Chapter 3: The Canada Border Services Agency's National Security and Intelligence Activities — Background and rationale for review
National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Annual Report 2019

Background and rationale for review

313. The Committee's decision to conduct a review of CBSA’s national security and intelligence activities was based on a number of considerations. The first is that the scale, scope and nature of national security and intelligence activities conducted by CBSA is not widely known, nor well understood. As noted by a former President of CBSA, "there's a need to bring greater public confidence in terms of the activities of CBSA." ^{Footnote 10}

314. The second consideration is that CBSA’s activities have not been subject to regular, independent, external review. Civil society experts, academics, and members of the judicial and legislative branches of government have expressed the need for CBSA’s activities - including those pertaining to national security and intelligence - to be subject to independent review, and by extension, public criticism. ^{Footnote 11} Although CBSA’s full complement of national security and intelligence activities have never been reviewed by an independent, external review body, the Committee acknowledges that some areas have been examined by independent bodies (e.g., the 2017 review of scenario-based targeting for national security purposes by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner). The scope of previous external review of CBSA activities is discussed in paragraph 317.

315. The third consideration is the overall complexity of the CBSA mandate, which includes administering over 90 acts of Parliament, regulations and international agreements. This complexity manifests in three ways. First, CBSA has concurrent roles of upholding Canada's security, supporting Canadian prosperity and serving the public (including as the government's second-largest revenue collector). ^{Footnote 12} Second, CBSA officers must balance customs, intelligence, interdiction, enforcement, immigration and import inspection functions in the provision of integrated border services. Third, CBSA officers are responsible for the organization's intelligence and enforcement priorities while also enforcing numerous other acts and regulations in areas such as health or agriculture. ^{Footnote 13}

316. The Committee's fourth consideration is the risks inherent in CBSA’s national security and intelligence activities. These include:

• Risks to an individual's rights under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: CBSA activities present risks to an individual's Charter rights. At the border, there is a reduced expectation of privacy and CBSA border services officers have the authority to search goods, conveyances and persons without a defined threshold. ^{Footnote 14} Inside Canada, CBSA may affect Canadians' Charter rights through the conduct of sensitive intelligence activities, such as surveillance, scenario-based targeting and confidential human sources; ^{Footnote 15}
• Risks related to balancing the interdiction of high-risk travellers and the facilitation of legitimate travel and trade: Risks may arise if CBSA casts its net too wide and focuses excess resources on low-risk goods and persons. Alternatively, risks may arise if CBSA focuses its efforts too narrowly and allows high-risk goods and persons to slip through the cracks;
• Risks to Canada's international relations and reputation: Engaging in sensitive activities, such as covert surveillance or the use of confidential human sources, may negatively affect Canadian relations with other countries or international organizations. ^{Footnote 16} Granting admissibility to individuals of national security concern may cause allied nations to question Canada's ability to secure its borders; denying entry to legitimate travellers may cause bilateral irritants. ^{Footnote 17}