Annex A – GAC Review findings and recommendations
The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians 2022 Annual Report
Findings
F1.
Global Affairs Canada (or the Department) is an integral part of the security and intelligence community. The Department advances Canada’s national security interests abroad, provides critical support to its intelligence partners in the collection of foreign intelligence within Canada, and has an overarching role in ensuring the activities of its security and intelligence partners are coherent with the government’s foreign policy interests and objectives.
F2.
Global Affairs Canada ensures the foreign policy coherence of the security and intelligence community through a number of formal consultation mechanisms. The Department has established effective consultation mechanisms with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Communications Security Establishment (CSE) to ensure the foreign policy coherence of their activities. Consultation between GAC and the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces remains largely informal and ad hoc, and both organizations have been slow to respond to ministerial direction in this area.
F3.
The internal governance of the Department’s national security and intelligence activities is inconsistent, and in some areas completely absent. For its international security programs, the Department has strong governance mechanisms, including detailed policies, procedures and oversight committee structures. For its most sensitive intelligence activities, the opposite is true: the Department lacks policies, procedures or guidance documents, including for its role in requesting the collection of foreign intelligence within Canada *** or providing foreign policy risk assessments for CSIS and CSE activities.
F4.
The absence of governance for the Department’s most sensitive intelligence activities creates an important gap in ministerial accountability. The Department has no requirements to report regularly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the full spectrum of its national security and intelligence activities. This gap raises concerns about the Minister’s awareness of the risk associated with the Department’s most sensitive activities on an ongoing basis, and undermines the Minister’s accountability for those activities.
F5.
The Department’s role in responding to terrorist hostage-takings abroad is neither leadership nor coordination, but facilitation and information sharing. At best, GAC convenes implicated departments with much greater operational roles and specific accountabilities, and works to build a coherent approach without authority to direct a whole-of-government response. Part of the challenge is one of the Department’s own making: over the past 10 years, it has not developed the necessary policy, operational and training mechanisms for implicated government organizations to respond to such events coherently. Notwithstanding these gaps, the most significant problem is political: successive governments have failed to provide direction for a framework to address such critical incidents or provide specific direction on individual cases. Together, these challenges undermine the ability of the Department and its security and intelligence partners to respond effectively to terrorist hostage-takings.
Recommendations
R1.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs work with the Minister of National Defence to put in place proactive, regular and comprehensive consultation mechanisms to ensure that Canada’s defence policies and military operations are aligned with its foreign policy objectives.
R2.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs provide written direction to the Department on its national security and intelligence activities. That direction should include clear accountability expectations and regular reporting requirements.
R3.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs put in place comprehensive governance mechanisms for the Department’s security and intelligence activities and for those that it supports or contributes to at partner organizations. Those mechanisms should better document processes and decision points to strengthen accountability and institutional memory.
R4.
The Government of Canada establish a clear framework to respond to terrorist hostage takings, including to establish principles to guide the Government’s response, identify triggers for Ministerial direction and engagement, establish leadership for whole of government responses to specific incidents, and provide sufficient resources to support operational requirements during critical incidents.
Status
The government agreed with the Committee’s recommendations, and provided the following response.
GAC and DND's response to R1:
GAC and DND agree with this recommendation.
DND/CAF and GAC actively consult on many areas of defence policy and military operations. The ADM [Assistant Deputy Minister] Joint Consultative Mechanism (JCM), which meets regularly, is the primary, formal mechanism between the two organizations. GAC and DND/CAF are actively working together to enhance consultation mechanisms and will consider establishing additional mechanisms to address specific areas of operations, as appropriate. For example, GAC continues to work with DND/CAF to finalize a Memorandum of Understanding concerning consultations on defence intelligence activities, as well as an interdepartmental consultation process to ensure that CAF cyber operations are aligned with foreign policy objectives.
GAC's response to R2:
GAC agrees with and has acted upon this recommendation.
In 2022, the Minister issued a classified Ministerial direction to GAC on the nature and scope of the roles, responsibilities and activities of the Department’s Intelligence Bureau. This document sets out regular reporting requirements for the Department’s security and intelligence mandate outlining accountability expectations. Ministerial directions serve as a guidepost for the Department in fulfilling its national security and intelligence roles and responsibilities.
GAC response to R3:
GAC agrees with this recommendation.
In recent years, GAC has developed a number of governance mechanisms for the Department’s security and intelligence activities. Notable examples are: the introduction of a Global Security Reporting Program Steering Committee, new governance instruments with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, a framework for consultative engagement with the Communications Security Establishment on cyber operations, a draft interdepartmental engagement process with DND/CAF on cyber operations, and the negotiation of a Memorandum of Understanding with DND/CAF on consultations in relation to defence intelligence activities.
The introduction of these mechanisms has strengthened governance and accountability in regard to the Department’s security and intelligence activities and for those that it supports or contributes to at partner organizations.
Joint PCO and GAC response to R4:
The government agrees with this recommendation.
The Government is committed to ensuring an effective whole of government response to international critical incidents (e.g. terrorist hostage-takings). Since the NSICOP review began, GAC has made significant progress on institutionalizing important foundational elements of the government’s hostage recovery efforts. This included the establishment of a family policy and a family charter to provide clarity and transparency on how the government can provide support to victim’s families.
A training program and table top exercises were conducted with officials from all relevant security and intelligence departments and agencies to promote understanding and operational coordination. Moving forward, this training will be held regularly to enhance the ability of the government to respond to international critical incidents.
In 2023, the government will work to clarify and strengthen the policy direction and response framework used to guide the management of terrorist hostage-takings. This will include GAC-led efforts to develop options in collaboration with departments and agencies to enhance and institutionalize the Government of Canada’s hostage recovery activities. This will include, for example, potential improvements to family engagement practices, evaluating training needs, and assessing resource requirement to ensure an effective response to future critical incidents.