Chapter 3: The Canada Border Services Agency's National Security and Intelligence Activities — Governance of national security and intelligence activities
National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Annual Report 2019

Governance of national security and intelligence activities

Ministerial direction

431. This section describes the mechanisms CBSA has put in place to govern its national security and intelligence activities.

432. The Minister has provided CBSA with two ministerial directions for its national security and intelligence activities: ^{Footnote 197}

• Ministerial Direction on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities (2017) states the government's commitment to values and principles against torture and mistreatment. It prohibits the disclosure of information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity, the making of requests for information that would result in a substantial risk of mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity, and certain uses of information that was likely obtained through the mistreatment of an individual by a foreign entity. ^{Footnote 198}
• The Ministerial Direction on Intelligence Priorities (2017) guides the implementation of the government's intelligence priorities, and is meant to support ministerial accountability for CBSA's administration and enforcement of its program legislation.

433. The Ministerial Direction on Intelligence Priorities identified the following principles to guide and inform all CBSA activities in support of the intelligence priorities:

• CBSA's program legislation and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms shall be respected;
• the privacy of individuals shall not be infringed on unless and only to the extent that there are valid reasons to do so;
• CBSA shall ensure adequate and consistent handling of personal information when collecting, storing, sharing and disclosing information in accordance with privacy legislation and government information classification policies and standards; and
• information sharing with foreign partners shall respect the Ministerial Direction to CBSA: Information Sharing with Foreign Partners (which was later replaced by the Ministerial Direction to CBSA: Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities).

434. The Ministerial Direction on Intelligence Priorities contains one reference to the accountability of CBSA to the Minister.

In the course of implementing these intelligence priorities, CBSA shall immediately inform [the Minister] when there is a potential that a CBSA activity may have a significant adverse impact, such as posing a risk to human life; discrediting CBSA or the Government of Canada; negatively affecting Canadian relations with any country or international organization of state; and/or, contravening any of the guidelines set out in this directive. ^{Footnote 199}

435. Since the issuance of the ministerial direction, CBSA has informed the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness of one instance where a CBSA activity met this obligation. In that case, the President of CBSA described the granting of permanent resident status to a foreign national of national security concern in August of 2017 [*** The rest of this sentence and the next were revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences describe the potential implications. ***] ^{Footnote 200} The Committee examined this case in detail and notes that CBSA and IRCC have put in place measures to prevent similar cases in the future.

436. Outside of the accountability obligation noted above, the Ministerial Direction on Intelligence Priorities for 2017-2019 contains no requirement for regular reporting (e.g., annual reporting) to the Minister on CBSA's national security or intelligence activities. This is in contrast to other ministerial directions provided to CBSA, which include obligations for regular reporting on activities. ^{Footnote 201}

437. CBSA has not received ministerial direction on any of its more sensitive activities, such as the use of surveillance or confidential human sources, *** ^{Footnote 202}

438. The Committee is aware that CBSA had drafted a proposed ministerial direction on two of its sensitive national security and intelligence activities, surveillance and confidential human sources. The draft Ministerial Direction proposed a number of limitations and requirements for the conduct of these activities, and set out specific reporting requirements to the Minister. ^{Footnote 203} Ultimately, the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness did not provide such direction.

Internal governance of national security and intelligence activities

439. CBSA's management of its national security and intelligence activities falls within its broader governance structures. In April 2019, CBSA replaced its previous model of governance of distinct Programs and Operations streams with a new Functional Management model. The new model blends previous areas of programs, policy and operations into three new branches: Travellers, Commercial and Trade, and Intelligence and Enforcement. ^{Footnote 204} Each branch is led by a vice-president who is accountable for program development, design and delivery. The vice-presidents will establish program priorities and provide national direction to the regions. As part of this shift, CBSA also created a Chief Transformation Officer and established a new Strategic Policy Branch. ^{Footnote 205}

440. CBSA stated that the shift to a new governance model had three objectives. First, the blending of CBSA's Programs and Operations branches is meant to provide clarity within the organization pertaining to roles and responsibilities, consistent with internal assessments that found that the previous division between Programs and Operations resulted in confusion over the precise roles, responsibilities and accountabilities of front-line practitioners and senior management. ^{Footnote 206} Second, by reorganizing the branches under designated vice-presidents as leads, the model is designed to create clearer lines of accountability and responsibility. Third, CBSA sought to improve efficiency, both financially and in facilitating the movement of low-risk goods and persons. ^{Footnote 207} CBSA stated that " [t]hese organizational changes will improve the Agency's ability to make the critical, results-based decisions that keep Canadians safe and prosperous." ^{Footnote 208}

441. As part of its governance structure, CBSA established a number of bodies to provide guidance on pertinent issues, and to elevate problems to senior decision-making bodies where required. CBSA's governance structure for its Intelligence and Enforcement Program comprises four levels, as shown in Figure 1.

442. CBSA officials also attend multiagency committees on national security and intelligence. To maintain interdepartmental coordination on operations, the CBSA President attends the weekly Deputy Ministers' Operations Committee, chaired by the Privy Council Office with representation from the security and intelligence community. CBSA vice-presidents attend interdepartmental assistant deputy minister (ADM) meetings, including the National Security Operations Committee and the National Security Policy Committee. To maintain interdepartmental coordination on policy and administration, CBSA's President is a member of the deputy ministers' committees on National Security and on Intelligence Assessment, and separate committees on Global Trends and Foreign Affairs and Defence, all which convene monthly. CBSA's vice-presidents participate in a number of ADM-level multiagency fora, including ADM committees on national security policy, intelligence, intelligence assessment, and money laundering and terrorism financing. CBSA directors-general, directors and managers also participate in a variety of issue-specific committees across the government.