Annex B: Recommendations of prior reviews
Annual Report 2023
Special report into the allegations associated with Prime Minister Trudeau’s official visit to India in February 2018
Description
A special report on the allegations raised in the context of the Prime Minister’s trip to India in February 2018 relating to foreign interference in Canadian political affairs, risks to the security of the Prime Minister, and the inappropriate use of intelligence.
Recommendations
Foreign interference
R1.
In the interest of national security, members of the House of Commons and the Senate should be briefed upon being sworn-in and regularly thereafter on the risks of foreign interference and extremism in Canada. In addition, Cabinet Ministers should be reminded of the expectations described in the Government’s Open and Accountable Government, including that Ministers exercise discretion with whom they meet or associate, and clearly distinguish between official and private media messaging, and be reminded that, consistent with the Conflict of Interest Act, public office holders must always place the public interest before private interests. ***
R2.
The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness should consider revising the *** to include a formal role for the National Security and Intelligence Advisor. The information provided to the Committee demonstrates that the NSIA played a significant role ***. The Committee believes that the NSIA has a legitimate role to provide advice as coordinator of the security and intelligence community and advisor to the Prime Minister. ***
Security
R3.
Drawing on the Committee’s findings, an interdepartmental review should be undertaken to identify key lessons learned following these events.
R4.
The Government should develop and implement a consistent method of conducting background checks by all organizations involved in the development of proposed guest lists for foreign events with the Prime Minister.
The use of intelligence
R5.
The Prime Minister should review the role of the NSIA in the area of countering threats to the security of Canada. The Committee already made one recommendation with respect to the role of the NSIA in the area of ***. The Committee notes that a number of other government departments and agencies have statutory authority to take measures to protect Canada from threats to its security. The role of the NSIA should be clarified for those organizations, as well.
Status
The government provided the following responses to the recommendations R1 and R2 in a report published in 2023 entitled Countering an Evolving Threat: Update on Recommendations to Counter Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Institutions (commonly known as the Leblanc-Charette report): Footnote 10 :
Response to R1.1:
The Parliamentary Protective Service provides security briefings to incoming Members of Parliament. The Security and Intelligence Threats to Election Task Force (SITE) offers briefings to political party representatives during writ period. The Privy Council Office Security Operations Division briefs all incoming Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries on the spectrum of threats, including foreign interference. CSIS also provides briefings to Parliamentarians upon request.
Briefings for Members of Parliament and the Senate will be provided upon their swearing-in and on a regular basis.
Response to R1.2:
Expectations and obligations for Ministers and their actions have been made public as part of Open and Accountable Government.
Response to R2:
Steps were taken to further strengthen the national security governance framework to ensure that the National and Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister (NSIA) maintains awareness of ongoing threats and mitigation measures, including those related to foreign interference.
Review of the Process for Setting Intelligence Priorities
Description
A review of the Government of Canada’s process for establishing the national intelligence priorities, focusing on the governance of the process, the participation of the organizations involved, and performance measurement and resource expenditures.
Recommendations
R1.
The National Security and Intelligence Advisor, supported by the Privy Council Office, invest in and take a stronger managerial and leadership role in the process for setting intelligence priorities to ensure organizational responses to the intelligence priorities are timely and consistently implemented.
R2.
The security and intelligence community develop a strategic overview of the Standing Intelligence Requirements to ensure Cabinet is receiving the best information it needs to make decisions.
R3.
Under the leadership of the National Security and Intelligence Advisor and supported by the Privy Council Office, the security and intelligence community develop tools to address the coordination and prioritization challenges it faces in relation to the Standing Intelligence Requirements.
R4.
The security and intelligence community, in consultation with the Treasury Board Secretariat, develop a consistent performance measurement framework that examines how effectively and efficiently the community is responding to the intelligence priorities, including a robust and consistent resource expenditure review.
Status
For the 2023 Annual Report, the government provided a partial status update on the implementation of these recommendations. It notes that as a result of the recommendations the Privy Council Office has “strengthened the process for setting priorities, including a greater leadership role for the National Security and Intelligence Advisor to the Prime Minister.” Footnote 11
Review of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces’ Intelligence Activities
Description
A review of the intelligence activities of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces. The Committee examined the scope of these activities, their legal authorities and the existing oversight mechanisms for their control and accountability.
Recommendations
R1.
The Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) review and strengthen its administrative framework governing defence intelligence activities, particularly with respect to the Ministerial Directive on Defence Intelligence, to ensure that it meets its own obligations on governance and reporting to the Minister of National Defence, and is properly tracking the implementation of those obligations. In particular:
- devise a standard process, or principles, for determining a nexus between a defence intelligence activity and a legally authorized mission;
- document its compliance with obligations in the Directive, including in areas of risk specified in the Directive not currently included in annual reports to the Minister; and
- implement a standardized process for interdepartmental consultations on the deployment of defence intelligence capabilities, including minimum standards of documentation.
R2.
The Government amend Bill C-59, National Security Act, 2017, to ensure that the mandate of the proposed National Security and Intelligence Review Agency includes an explicit requirement for an annual report of DND/CAF activities related to national security or intelligence.
R3.
Drawing from the Committee’s assessment and findings, the Government give serious consideration to providing explicit legislative authority for the conduct of defence intelligence activities.
Status
For the 2023 Annual Report, the government provided a status update on the implementation of these recommendations. It notes that as a result of the recommendations the DND/CAF has “enhanced its policy framework for these activities; and has established a program to ensure the compliance of these activities with relevant legislation, ministerial directives, and internal policies.” Footnote 12
The Committee recognizes that recommendation R2 was overtaken by events when Bill C-59, the National Security Act, 2017 received Royal Assent on June 21, 2019, and did not include a requirement for NSIRA to produce an annual report of DND/CAF activities related to national security or intelligence.
Diversity and Inclusion in the Security and Intelligence Community
Description
A review that provides a baseline assessment of the degree of representation of women, Aboriginal peoples, members of visible minorities and persons with disabilities within the security and intelligence community, and examines the goals, initiatives, programs and measures that departments and agencies have taken to promote diversity and inclusion.
Recommendations
R1.
The Committee conduct a retrospective review in three to five years to assess the security and intelligence community’s progress in achieving and implementing its diversity goals and inclusion initiatives, and to examine more closely the question of inclusion, including issues of harassment, violence and discrimination, through closer engagement with employees.
R2.
The security and intelligence community adopt a consistent and transparent approach to planning and monitoring of employment equity and diversity goals, and conduct regular reviews of their employment policies and practices (that is, employment systems reviews) to identify possible employment barriers for women, Aboriginal peoples, members of visible minorities and persons with disabilities.
R3.
The security and intelligence community improve the robustness of its data collection and analysis, including GBA+ assessments of internal staffing and promotion policies and lustering analyses of the workforce. In this light, the Committee also highlights the future obligation for organizations to investigate, record and report on all occurrences of harassment and violence in the workplace.
R4.
The security and intelligence community develop a common performance measurement framework, and strengthen accountability for diversity and inclusion through meaningful and measurable performance indicators for executives and managers across all organizations.
Status
For the 2023 Annual Report, the government provided a partial status update on the implementation of these three recommendations (R2 to R4; R1 relates to the Committee). It notes that:
departments in the security and intelligence community continue to make progress in implementing the Committee’s diversity, equity, and inclusion recommendations, and in achieving these goals generally. Most have completed Employment Systems Reviews (ESRs), or have such reviews underway. ESRs are key tools for employment equity and diversity goals, and are the foundation of departmental employment equity plans. For example, in mid-2022 the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) launched its Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Strategy, based on broad consultations with stakeholders including a Diversity and Inclusion Advisory Committee and various employee networks. Footnote 13
The Government Response to Foreign Interference
Description
A review of the breadth and scope of foreign interference in Canada; the government’s response; the implicated organizations and their response capabilities; the extent of coordination and collaboration among these organizations; the degree to which the government works with other levels of government and targets of foreign interference; and government engagement with allies abroad.
Recommandations
R1.
The Government of Canada develop a comprehensive strategy to counter foreign interference and build institutional and public resiliency. Drawing from the Committee’s review and findings, such a strategy should:
- identify the short- and long-term risks and harms to Canadian institutions and rights and freedoms posed by the threat of foreign interference;
- examine and address the full range of institutional vulnerabilities targeted by hostile foreign states, including areas expressly omitted in the Committee’s review;
- assess the adequacy of existing legislation that deals with foreign interference, such as the Security of Information Act or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, and make proposals for changes if required;
- develop practical, whole-of-government operational and policy mechanisms to identify and respond to the activities of hostile states;
- establish regular mechanisms to work with sub-national levels of government and law enforcement organizations, including to provide necessary security clearances;
- include an approach for ministers and senior officials to engage with fundamental institutions and the public; and
- guide cooperation with allies on foreign interference.
R2.
The Government of Canada support this comprehensive strategy through sustained central leadership and coordination. As an example of a centralized coordinating entity to address foreign interference, the Committee refers to the appointment and mandate of the Australian National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator.
