Chapter 2: Foreign Policy Coherence
Special Report on the National Security and Intelligence Activities of Global Affairs Canada
44. The Department's broadest role in the security and intelligence community is to ensure foreign policy coherence. The Minister of Foreign Affairs is both responsible for advancing Canada's foreign policy interests and accountable for the foreign policy implications of the government's activities domestically and abroad. In effect, the Minister of Foreign Affairs is responsible for managing the government's foreign policy risk for security and intelligence activities with a foreign nexus. Given this broad responsibility and accountability, one of GAC's core functions is to ensure that security and intelligence organizations consider the full range of Canada's foreign policy interests when determining how to respond to a security threat or when planning an intelligence activity abroad.
45. How GAC does so in practice is through a variety of formal and informal mechanisms. Domestically, the Department consults regularly with its core partners in the community through formalized processes and committee structures. Globally, the heads of Canadian missions (embassies, consulates) play a central role in ensuring the foreign policy coherence of the security and intelligence community's activities abroad. Finally, the Department's foreign policy perspective and responsibilities are a central consideration in the government's broader response to a wide range of national security threats, most prominently hostile activity by state actors. This chapter examines the different facets of GAC's role in ensuring the national security and intelligence activities of other departments and agencies are aligned with Canada's foreign policy.
Formal engagement with security and intelligence partners
46. One of the principal ways GAC ensures foreign policy coherence is through regular consultation with its core security and intelligence partners on strategic and operational matters. In the past decade, the Department's consultations with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) and, to a more limited extent, the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF), have become increasingly formalized. This evolution reflects changes in the activities and authorities of the Department's security and intelligence partners, and a growing recognition of GAC's role in managing foreign policy risk.
Canadian Security Intelligence Service
47. GAC's relationship with CSIS, Canada's security intelligence service, dates back to that organization's founding in 1984. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (CSIS Act) provides a role for the Minister of Foreign Affairs in requesting the collection of foreign intelligence within Canada (see paragraphs 88-96) and requires CSIS to consult GAC prior to entering into arrangements with foreign entities. Footnote 84 In the subsequent decades, the two organizations have concluded a number of arrangements formalizing and strengthening consultation on activities and operations domestically and abroad.
Joint Management Team
48. Cooperation between the two organizations was formalized in 2009 with the signing of a joint GAC-CSIS Memorandum of Understanding on Intelligence Cooperation ***. In addition to outlining the reporting relationships and accountability for ***, the agreement established the Joint Management Team structure as the principal forum for intelligence cooperation and coordination between the two organizations. Footnote 85 Under the 2009 agreement, Joint Management Team meetings were to be held monthly at the director general-level between GAC's Intelligence Bureau and CSIS's *** division. The Joint Management Team's mandate was to manage all aspects of intelligence cooperation between the two organizations, from coordination of and collaboration on activities and operations to resolving potential challenges in the relationship. In 2013, GAC and CSIS created an Executive Joint Management Team, co-chaired by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director of CSIS, and tasked it with addressing high-priority strategic issues. Footnote 86 Though this executive team had no fixed schedule, meeting records from 2015 to 2020 suggests discussions took place annually, with a gap in 2017. In 2019, the two organizations made the director general-level meetings that had been supporting the Executive Team a formal part of the Joint Management Team structure in an effort to improve working-level collaboration. Footnote 87 This group meets quarterly to discuss all aspects of cooperation, including activities to collect foreign intelligence in Canada, CSIS foreign relationships, and foreign policy risk assessments.
