Findings
Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada's Democratic Processes and Institutions

F1

Foreign states conduct sophisticated and pervasive foreign interference specifically targeting Canada’s democratic processes and institutions, occurring before, during and after elections and in all orders of government. These activities continue to pose a significant threat to national security, and to the overall integrity of Canada’s democracy. The PRC and India are the most active perpetrators.

F2

The government was aware in 2018 that the reforms implemented under the Plan to Protect Democracy were insufficient to address foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions. It has yet to implement an effective response to foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions. This is despite a significant body of intelligence reporting, the completion of foundational policy work, public consultations and having been called to do so by this Committee.

F3

Significant differences persist in how Ministers, departments and agencies interpret the gravity and prevalence of the threat, including the threshold for response.

• The intelligence community increased its reporting to the government on the threat of foreign interference in Canada’s democratic processes and institutions in response to Canada’s intelligence priorities.
• Policy departments (Privy Council Office, Global Affairs Canada, and Public Safety) did not adequately consider intelligence reporting or assessments, or develop policy advice to address specific cases of foreign interference.
• Ministers accountable for national security did not request policy advice in response to intelligence reporting and the government was slow to put in place governance structures to consider intelligence and take decisions.

F4

The roles, mandates and accountabilities of the National Security Council and supporting governance committees are unclear.

F5

Canada’s current legal framework does not enable the security and intelligence community or law enforcement to respond effectively to foreign interference activities. This impedes the federal government’s ability to engage other orders of government and law enforcement with respect to sharing and use of classified intelligence, respectively.

F6

While departments and agencies conducted operations to disrupt or deter foreign interference, tangible results with respect to the level of actual threat reduction were difficult to measure.

F7

The government continues to lack an effective approach to engage with the Canadian public and other orders of government. While it has increased engagement with some Parliamentarians, political parties and electoral candidates, its efforts have been time-bound (i.e., election-focused), narrowly targeted, often reactive and the information provided too general. It has also repeatedly failed to implement a comprehensive approach to engaging federal Parliamentarians.

F8

The government’s ability to address vulnerabilities in political party administration is limited.