The Committee reiterates its recommendation from its Special Report into the Allegations Associated with Prime Minister Trudeau’s Official Visit to India in February 2018:
- In the interest of national security, members of the House of Commons and Senate should be briefed upon being sworn-in and regularly thereafter on the risks of foreign interference and extremism in Canada. In addition, Cabinet Ministers should be reminded of the expectations described in the Government’s Open and Accountable Government, including that Ministers exercise discretion with whom they meet or associate, and clearly distinguish between official and private media messaging, and be reminded that, consistent with the Conflict of Interest Act, public office holders must always place the public interest before private interests.
Status
The government provided the following responses to the recommendations R1 and R2 in a report published in 2023 entitled Countering an Evolving Threat: Update on Recommendations to Counter Foreign Interference in Canada’s Democratic Institutions (commonly known as the Leblanc-Charette report): Footnote 14 :
Response to R1:
Departments and agencies work together as part of an effective governance framework to identify and respond to foreign interference activities. The new National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator will play a leading role to ensure Government-wide efforts to combat foreign interference are working effectively and towards the same goal. Using the findings and recommendations from the Independent Special Rapporteur’s review on foreign interference, as well as the ongoing reviews from NSICOP and the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency, the Government will take additional action.
Response to R1.a:
Departments and agencies have developed comprehensive assessments of foreign interference threats and risks. This analysis is ongoing and takes into account how the threat — and the measures to counter it — evolve. Departments and agencies have been engaging with stakeholders in various sectors to share information on threats and help identify risks. Challenges remain in concretely measuring and articulating foreign interference harms in certain sectors of strategic interest. The Government will leverage the new National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator, academic and other outreach programs to engage stakeholders to further assess the short- and long-term impacts of foreign interference in Canada.
Response to R1.b:
Departments and agencies have developed comprehensive assessments of foreign interference threats and risks.
The tools used by foreign state actors to conduct interference activities continue to evolve, require ongoing assessments of risks. Departments and agencies will continue to collaborate with stakeholders to assess vulnerabilities in strategic sectors.
Budget 2023 provides $48.9 million over three years to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) to protect Canadians from harassment and intimidation, increase its investigative capacity, and more proactively engage with communities at greater risk of being targeted.
Response to R1.c:
Over the past few years, departments and agencies have conducted policy and legal analysis to identify gaps and develop options to address them.
The Minister of Public Safety, informed by the ongoing work of the Independent Special Rapporteur and the reviews of NSICOP's and NSIRA, will work and consult on changes to the CSIS Act, the Security of Information Act, and the Criminal Code.
Response to R1.d:
The establishment of the Counter-Foreign Interference Coordinator enhances the existing national security governance and the government’s capacity to effectively address foreign interference activities. Budget 2023 provides $13.5 million over five years, and $3.1 million ongoing to Public Safety Canada to establish a National Counter-Foreign Interference Office. The 2023 Budget further proposes $48.9 million over three years to the RCMP to protect Canadians from harassment and intimidation, increase its investigative capacity, and more proactively engage with communities at greater risk of being targeted.
Departments and agencies work together as part of an effective governance framework to identify and respond to foreign interference activities. Over the past years, steps were taken to strengthen the national security governance framework to ensure that the NSIA maintains active awareness of ongoing threats and mitigation measures, including those related to foreign interference.
Budget 2022 provided $2 million annually for the Protecting Democracy Unit at the Privy Council Office to coordinate, develop, and implement government-wide measures designed to combat disinformation and protect Canada’s democratic institutions and processes. This includes developing a whole-of-society approach to protecting Canada’s democracy, the implementation of a counter disinformation toolkit, and training for Parliamentarians and public servants on misinformation and disinformation, building upon the United Kingdom’s RESIST model. It also includes further developing options to strengthen interdepartmental governance, in consideration of existing committees.
The Government of Canada announced a $5.5 million investment to strengthen the capacity of civil society and research partners to provide important insights into the dynamics of Canada’s information ecosystem, including with respect to disinformation and activities of state actors.
Response to R1.e:
Over the past few years, the RCMP, CSIS, the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, and Public Safety Canada have engaged with provincial, territorial and municipal colleagues, as well as with critical infrastructure owners and operators to increase awareness of foreign interference threats and build resilience.
Sustained, regular, and coordinated engagement with partners is essential to detect threats, build resilience and effectively counter foreign interference activities. The new National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator will work on expanding briefing mechanisms with provincial/territorial, municipal, and Indigenous officials. The Protecting Democracy Unit within the Privy Council Office will expand its work with provinces and territories.