Arrangements and information sharing with foreign entities
49. Under the CSIS Act, the Minister of Public Safety must consult the Minister of Foreign Affairs prior to authorizing CSIS to enter into an arrangement or otherwise cooperate with a foreign government, institution or international organization. Footnote 88 In practice, the consultation process begins with a written request from CSIS's *** Unit to GAC's Intelligence Bureau with the rationale and scope of the proposed arrangement. Footnote 89 Once the Intelligence Bureau confirms its support, Public Safety prepares the formal correspondence from the Minister of Public Safety to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. GAC, in turn, prepares briefing material and correspondence for its minister outlining the foreign policy considerations of the arrangement and raising potential human rights concerns associated with the foreign partner. Footnote 90
50. While the consultation process for foreign arrangements is long-standing, GAC has not developed any policies or procedures to govern or guide its consultations on such arrangements. The Committee gleaned GAC's internal process from a series of memoranda to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, rather than from clear procedures outlining the Department's consultation process and considerations for supporting or opposing an arrangement. The Department has no internal mechanisms to review the status of previously approved arrangements or any reporting requirements to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the status of those arrangements. Footnote 91 By way of comparison, CSIS has formal procedures to govern its internal process for requesting a section 17 arrangement and reports annually to the Minister of Public Safety on the status of section 17 arrangements, in accordance with the agency's Ministerial Direction for Accountability. Footnote 93
51. Separate from the section 17 process, CSIS consults GAC on informat ion sharing with foreign ent ities through its Intelligence Sharing Evaluation Committee. This committee is responsible for determining whether to share information with a foreign entity while ensuring CSIS's compliance with the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act. Footnote 93 GAC provides a foreign policy and human rights perspect ive to the committee's deliberations. Footnote 94
Foreign policy risk assessments
52. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged informat ion. *** ] Two important operational and legislative developments spurred closer operational consultation between GAC and CSIS. The first ***. Footnote 95 The event had important implications for Canada's bilateral relations and confirmed the need for stronger consultation between the two organizations. Footnote 96 The second important development was the passing of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2015, which granted CSIS the authority to take measures within or outside of Canada to reduce a threat to national security. Footnote 97 In this context, senior officials recognized a need for greater accountability, including a new role for GAC to assess the foreign policy risk of such measures. Footnote 98 The role was formalized in CSIS's 2015 Ministerial Directive on Operations and Accountability, which directs CSIS to maintain "a robust consultation mechanism with [GAC] to facilitate joint consideration and management of the risk of operational activity outside of Canada." Footnote 99 The directive added an addit ional requ irement for consultations with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Footnote 100 and laid out GAC's four foreign policy risk considerations.
53. In 2016, GAC and CSIS developed two formal consultation mechanisms to guide the Department's provision of foreign policy risk assessments. The *** first consultation mechanism guides GAC's provision of foreign policy risk assessments for CSIS operations in the context of national security investigations under section 12 of the CSIS Act. Footnote 101 The *** second consultation mechanism guides the provision of foreign policy risk assessment for CSIS's threat reduction measures under section 12.1 of the CSIS Act. Footnote 102 Under both mechanisms, CSIS consults GAC on all operations with a foreign policy nexus, in other words, operations taking place outside of Canada or which could affect foreign policy interests or objectives. [*** Two sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described different requirements between the two mechanisms. ***]
54. In practice, CSIS *** initiates the above consultation processes by providing *** of the CSIS operation and *** to GAC's Intelligence Bureau. Footnote 103 The Department's Intelligence Bureau subsequently conducts internal consultations with relevant stakeholders, including the geographic desks, relevant heads of mission, the Department of Justice and the Department's legal services unit (both as required), to assess the operation's potential impact on Canada's bilateral or multilateral relations, and compliance with international legal obligations and sanctions legislation. Footnote 104 GAC may request additional details or discussion prior to completing its risk assessment. Footnote 105 CSIS then incorporates GAC's assessment into its broader risk assessment to determine the operation's overall risk level. Footnote 106 GAC and CSIS officials explained that their staff remain in close contact throughout the consultation process to ensure effective information sharing and risk mitigation for all operations. Footnote 107 GAC noted that consultations have increased since the mechanisms were introduced, with the Department providing some *** risk assessments in 2019 and *** in 2020.
