Chapter 2: The Government Response to Foreign Interference — Findings
National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Annual Report 2019

F8.

Some foreign states conduct sophisticated and pervasive foreign interference activities against Canada. Those activities pose a significant risk to national security, principally by undermining Canada's fundamental institutions and eroding the rights and freedoms of Canadians. (Paragraphs 136-175)

F9.

CSIS has consistently conducted investigations and provided advice to government on foreign interference. (Paragraphs 195-201)

F10.

Throughout the period under review, the interdepartmental coordination and collaboration on foreign interference was case-specific and ad hoc. Canada's ability to address foreign interference is limited by the absence of a holistic approach to consider relevant risks, appropriate tools and possible implications of responses to state behaviours. (Paragraphs 219-227 and 280-285)

F11.

Foreign interference has received historically less attention in Canada than other national security threats. This is beginning to change with the government's nascent focus on "hostile state activities." Nonetheless, the security and intelligence community's approach to addressing the threat is still marked by a number of conditions:

• There are significant differences in how individual security and intelligence organizations interpret the gravity and prevalence of the threat, and prioritize their resources. (Paragraphs 276-279)
• In determining the measures the government may use to address instances of foreign interference, responses address specific activities and not patterns of behaviour. Furthermore, the government's approach gives greater weight to short-term interests (e.g., foreign policy) than longer-term considerations (e.g., risks to freedoms, rights and sovereignty). (Paragraphs 281-285)

F12.

Government engagement on foreign interference has been limited.

• With the exception of CSIS outreach activities, the government's interaction with subnational levels of government and civil society on foreign interference is minimal. (Paragraphs 256-267)
• Engagement is limited in part by the lack of security-cleared individuals at the subnational level. (Paragraph 261)
• There is no public foreign interference strategy or public report similar to those developed for terrorism or cyber security. (Paragraphs 289-291)

F13.

Canada is working increasingly with its closest allies and partners to address foreign interference. This is essential for Canada. (Paragraphs 268-274)