Chapter 5: Accountability and Governance
Special Report on the Federal Policing Mandate of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police

107. Ministerial accountability is a fundamental principle of Canada’s Parliamentary system of democracy. Footnote 189 The Minister of Public Safety is responsible and accountable for the RCMP, both to the Prime Minister and to Parliament. Under the RCMP Act, the Governor in Council appoints the RCMP Commissioner, who, under the direction of the Minister, has the control and management of the RCMP and all matters connected with it. Footnote 190 The Minister is therefore responsible for ensuring the RCMP is effective, accountable and addresses the government’s priorities. In answering to Parliament, the Minister must report on the functioning of the RCMP and the use of its authorities.

Police independence

108. That said, Ministerial accountability for the RCMP is different from other government organizations. The core issue is police independence. Footnote 191 Police independence in Canada is not defined in legislation. Instead, the concept has been defined over time through case law and Commissions of Inquiry, which have discussed the relationship between police and Ministers. In 1981, the Commission of Inquiry Concerning Certain Activities of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (the McDonald Commission) recommended that the appropriate Minister should have “full power of direction over the activities of the RCMP, except over the ‘quasi-judicial’ police powers of investigation, arrest and prosecution.” Footnote 192 The Commission also noted that control over police by elected representatives was similar to the need to have civilian control of the military. Footnote 193

109. In 1999, the Supreme Court decision in R. v. Campbell affirmed police independence in the context of criminal investigations:

A police officer investigating a crime is not acting as a government functionary or an agent of anybody… While for certain purposes the Commissioner of the RCMP reports to the Solicitor General, the Commissioner is not to be considered a servant or agent of the government while engaged in a criminal investigation. The Commissioner is not subject to political direction. Footnote 194

The 2006 Commission of Inquiry into the Activities of Canadian Officials in Relation to Maher Arar referenced the Campbell decision, noting that the RCMP is accountable to the Minister, who must be informed of its conduct and be answerable to Parliament and the Canadian public. Footnote 195

110. More recent decisions reaffirm this perspective. Three appellate court decisions following Campbell all noted that police independence should be confined to “law enforcement” and “core law enforcement decisions” such as laying charges. Footnote 196 While the Minister of Public Safety may issue direction for the RCMP, the Minister may not interfere in investigations. That said, the Minister may issue direction on priorities and on the administration of the organization. Indeed, as Canadian law scholar Kent Roach argued in a submission to the Committee, “strategic and democratically accountable direction of policing priorities, objectives and policies through Ministerial directions is consistent with police independence.” Footnote 197 However, Professor Roach makes a distinction between inappropriate and legitimate direction:

Following Campbell, police independence as a common law and constitutional principle and perhaps even a principle of fundamental justice under s.7 [of the Charter] does not prevent the government from establishing policing priorities or policies. Such directions would only infringe police independence if they effectively dictated investigations of specific individuals or ended investigations of specific individuals.

The Minister is ultimately responsible for the legitimate direction of police priorities, objectives and policies. As Professor Roach noted before the Committee, “We don’t want a police state in which the government can tell the police to charge and who not to charge, but we don’t want a state where the police operate independent of democracy.” Footnote 198

Ministerial Direction to the RCMP

111. The Minister of Public Safety provides direction to the RCMP. In addition to ensuring the appropriate use of its powers, the Minister may provide direction to the Commissioner on the management of the RCMP and all matters connected with it. This allows the Minister to proactively prescribe how the RCMP should function, including its priorities and objectives. This direction has recently taken two forms: Ministerial Directions and Mandate Letters.

112. Ministerial Directions provide policy guidance to the RCMP on specific areas. In the past, these directions have focused on sensitive or particularly important areas, such as information sharing and counterterrorism. The Minister of Public Safety has issued several directives to the RCMP that apply to RCMP Federal Policing:

  • Ministerial Direction on National Security Investigations in Sensitive Sectors (2003): This directed the RCMP to implement special measures when investigating terrorist offences or activities which have an impact on fundamental institutions in Canadian society, including academia, politics, religion, the media and trade unions.
  • Ministerial Direction on National Security Related Arrangements and Cooperation (2003): This established processes for the RCMP to enter into arrangements with foreign security or intelligence organizations for the purposes of investigating terrorist offences or activities.
  • Ministerial Direction on National Security Responsibility and Accountability (2003): This outlined the responsibilities of the Minister and the Commissioner related to investigations of terrorist offences or activities.
  • Ministerial Direction on Information Sharing with Foreign Entities (2011): This provided guidance on sharing information with foreign entities relating to terrorist offences or activities.
  • Ministerial Direction on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities (2019): This required the RCMP to monitor and report on information sharing with foreign partners. It also obligated the RCMP to provide the Minister an annual report on cases where the Direction was engaged, including the number of cases, any restrictions on information sharing arrangements due to concerns about potential mistreatment, and any changes to internal policies and procedures related to this Direction.

113. The Minister also provided the Commissioner with Mandate Letters in 2018 and 2022. In the 2018 letter, the Minister directed the Commissioner to focus on modernizing the RCMP, address harassment and bullying, and advance reconciliation with Indigenous Peoples. The letter contained no specific reference to the RCMP Federal Policing mandate or operations. Footnote 199

114. In the 2022 letter, the Minister directed the Commissioner to take action in a number of areas related to the RCMP Federal Policing mandate, including:

  • improve the provision of federal and national policing services and supporting the establishment of a dedicated unit to investigate all forms of major financial crime;
  • collaborate with other authorities to combat cybercrime, money laundering, human trafficking, child sexual exploitation, ideologically inspired violent extremism, foreign interference and threats to Canada’s democratic institutions; and
  • improve RCMP recruitment at all levels to better reflect the communities it serves, in particular Indigenous and Black communities, and recruiting more members with the skills necessary to combat sophisticated crimes.