55. The joint management teams at the director general and deputy minister levels govern the joint implementation of the two consultation mechanisms. In support of this governance structure, GAC and CSIS jointly prepare an annual report for the Joint Management Team on the implementation of the *** Consultation Mechanism. These reports include the total number of consultations and a breakdown of the amount of operations assessed to pose a low, medium or high foreign policy risk. Footnote 108 The reports also note ongoing challenges in the consultation process and potential areas for improvement. Reports from *** to *** noted an improvement in the consultation process and identified where the two organizations could reduce the number of consultations for operations [*** Two sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described risks and information sharing. ***] with a foreign policy nexus. Between 2015 and 2018, CSIS conducted *** threat reduction measures with a foreign policy nexus. Footnote 109
56. From an internal governance perspective, GAC developed an internal consultation chart and an approvals template for its risk assessment process in 2021. Footnote 110 However, the two-page chart provides limited details on the consultation process. For example, it does not include a comprehensive list of who to consult within the Department or how to document those consultations. The one-page template, in turn, provides little detail on the process or criteria upon which assessments are reviewed and approved. The Department has no other policies, procedures or internal committee structures to guide or oversee its provision of foreign policy risk assessments, nor does it have any reporting requirements to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on its provision of foreign policy risk assessments for CSIS operations. GAC explained that, despite an absence of formal policies or procedures, officials consult regularly and substantively with relevant units within the Department to ensure a comprehensive assessment of risk. Footnote 111 By way of comparison, CSIS has formal policies and procedures to govern the conduct of its activities under sections 12 (national security investigations) and 12.1 (threat reduction measures) of the CSIS Act. Footnote 112 These documents outline the internal risk assessment, approval process and reporting requirements for all operational activities conducted abroad under section 12 and section 12.1. In accordance with its Ministerial Direction for Accountability, CSIS also reports annually to the Minister of Public Safety on its operational activities abroad and its use of threat reduction measures. Footnote 113
Other areas of coordination and consultation
57. GAC and CSIS cooperate on broader elements of CSIS's activities abroad. Under their *** Memorandum of Understanding, CSIS must consult GAC and receive the concurrence of the relevant head of mission prior to the deployment of a CSIS officer ***. The Director General Joint Management Team reviews proposals to establish new *** positions abroad and both the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director of CSIS are briefed annually on these developments. Footnote 114 In a similar vein, CSIS and GAC developed agreements for ***. In both cases, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Director of CSIS exchanged letters establishing the terms and conditions ***. Footnote 115 Finally, under its 2015 Ministerial Directive on Operations and Accountability, CSIS must inform GAC of its designation of a dangerous operating environment in which certified CSIS employees are permitted to carry firearms. Footnote 116 GAC and CSIS have procedures to notify the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, the relevant head of mission and the Director General of GAC's Intelligence Bureau when such environments are designated and when armed employees will be travelling to such an area. Footnote 117
Communications Security Establishment
58. GAC's collaboration with CSE, Canada's national signals intelligence agency for foreign intelligence and the technical authority for cybersecurity and information assurance, dates back to the creation of CSE in 1946. GAC has long been a client of CSE's foreign intelligence collection ***. While GAC has had a formal consultation role for some of CSE's most sensitive activities since 2002, the coming into force of the CSE Act in 2019 provided GAC a more significant role in CSE's new authorities for cyber operations.
Senior Management Team
59. GAC and CSE formalized their cooperation with the signing of a General Framework Agreement in 2009. The agreement recognized the organizations' cooperation in the collection of foreign intelligence, their long-standing collaboration on the implementation of Canada's Export Control legislation, and their response and handling of cyber incidents targeting GAC. Footnote 118 The agreement also created a Senior Management Team structure to serve as a principal forum for discussion on their respective plans and priorities, areas of collaboration and dispute resolution. The Senior Management Team meets quarterly and is co-chaired by the Director General of GAC's Intelligence Bureau and the Director General of CSE's Strategic Policy and Planning Division. A review of records from 2015 to 2019 showed consistent discussions on intelligence priorities, ***, section 16 and relevant legal and policy updates.
