded that "the world is sleepwalking its way through a newly unstable nuclear landscape." Footnote 167 Two significant trends in the area of nuclear weapons have emerged in the past two years: the weakening of the nuclear disarmament regime, and the deterioration of the nuclear safety enviranment.
103. The nuclear disarmament regime is erading for a number of reasons. First, long-standing bilateral arms contrai agreements between the two largest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia, are at risk. The United States withdrew from the lntermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019 after alleging that Russia was in violation of the treaty. The only remaining bilateral arms contrai agreement between the two countries, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), expires in 2021 and its renewal is uncertain. Footnote 168 Second, disarmament negotiations with North Korea have stalled, and the unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), a multilateral agreement to limit Iran's ability to develop a nuclear weapon, has prampted Iran to resume some previously restricted elements of its nuclear pragram. Footnote 169 Finally, progress on nuclear disarmament by nuclear weapon states is slow. While the total global inventory of nuclear warheads has declined, nuclear weapon states continue to modernize their weapons systems and have a poor record of implementing disarmament commitments agreed to during past review conferences on the Treaty on the Non-Praliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Footnote 170 This slow pace has led to grawing frustration among non nuclear weapons states and an increasing divide between the two graups, potentially undermining the global disarmament regime as a whole. Footnote 171
104. The security and intelligence community has highlighted the continued modernization of missile systems. According to DND/CAF, China remains at the forefront of the testing and development of ballistic missiles, while North Korea, Iran and Russia have continued a steady pace of missile testing in the same period. Footnote 172
105. The threat to Canada from the use of nuclear weapons is limited to Russia and China, who would likely consider striking Canadian targets during a nuclear conflict with the United States. DND/CAF assesses that while bath states continue to modernize their nuclear arsenals, their primary strategic objectives remain deterring a major conventional or nuclear attack. Footnote 173 North Korea's nuclear weapons and missile capabilities have increased since 2018 and it continues to develop capabilities to strike the United States. While concerns exist regarding Iran's nuclear-related activities, [*** This sentence was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentence describes a DND/CAF assessment. ***] Footnote 174
106. The potential for terrorist groups to acquire nuclear weapons is not of significant concern for the security and intelligence community. CSIS assesses [*** Two sentences were revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences describe a CSIS assessment. ***] Footnote 175 *** Footnote 176 From a nuclear and radiological safety perspective, the International Atomic Energy Agency has recorded over 450 incidents of smuggling or unauthorized possession of nuclear materials (not weapons) and over 700 incidents involving theft or loss of such material since the 199Os. Footnote 177 The Nuclear Threat lnitiative's 2020 Nuclear Security Index assesses that progress on global nuclear security has "slowed significantly" since 2018 and that remaining security gaps leave nuclear materials and facilities vulnerable to threat and sabotage. Footnote 178 Some experts have also raised concerns regarding the risk of cyber attacks against nuclear facilities. Footnote 179 In the Canadian context, however, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission notes that all operating nuclear facilities in Canada are cornpliant with strict cyber security regulations, and are regularly reviewed and inspected to ensure continued compliance. Footnote 180
Chemical weapons
107. Another risk is weakened norms surrounding the use of chemical weapons. In the past decade, chemical weapons have been used repeatedly in conflicts and targeted assassinations. Over the course of Syria's civil war, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-UN Joint lnvestigative Mission team found that chemical weapons were used on several occasions by bath state and non-state actors since 2013. Footnote 181 DND/CAF assesses that the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons multiple times since the outbreak of the war and that Daesh has used chemical agents in*** Syria *** Footnote 182 The use of chemical weapons in targeted assassinations in the past three years, despite sanctions and international condemnation, further undermines norms against the use of such weapons. Footnote 183 In February 2017, the North Korean government ordered the assassination of Kim Jong-nam, the brother of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, with the VX nerve agent in Malaysia. Footnote 184 In March 2018, Russian intelligence agents poisoned former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter Yulia with a nerve agent in Salisbury, United Kingdom. Footnote 185 In August 2020, Russian intelligence agents poisoned Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny with the same class of nerve agent in Russia. Footnote 186
108. The proliferation of chemical weapons is an added concern. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, chemical weapons are "the most widely used and proliferated weapon of mass destruction." Footnote 187 Some of the agents used to develop these chemical weapons have legitimate uses and are highly regulated. However, technological developments in the past decade, including technologies and supply chains that can facilitate the delivery of these weapons and materials, may complicate non proliferation efforts in the future. Footnote 188 CSIS suggests that recent incidents of chemical weapons use have increased public awareness and knowledge about these weapons, and could therefore change the chemical weapons threat environment. Footnote 189 Researchers have noted that terrorist groups such as al-Qaida have sought to obtain chemical weapons and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons UN Joint lnvestigative Mission team identified instances of chemical weapons use by Daesh in Syria. Footnote 190 CSIS assesses [*** Two sentences were revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences describe a CSIS assessment of risks associated with terrorists and proliferation. ***] Footnote 191 *** Footnote 192
Biological weapons
109. Similar concerns have been voiced about the proliferation of biological weapons and countries' capacity to respond to a large-scale biological attack. Footnote 193 In March 2020, the UN Secretary General warned that "scientific advances are reducing technical barriers which earlier limited the potential of biological weapons." Footnote 194 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists echoed this concern, noting that "genetic engineering and synthetic biology technologies are now increasingly affordable, readily available and spreading rapidly." Footnote 195 While these technologies have legitimate uses, they can also be used in the deployment of biological weapons. The Biological Weapons Convention has no formai verification mechanism. While no country admits to having a biological warfare program, DND/CAF assesses that specific countries maintain such programs *** Footnote 196 The UN Secretary General has highlighted the importance of building state capacity to respond to a biological attack if prevention fails. Footnote 197 The challenges many countries are facing in responding to the global COVID-19 pandemic suggest that capabilities to respond to a large-scale biological attack may be limited.
Dual-use technologies
110. According to CSIS, Canada remains a target of illegal and covert procurement and technology transfer by *** Footnote 198 [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph describes CSIS assessments of a state's methods and objectives, and concerns arising from new technologies. ***] Footnote 199 *** Footnote 200 *** Footnote 201
COVID-19 pandemic
111. The COVID-19 pandemic has not had a significant impact on the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed significant weaknesses in state health sectors and response systems.
Key conclusions
112. The security environment surrounding weapons of mass destruction has not improved since 2018. The nuclear arms control regime has seen important setbacks in the past two years. Long-standing international norms against chemical weapons have been effectively undermined by the use of these weapons by state and non-state actors in conflicts and targeted assassinations. The use of biological weapons remains rare, but the verification regime is weak and the challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic suggest that states' capacity to respond may be limited. The relative accessibility of chemical and biological materials, and the proliferation of dual-use technologies, is of particular concern for Canada.