The Minister requested an annual report on the RCMP's progress in achieving these priorities.

115. The Minister of Public Safety’s role is to hold the RCMP to account as an elected representative. In turn, the RCMP is accountable to the Minister for its policies and actions. Footnote 200 However, there are only two statutory requirements for the Commissioner to report to the Minister. The first is the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act, which requires the RCMP to report to the Minister on cases of information sharing that trigger a risk of complicity in mistreatment by foreign entities. The second is the Criminal Code, which requires the RCMP to report to the Minister through Public Safety on its use of electronic surveillance during investigations.

116. Within the RCMP Act, there is no provision for regular reporting to the Minister. Instead, reporting is determined informally between the Minister and the Commissioner. Footnote 201 In an appearance before the Committee, the Deputy Commissioner of Federal Policing stated that the majority of the Minister’s engagement on the RCMP focuses on the Contract Policing mandate. When Federal Policing engages with the Minister, it is almost exclusively in the context of providing situational awareness on a major file or investigation. Due to ‘police independence,’ he stated that the relationship is a “one-way street”: Federal Policing briefs the Minister, but the Minister does not provide direction to Federal Policing. There is no engagement between the Minister and Federal Policing on issues such as governance, priorities and organizational direction. Footnote 202 In contrast, the Policing Service Agreements that the RCMP has with eight provinces and three territories require RCMP divisional commanders to provide detailed annual reports to the contract jurisdictions on objectives and priorities, and separate reporting on financial and human resources planning. Footnote 203 In the same vein, CSIS has a statutory requirement to provide reports to the Minister every 12 months with respect to the Service’s operational activities during that period. Footnote 204

Internal governance

117. Within the RCMP, the senior most governing body is the Senior Executive Committee. This Committee is currently comprised of the Commissioner, the Chief Administrative Officer, the Deputy Commissioners from each of the RCMP's business lines (Contract and Indigenous Policing, Federal Policing, Specialized Police Services), Deputy Commissioners who are the Commanding Officers for British Columbia and Alberta, the Chief Financial Officer, the Chief Strategic Policy and External Relations Officer, and the Chief Human Resources Officer. Footnote 205 While all final authority and decision making for the RCMP rests with the Commissioner, the Committee may provide advice to the Commissioner, deliberate on matters concerning the RCMP or take collective decisions. Footnote 206

118. Below the Senior Executive Committee is the Senior Management Team. This team is comprised of the Commissioner, SEC members, the remaining Commanding Officers in each Division, and other senior executives based in national headquarters. Generally, the Senior Management Team is responsible for setting the RCMP's strategic priorities, but it may also discuss items brought to its attention, either before they go to the Senior Executive Committee or afterwards for further consideration. Footnote 207

119. Outside of the RCMP, the Commissioner is provided with external advice from the Management Advisory Board. This Board is comprised of up to 13 members appointed on behalf of the Minister of Public Safety. Footnote 208 The Board may provide advice and reports to the Commissioner on the management of the RCMP, notably the use of resources, the development of modernization plans and the implementation of policies and management controls to support the operation of the RCMP. Footnote 209 While the Board considered the status of Federal Policing in November 2019, it is unclear whether it provided advice to the Commissioner thereafter.

120. Federal Policing is led by the Deputy Commissioner Federal Policing, who sits on the Senior Executive Committee. Given that the RCMP is Canada’s national police force, Federal Policing resources are distributed nationally and have varying reporting chains. Footnote 210 Within Ontario and Quebec, the divisions are comprised exclusively of Federal Policing resources which report directly to the Deputy Commissioner Federal Policing. In the other provinces and territories, Federal Policing resources report to a divisional Commanding Officer, who is also responsible for Contract Policing and accountable to both the RCMP Commissioner and to provincial authorities. Footnote 211

121. Over the years, Federal Policing has made adjustments to enhance its governance over its resources within divisions, particularly those outside of Ontario and Quebec. In 2017, it implemented the Federal Criminal Operations Officer positions. These Criminal Operations Officers became a link between Federal Policing at Headquarters and Federal Policing personnel in the divisions. Footnote 212 While this change strengthened Federal Policing governance over resources in the provinces and territories, Federal Policing reported that challenges persisted in some areas, including the diversion of federal resources, the alignment of resources against priorities and inconsistencies in Federal Policing operations. Footnote 213

122. In 2021, the RCMP approved and began implementing its Federal Policing Transformation plan. Among other things, the objective of the plan was to increase the governance and accountability of the Federal Policing program nationally. By changing the reporting structure to have Federal Criminal Operations Officers report to Federal Policing at Headquarters and not through divisional Commanding Officers, Federal Policing sought to have more visibility and authority over its resources to ensure that they are responding to Federal Policing priorities. Footnote 214 Federal Policing also expects to be better able to direct and oversee its investigations nationally. In addition, Federal Policing intends to relocate resources to areas where the majority of Federal Policing investigations are concentrated: Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal. Footnote 215 While the deadline for altering the reporting chain was set for April 2022, delays caused it to be postponed and there is currently no timeline for its implementation. There is no timeline for Federal Policing’s geographic redistribution of resources. Footnote 216