***
60. The first formal agreement on consultation between CSE and GAC concerned the agency's *** activities. These activities use *** for the purpose of collecting foreign intelligence. In 2002, GAC and CSE signed a memorandum of understanding under which CSE would inform GAC prior to undertaking its most *** outside of Canada. The agreement also granted GAC a role in challenging CSE's conduct of certain activities ***. Footnote 119 While the 2002 memorandum of understanding remains in place, the two organizations streamlined elements of the agreement in 2015. Footnote 120 Currently, CSE is required to provide GAC with quarterly email updates *** and prior notification ***. Footnote 121
Foreign arrangements
61. Similar to CSIS, CSE is required to consult GAC prior to entering into an arrangement with a foreign government institution. This requirement was first out lined in a policy document, the June 2001 Ministerial Directive Accountability Framework, then formalized in the 2006 and 2012 Ministerial Directives on Third Party Re lationships. Footnote 122 This latest directive required CSE to prepare a rationale for the establishment of a potential relationship, including expected benefits, the nature of the relationship, possible foreign policy implications and any associated risks. In doing so, CSE was required to consult the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs on potential foreign policy implications of the arrangement. Finally, CSE was required to conduct an annual review of all of its foreign arrangements to assess risk and ensure their continued alignment with Canada's foreign policy interests. Footnote 123 The coming into force of the CSE Act in 2019 put this requirement into statute, providing a formal role for the Minister of Foreign Affairs with regards to CSE's foreign arrangements. Similar to GAC's responsibilities under the CSIS Act, the CSE Act requires the Minister of National Defence to consult the Minister of Foreign Affairs prior to approving CSE's arrangement with foreign states or institutions. Footnote 124 Given the recent nature of this authority, CSE has not consulted GAC prior to entering into such an arrangement at the time of writing. Footnote 125 The Department does not have internal policies or proced ures to govern its role in this process.
Defensive cyber operations
62. The CSE Act granted GAC a formal consultation role in CSE's new authority for defensive cyber operations. The Act authorizes CSE to conduct cyber operations to protect government networks or systems designated as being of importance to the government. Footnote 126 In the conduct of this activity, CSE can target foreign cyber threat activity to diminish or disrupt the activity. Footnote 127 Similar to CSE's active cyber operations (see paragraphs 97-103), defensive cyber operations have important foreign policy implications, including that their exposure or discovery could damage bilateral relations, their conduct could violate international legal norms or obligations ***. In recognition of these implications, the CSE Act requires the Minister of National Defence to consult the Minister of Foreign Affairs prior to issuing an authorization for defensive cyber operations. Footnote 128
63. The Minister of National Defence issued the first authorization for defensive cyber operations in *** 2019. Footnote 129 CSE officials developed this authorization in consultation with GAC. In recognition of the potential risks posed by these new activities, the authorization ***. Footnote 130 At the operational level, GAC provides foreign policy risk assessments for all of CSE's planned defensive cyber operations. As part of its assessment of the proposed operation, GAC considers potential implications for Canadian interests, the operation's compliance with international law and cyber norms, alignment with broader foreign policy interests, the nature of the target (***) and whether the operations ***. Unlike risk assessments for active cyber operations, which are intended to fulfill the statutory requirement for the Minister to consent to or request authorizations for active cyber operations, GAC's risk assessment for defensive cyber operations are only intended to inform CSE's decision-making process and operational planning (however, the Department noted that the same level of effort is required to support the Minister's consultation for defensive cyber operations and for the Minister to request or consent to active cyber operations). Footnote 131 Between *** and ***, CSE planned but did not conduct any defensive cyber operations, because separate defensive cyber measures taken by CSE obviated the need for the planned cyber operations. Footnote 132
64. CSE and GAC's collaboration on defensive cyber operations is governed through the Active Cyber Operation/Defensive Cyber Operations Working Group (see paragraph 186). Footnote 133 GAC's internal policies and procedures for the governance of its role in this process consist of a risk assessment template and chart. Until March 2022, the Department had not instituted any formal reporting requirements to the Minister of Foreign Affairs with respect to defensive cyber operations. By contrast, CSE has developed policies, procedures and oversight committee structures to govern its cyber operations (see paragraph 102-103). CSE's Ministerial Authorization also imposes reporting requirements to the Minister of National Defence, which include quarterly updates on defensive cyber operations and, consistent with provisions in the CSE Act, a report within 90 days of the expiry of the authorization on the outcome of the activities carried out, the latter of which is also provided to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Footnote 134
Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces
65. The Canadian Armed Forces are an important part of Canada's foreign policy. Given the significant scope and potential sensitivity of CAF's activities abroad, including those directly related to national security and intelligence, there is a clear need for close coordination between DND/CAF and GAC to ensure foreign policy coherence. However, aside from the engagement on proposed memoranda to Cabinet common to all departments, consultations between DND/CAF and GAC have remained largely ad hoc and informal until recently. Footnote 135 In 2016, GAC and DND/CAF started to develop a number of more formal and structured processes in response to government direction to improve consultation between the two organizations. These are described below.
