Annex A: List of Findings
National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Annual Report 2019

Chapter 1: Diversity and Inclusion in the Security and Intelligence Community

F1.

In successive ministerial mandate letters and in its call to create a Security and Intelligence Diversity and Inclusion Tiger Team, the government identified the promotion and enhancement of diversity and inclusion as a priority in the security and intelligence community. This community approach has significant merit, but its implementation has fallen short. (Paragraphs 22, 68 and 69)

F2.

Organizations in the security and intelligence community have put in place measures and programs to support employment equity, diversity and inclusion. However, the degree to which those organizations are diverse and inclusive differs significantly. (Paragraphs 36-50)

F3.

In the past three years, the CAF and the RCMP settled lawsuits variously alleging widespread harassment, violence and discrimination. Progress on resolving and eradicating these underlying problems has been slow. CSIS also settled a lawsuit in 2017 specifically alleging lslamophobia, racism and homophobia in its Toronto Region office, and responded with an organization-wide Workplace Action Plan that same year. (Paragraphs 88-91)

F4.

All of the organizations in the security and intelligence community have developed policies, training and awareness campaigns to combat and resolve harassment and violence in the workplace. However, some challenges exist with regard to survey analysis and tracking. This includes tracking harassment complaints, which can limit an organization's awareness of its prevalence. The issue of discrimination receives significantly less attention than harassment throughout the community. (Paragraphs 93-97)

F5.

The representation of designated groups is lower than the public service average in a majority of the organizations under review. In a majority of the organizations under review, persons with disabilities are underrepresented overall and women are underrepresented at executive levels. Members of visible minorities are underrepresented both overall and at executive levels, and recruitment of members of visible minorities has stalled or decreased in several of the organizations under review over the past three years. There is currently not enough information available to assess the representation of Aboriginal peoples at executive levels across organizations under review. (Paragraphs 52-54)

F6.

Inconsistencies in planning, monitoring and review undermine efforts to assess progress on diversity across the security and intelligence community. (Paragraphs 25-31)

F7.

Accountability for diversity and inclusion across the security and intelligence community is insufficient. Organizations have not developed performance measurement frameworks, nor have they established measurable performance objectives for diversity and inclusion for executives or managers. Responsibility for advancing diversity and inclusion is not shared throughout most organizations, but is most often considered the sole responsibility of human resources divisions. Weaknesses in the areas of accountability and responsibility undermine organizational efforts to advance organization-wide objectives. (Paragraphs 66-71)

Chapter 2: The Government Response to Foreign Interference

F8.

Some foreign states conduct sophisticated and pervasive foreign interference activities against Canada. Those activities pose a significant risk to national security, principally by undermining Canada's fundamental institutions and eroding the rights and freedoms of Canadians. (Paragraphs 136-175)

F9.

CSIS has consistently conducted investigations and provided advice to government on foreign interference. (Paragraphs 195-201)

F10.

Throughout the period under review, the interdepartmental coordination and collaboration on foreign interference was case-specific and ad hoc. Canada's ability to address foreign interference is limited by the absence of a holistic approach to consider relevant risks, appropriate tools and possible implications of responses to state behaviours. (Paragraphs 219- 227 and 280-285)

F11.

Foreign interference has received historically less attention in Canada than other national security threats. This is beginning to change with the government's nascent focus on "hostile state activities." Nonetheless, the security and intelligence community's approach to addressing the threat is still marked by a number of conditions:

• There are significant differences in how individual security and intelligence organizations interpret the gravity and prevalence of the threat, and prioritize their resources. (Paragraphs 276-279)
• In determining the measures the government may use to address instances of foreign interference, responses address specific activities and not patterns of behaviour. Furthermore, the government's approach gives greater weight to short-term interests (e.g., foreign policy) than longer-term considerations (e.g., risks to freedoms, rights and sovereignty). (Paragraphs 281-285)

F12.

Government engagement on foreign interference has been limited.

• With the exception of CSIS outreach activities, the government's interaction with subnational levels of government and civil society on foreign interference is minimal. (Paragraphs 256-267)
• Engagement is limited in part by the lack of security-cleared individuals at the sub-national level. (Paragraph 261)
• There is no public foreign interference strategy or public report similar to those developed for terrorism or cyber security. (Paragraphs 289-291)

F13.

Canada is working increasingly with its closest allies and partners to address foreign interference. This is essential for Canada. (Paragraphs 268-274)

Chapter 3: The Canada Border Services Agency's National Security and Intelligence Activities

F14.

While the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) does not have explicit legislative authority to investigate national security issues or organized crime, it is a core member of the national security and intelligence community, given its responsibility for border security (Paragraph 334).

F15.

While the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) does not have explicit legislative authority to investigate national security issues or organized crime, it is a core member of the national security and intelligence community, given its responsibility for border security (Paragraph 334).

F16.

Intelligence and national security play different roles within CBSA’s range of activities. Intelligence informs decision-making across the full range of CBSA decision-making and operations. On the other hand, CBSA has only a niche role in relation to national security, and its activities are directed at supporting national security outcomes within CBSA’s broader customs and immigration mandate (Paragraphs 305, 334 and 444-445).

F17.

CBSA’s authorities for engaging in national security and intelligence activities are clear. The Canada Border Services Agency Act establishes CBSA’s mandate to support national security and public safety priorities and enforce its program legislation. CBSA’s authority to control the importation and exportation of goods and make admissibility decisions is explicit in the Customs Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act respectively. CBSA’s use of particular national security and intelligence activities is implicitly derived from its enforcement mandate based on common law principles codified in the Interpretation Act (Paragraphs 324-333).

F18.

CBSA’s sensitive national security and intelligence activities are well governed. However, CBSA does not have ministerial direction for its conduct of sensitive national security and intelligence activities. This is inconsistent with other organizations in the security and intelligence community that conduct similar activities and is a gap in ministerial accountability (Paragraphs 437-438).

F19.

In support of its mandate, CBSA conducts sensitive national security and intelligence activities that may pose a range of risks, including to the rights of individuals. While these activities are subject to governance controls, dedicated policy and operational guidance, CBSA does not have a standard process for assessing and reporting on the risks and outcomes of these national security and intelligence activities (Paragraphs 436 and 449).