Un engagement soutenu, régulier et coordonné avec les partenaires est essentiel pour détecter les menaces, renforcer la résilience et contrer efficacement les activités d’ingérence étrangère. Le nouveau Bureau national de lutte contre l’ingérence étrangère travaillera en vue d’élargir les mécanismes d’information avec les autorités provinciales, territoriales, municipales et autochtones. L’Unité de protection de la démocratie du Bureau du Conseil privé collaborera également davantage avec les provinces et les territoires.
Response to R1.f:
Departments and agencies have been developing their capabilities to conduct outreach activities, including CSIS stakeholder engagement (industry, universities, research and development, Canadian communities, civil society), Communications Security Establishment and Cyber Centre outreach (industry, small business, privately-owned critical infrastructure), and RCMP community outreach efforts.
Communications and outreach are key elements of the government strategy to counter foreign interference. Efforts will continue to engage with partners effectively and cohesively across all jurisdictions.
The Government will use the new National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator and CSIS's upcoming Annual Report to bolster communications with Canadians. Recently announced funding to strengthen the capacity of civil society partners to counter disinformation, including from foreign sources, will also help to increase resilience. New briefings will be offered to Members of Parliament and Senators and the Coordinator will work on expanding briefings to partners outside the Federal Government.
The Government will look at establishing a process by which members of the Panel as part of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, engage with stakeholders and communities. This engagement would seek views on best practices to mitigate the impact of foreign interference and disinformation on Canada’s institutions.
Response to R1.g:
Departments and agencies each engage with their international counterparts in collaborative efforts and partnerships to address foreign interference.
The Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator will increase the coherence of these interdepartmental efforts, and will ensure alignment with Canada’s foreign policy objectives.
Cooperation with Canada’s allies is also undertaken by the Minister of Public Safety as Canada’s representative at the annual Five Country Ministerial, where Five Eyes security ministers meet to collaborate on various national security issues, including foreign interference; to discuss respective approaches to shared issues; and to coordinate a cohesive Five Eyes response.
Response to R2:
The Prime Minister announced the establishment of the Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator. Budget 2023 proposes to provide $13.5 million over five years, and $3.1 million ongoing to Public Safety Canada to establish a National Counter-Foreign Interference Office.
Budget 2022 provided $2 million annually to the Privy Council Office to coordinate, develop, and implement government-wide measures designed to combat disinformation and protect Canada’s democracy.
The Canada Border Services Agency’s National Security and Intelligence Activities
Description
A review of the national security and intelligence activities of the Canada Border Services Agency, focusing on CBSA’s governance over national security and intelligence activities in CBSA’s Enforcement and Intelligence Program; CBSA’s conduct of sensitive national security and intelligence activities; and CBSA’s relations with its key partners in the areas of national security and intelligence.
Recommendations
R1.
The Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness provide written direction to the Canada Border Services Agency on the conduct of sensitive national security and intelligence activities. That direction should include clear accountability expectations and annual reporting obligations.
R2.
The Canada Border Services Agency establish a consistent process for assessing and reporting on the risks and outcomes of its sensitive national security and intelligence activities.
Status
For the 2023 Annual Report, the government provided a status update on the implementation of these recommendations. Footnote 15 The government advised that the Minister of Public Safety issued the Ministerial Direction to the Canada Border Services Agency on Surveillance and Confidential Human Sources, which directs it to establish risk management and reporting mechanisms related to surveillance and confidential human sources. Footnote 16 .
Special Report on the Collection, Use, Retention and Dissemination of Information on Canadians in the context of the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces Defence Intelligence Activities
Description
A special report on the collection, use, retention and dissemination of information on Canadian citizens by the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces in the conduct of defence intelligence activities, focusing on the operational context, legal framework, the CANCIT Function Directive, and the treatment of this information before the Directive.
Recommendations
R1.
The Department of National Defence / Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) rescind the Chief of Defence Intelligence Functional Directive: Guidance on the Collection of Canadian Citizen Information and, in consultation with the Privacy Commissioner, review all of its functional directives and other DND/CAF policy instruments that are relevant to the collection, use, retention and dissemination of information about Canadians to ensure consistent governance of these activities.
R2.
To resolve the issue of the extraterritorial application of the Privacy Act, the Minister of National Defence should ensure DND/CAF complies with the letter and spirit of the Privacy Act in all of its defence intelligence activities, whether they are conducted in Canada or abroad.
R3.
The Minister of National Defence introduce legislation governing DND/CAF defence intelligence activities, including the extent to which DND/CAF should be authorized to collect, use, retain and disseminate information about Canadians in the execution of its authorized missions.
Status
As of December 31, 2023, the government has not provided a status update regarding the implementation of these recommendations.