Joint Consultative Mechanism
66. In 2016, GAC and DND/CAF established the Joint Consultative Mechanism as part of a joint commitment in the government's Middle East strategy to ensure alignment between foreign and defence policy. Footnote 136 Initially developed as a forum to discuss and coordinate the Middle East strategy and DND/CAF's Operation IMPACT, GAC and DND/CAF have since expanded the mechanism to include discussions on a broad range of issues, including current CAF operations, Canada's peacekeeping commitments, membership in multilateral organizations like NATO and the United Nations (UN), and GAC's administration of the Export and Import Controls Act. Footnote 137 The mechanism consists of discussions held as needed at the assistant deputy minister (ADM) level to discuss recent or upcoming events or developments and ensure mutual awareness, alignment and coordination between the two organizations on strategic issues of mutual interest. Footnote 138 However, GAC officials noted that these consultations have yet to reach a sufficient level of detail for GAC to ensure that DND/CAF activities - particularly special forces, intelligence and cyber operations - are consistently aligned with foreign policy objectives. Footnote 139
Consultation mechanisms in development
67. More recently, the Prime Minister, the ministers of Foreign Affairs and National Defence, and this Committee have called for more robust consultation between the organizations. In its 2018 review of defence intelligence, NSICOP identified a weakness in consultation between GAC and DND/CAF and recommended that the organizations develop a formal interdepartmental consultation mechanism for the deployment of defence intelligence capabilities. Footnote 140 In his 2019 mandate letters, the Prime Minister directed the ministers of Foreign Affairs and National Defence to work together to ensure CAF deployments align with Canada's foreign policy interests, priorities and multilateral commitments. Footnote 141 Both ministers further highlighted the imperative for more robust operational consultation in subsequent years. In May 2019, the Minister of National Defence directed his officials to work with GAC to develop a consultation framework for the CAF's activities in the South China Sea. [*** One sentence was removed due to a government claim of Cabinet confidence. The Committee disagrees that the claim is valid. ***]. Footnote 142 These latter two initiatives are important: the first because of the sensitivity of Canadian military operations around Taiwan and the South China Sea ***; the second because CAF cyber operations hold the same risks as CSE active cyber operations, but are not subject to the same statutory requirements, including Ministerial approvals and consultations.
68. In response, GAC and DND/CAF have started to develop consultation mechanisms across a number of areas. First, in response to NSICOP's 2018 recommendation, the two organizations drafted a plan and memorandum of understanding to guide consultation on the deployment of defence intelligence capabilities. Footnote 143 The draft includes provisions for annual briefings on ongoing and projected defence intelligence activities, briefings on likely defence intelligence support for Cabinet-approved operations, quarterly meetings between GAC's Intelligence Bureau and the Canadian Forces Intelligence Command, and the development of GAC foreign policy risk assessments for defence intelligence deployments requiring ministerial approval. Footnote 144 The second mechanism is a draft policy framework governing DND/CAF's activities in the South China Sea. The document states that DND/CAF will consult GAC annually on its Navy 'sail plan' in the region, and outlines the scope of consultation with GAC according to the nature of the activity or operation. Footnote 145 Finally, DND/CAF and GAC are developing a formal consultation mechanism on DND/CAF active cyber operations. The draft document proposes the creation of a forum with CSE and GAC for consultation on cyber operations and the development of a governance framework for consultation. Footnote 146 None of these mechanisms has been finalized.
Community-wide committees
69. In addition to formalized engagement with partners, GAC ensures foreign policy coherence through its participation in key interdepartmental forums for national security and intelligence. The Department participates in three deputy minister-level committees: the Committee on Operations, which meets weekly and covers ongoing operations in the national security and intelligence community; the Committee on National Security, which meets monthly to examine broader policy frameworks for national security and intelligence; and the Intelligence Committee, which meets monthly to discuss a range of matters, including the review of intelligence assessments with a view to evaluating their implications for Canada. Footnote 147 All three committees are supported by equivalent discussions at the ADM level. GAC officials characterized these forums as central components of the Department's foreign policy coherence role, noting that they allow the Department to apply a foreign policy lens to the activities and policies of security and intelligence organizations. Footnote 148
70. In 2019, GAC, CSIS, CSE and DND/CAF began meeting at a director general-level through the established GAC-CSIS Joint Management Team structure to discuss issues of mutual interest. Over the course of two annual meetings, the group of four launched discussions and drafted terms of reference for a separate *** Coordination Committee. Footnote 149 According to the draft, the Committee's purpose would be to review foreign intelligence collection efforts and ensure their alignment with foreign policy priorities or objectives. It would be chaired by GAC and meet quarterly or as required. Footnote 150 In a written response to the Committee's request for further information, GAC noted that the Joint Management Team "continues to discuss the possibility of establishing" this committee, but that no final decisions has been made. Footnote 151
Heads of mission
71. Globally, GAC's heads of mission play a central role in ensuring the foreign policy coherence of the activities of other government departments abroad. Footnote 152 Under the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Act, the head of mission is responsible for the "management and direction of their mission and its activities and the supervision of the official activities of the various departments and agencies of the Government of Canada" in their area of accreditation. In practice, the head of mission is accountable to the host government for all aspects of the bilateral relationship, including activities that are not under GAC's area of responsibility. Footnote 153 Importantly, while the head of mission supervises official activities of other departments or agencies, they do not direct those organizations' programs abroad. Footnote 154 According to GAC, the head of mission and other government departments are jointly responsible "to ensure coordination between the different activities of the government, with a view to preventing different programs running counter to the government's policy objectives in the relevant foreign state." Footnote 155
72. The head of mission's supervisory role and responsibilities are set out in policy and through non-binding agreements. Under the Treasury Board Policy on Common Services, GAC is a common service provider to departments and agencies abroad. Footnote 156 In accordance with this policy, GAC and its partner departments adhere to an Interdepartmental Memorandum of Understanding on Operations and Support at Missions. This agreement sets out the arrangements for routine services, including human resources, property and information technology services, as well as the governance and accountability structure. Under the agreement's accountability structure, the program manager of every represented organization is accountable to the head of mission and their respective headquarters for the management and direction of all program-related activities. Footnote 157 In addition to the broad interdepartmental agreement, GAC has concluded separate annexes with CSIS, DND/CAF and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), related primarily to human resources, property and material.
73. The central governance mechanism through which heads of mission ensure the coherence of activities at their mission is the Committee on Mission Management. The head of mission chairs this committee, which is composed of program managers and serves as the principal forum for discussion on mission management issues, emergency planning and security, and inter-program coherence and coordination. Footnote 158 GAC acknowledged that it remains possible that neither GAC nor the head of mission are aware of certain activities, particularly in countries where security and intelligence organizations have extensive bilateral relationships with their foreign counterparts. However, the Department explained that when such issues arise, there are interdepartmental consultative governance mechanisms in place to resolve conflict and identify areas of policy clarification or change. Footnote 159
74. In the context of the review, the Committee canvassed the views of the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), CSIS, DND/CAF and the RCMP on the role of the head of mission. Their responses demonstrated a common recognition of the shared accountability for their conduct and official activities to their respective headquarters and the head of mission. However, interpretations differed on the nature and scope of the reporting relationship between deployed personnel and the head of mission. CBSA and CSIS stated that their officials were responsible for reporting on the general elements of their activities insofar as they relate to the bilateral relationship with the host country, but not on specific operational details. Footnote 160 DND/CAF distinguished between deployed Canadian defence attaches, who provide military advice and support to the head of mission, and operational CAF personnel deployed on mission, who have no formal reporting relationship with the head of mission (though they are expected to be transparent and collaborative). Footnote 161 For its part, the RCMP asserted, "there are no reporting relationships between RCMP personnel and the head of mission," pointing to the primacy of police independence. Footnote 162 These differing interpretations are largely reflected in departments' pre-deployment training materials and policies. While CBSA, CSIS and DND/CAF have developed materials outlining roles and responsibilities of deployed personnel and defence attaches related to the head of mission, the RCMP has not developed materials to this effect, noting instead that this role is "discussed informally" prior to deployment. Footnote 163
Hostile activity by state actors
75. The final mechanism through which GAC ensures foreign policy coherence can be illustrated by the government's response to hostile activity by state actors. As GAC explained, the core challenge in responding to threats from foreign states is that Canada's interests are broad and interconnected. A decision to respond to a foreign state's espionage activity, for example, could have significant implications on trade relations with that country. GAC's contribution to the government's response on this issue is to bring a foreign policy lens and "calibrate Canada's answer" to those threats. Footnote 164 The following section examines GAC's contributions to the national security review process under the Investment Canada Act, and the government's response to state-sponsored malicious cyber activity and foreign interference.
National security reviews under the Investment Canada Act
76. The Investment Canada Act allows for the review of an investment by a non-Canadian in Canada on national security grounds. Footnote 165 The Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry administers the national security review process in consultation with the Minister of Public Safety. Footnote 166 Along with core members of the security and intelligence community, GAC is listed as a prescribed investigative body under the Act's National Security Review of Investment Regulations. Organizations responsible for such reviews have developed criteria to assist in identifying investments of potential concerns, including investments by state-owned enterprises, those related to sensitive sectors or those with ties to organized crime. Footnote 167
77. The national security review process involves a series of escalating interdepartmental committees comprising the prescribed investigative bodies, which are responsible for advising the Minister of Public Safety on foreign investments of concern. Under this structure, Public Safety Canada chairs the weekly Director Review Committee, which is the forum to review all transaction notifications under the Investment Canada Act and proactively identify potential cases. Footnote 168 Transactions of concern are subsequently raised to the Director General Economic Security Management Committee, then to the equivalent ADM committee, and finally to the Deputy Minister Investment Review Committee, which ultimately advises the Minister of Public Safety. In turn, this advice informs the Minister's recommendation to the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry, who ultimately decides whether to allow an investment. Footnote 169 Once a review is under way, investigatory bodies are responsible for exploring risks, developing risk mitigation options, and providing advice to the Minister of Public Safety to inform his or her recommendation to the Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry on whether to allow the investment, to allow it with mitigation measures or to block the transaction. In 2018-2019, the government received 962 filings, of which seven underwent a national security review. Footnote 170
78. GAC provides a consolidated trade and security perspective to the national security review process. Footnote 171 For each potential decision to permit or block an investment, the Department is responsible for identifying the potential foreign and commercial implications, views and reactions of allies, effects on Canada's investment regime and foreign direct investment attraction efforts, and any ramifications on international trade law. The Department also identifies potential national security risks, particularly in areas where GAC plays a lead role, such as remote sensing space systems and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. A designated team within the Investor Services Division leads the Department's contributions to the process, consulting with the Intelligence Bureau, the Export Controls Division and relevant geographic or other divisions. Footnote 172 GAC describes its internal process as a "blended governance model that combines international security and commercial perspectives." Footnote 173 Officials from the Investor Services Division consult internal stakeholders to determine the Department's recommendation on an ad hoc basis depending on the specifics of the transaction, including the country of origin, the use of sensitive technologies or potential for sanctions violations. Footnote 174
State-sponsored malicious cyber activity
79. Under the National Cyber Security Strategy, GAC contributes to the government's response to state-sponsored malicious cyber activity through diplomatic efforts to promote international norms for appropriate state behaviour in cyberspace. Footnote 175 Since 2004, GAC has worked to promote Canada's interests in cyberspace through its participation on the UN Group of Governmental Experts charged with advancing responsible state behavior in cyberspace. While Canada was not selected to participate in this forum for the 2019-2021 period, the Department continues to represent Canada at the UN Open-Ended Working Group, a similar forum created by Russia that is open to all states. Footnote 176 Other forums through which GAC promotes Canada's cyber foreign policy interests are: the Ottawa Five, a group for strategic policy coordination on cyber security issues among Five Eyes countries; the G7, where cyber threats remain a priority issue for member states; and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, where Canada has supported a number of cyber confidence-building measures. Footnote 177
80. Beyond diplomatic efforts, GAC plays a lead role in determining whether to publicly attribute malicious cyber activity to a state actor. Footnote 178 In 2019, the government developed a Framework for Public Attribution of Responsibility for Malicious Cyber Activity. The framework governs the government's process for publicly attributing behaviour in cyberspace that is prohibited under international law, in contravention of non-binding international norms, or poses a threat to Canada's security or economic interests. Under this process, GAC consults relevant government stakeholders to assess potential implications of attribution and consults allies to assess the foreign policy implications and objectives of a public attribution. It then recommends to the Minister of Foreign Affairs whether and by whom an attribution should be made. Once an attribution is public, GAC monitors the response, conducts lessons learned, and coordinates engagement with foreign partners to share assessments and best practices. Footnote 179
Foreign interference
81. The Committee's 2019 review of the government's response to foreign interference noted GAC's integral role in the efforts of the security and intelligence community to counter this threat. The report explained that the Department's responsibility for managing Canada's bilateral and multilateral relationships render it a key decision-maker in determining how to respond to a state's attempts at interfering in domestic affairs. The Department has a number of diplomatic tools at its disposal to induce behavioural change, from bilateral measures, like suspending diplomatic engagement or denying admissibility to diplomatic officials, to multilateral approaches, such as developing diplomatic responses with like-minded states or raising a country's behaviour for consideration by international organizations. The Committee recognized, however, that when considering possible measures, the Department had to calibrate the government's response against broader foreign policy interests. Footnote 180
82. In the lead-up to the 2019 federal election, GAC undertook diplomatic initiatives aimed at countering foreign interference threats. At the April 2018 G7 Foreign and Security Ministers Summit in Toronto, Canada led efforts to reach an agreement on countering foreign interference threats to democratic institutions and processes. Footnote 181 At the June 2018 G7 Summit in Charlevoix, leaders announced the creation of the Rapid Response Mechanism. This Canada-led initiative sought to strengthen coordination across G7 countries to respond to foreign interference by sharing information and identifying opportunities for coordinated responses. Footnote 182 Under this mechanism, G7 countries share information through their designated focal points. Since its establishment in 2018, the Rapid Response Mechanism has shared information on threats to European Union parliamentary elections, Ukrainian presidential elections and the Canadian federal election. It has also expanded its information sharing network to include Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Lithuania, Sweden and NATO. Footnote 183
83. GAC's Rapid Response Mechanism Coordination Unit manages and disseminates information from G7 focal points. This unit also serves as Canada's focal point for the Mechanism. Its activities include monitoring digital information sources for signs of foreign state sponsored disinformation and interference activity, and sharing relevant information and analysis with its domestic security and intelligence partners. Footnote 184 In 2019, the unit developed an Ethical and Methodological Framework for Open Source Data Monitoring and Analysis to ensure its open source data monitoring and information sharing activities respect relevant privacy legislation and meet certain thresholds for identifying accounts associated with foreign interference. Footnote 185 The framework outlines the protocols for its monitoring and information sharing, noting that the unit examines indicators of coordinated foreign interference campaigns, including the use of fake accounts, the artificial amplification of content and the covert foreign nature of the activity. Footnote 186
84. In addition to its efforts as part of the Rapid Response Mechanism, GAC contributed to several government initiatives aimed at protecting the 2019 federal election. GAC's Rapid Response Mechanism Coordination Unit participated in the Security and Intelligence Threats to the Election Task Force alongside CSIS, CSE and the RCMP, to address covert, clandestine and criminal activities interfering with Canada's electoral process. GAC's contributions to the task force related primarily to its work on the Rapid Response Mechanism, including sharing international lessons learned and data analysis. The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs also sat. on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol Panel of five senior public servants tasked with determining whether and how the Canadian public would be informed of a serious threat to the integrity of the federal election. Footnote 187
Hostile state actor and state activity working group
85. In recognition of the Department's broader role in responding to hostile activity by state actors, GAC established the Hostile State Actors and State Activity Working Group in January 2021. The group's purpose is to ensure the coordination and coherence of relevant divisions within the Department working on domestic and international policy, operations and communication related to hostile state activity. Between January and April 2021, the working group met monthly and convened officials from GAC's geographic bureaus covering Russia and China, the Investor Services Division, the Intelligence Bureau, legal services, the export controls division, human rights division and international cyber policy groups. Footnote 188 Its ultimate objective was to advance foreign policy considerations in broader government policy and programming decisions related to hostile state activity. Footnote 189 It has not met since April 2021.