Introduction

1. The National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (the Committee, or NSICOP) is pleased to present the Prime Minister with its third annual report. This year's report differs in style and substance from the Committee's previous work. It not only reflects the unprecedented events and the resulting constraints of 2020, but it also marks the beginning of the second iteration of the Committee, which was reconstituted in February 2020. The Committee's 2019 annual and special reports were tabled in Parliament in March 2020 and, shortly thereafter, a nationwide lockdown came into effect. The Committee was forced to pause its operations in the interest of curbing the spread of COVID-19. The Committee adjusted its work plan in the months following the lockdown and resumed regular meetings only when it was safe to do so.

The Committee's 2020 activities

2. In accordance with the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Act (NSICOP Act), the Committee was dissolved in September 2019 when the federal election was called. In February 2020, the Committee was reconstituted. The Committee welcomed five new members and four returning members representing all major parties and recognized groups in the Senate and the House of Commons. Between February and March 2020, the Committee held seven meetings focused on building members' knowledge of the Committee's mandate and the raies and authorities of the core organizations in the security and intelligence community. The Committee dedicated several meetings to preparations for the tabling of its 2019 reports, including to discuss the government's process to identify information in the reports the disclosure of which would be injurious to national security, national defence or international relations or which constituted solicitor-client privilege, and to then to determine how it would remove that information prior to the tabling of the reports. During this period, the Committee was able to conduct a site visit to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and to meet with academics to discuss important issues facing the national security and intelligence community. New Committee members spent additional hours outside of the regular meeting times to familiarize themselves with the Committee's past reports, and to learn more about the Committee's legislation and procedures.

3. On March 12, 2020, the government tabled the Committee's Annual Report 2019 and its Special Report on the Collection, Use, Retention and Dissemination of Information on Canadians in the context of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces Defence Intelligence Activities. Together, the reports contained four substantive reviews. Their tabling coincided with the start of the nationwide lockdown to slow the spread of COVID-19. The reports nevertheless received significant domestic and international media coverage at that time, and the Committee Chair conducted outreach with academics and Canadians in the months that followed. Continued media interest in the Committee's reviews, particularly those regarding foreign interference and diversity and inclusion, underlines their ongoing relevance for Canadians. The Chair conducted further outreach when he appeared before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security on November 23, 2020, to discuss the Committee's 2019 reports.

4. The nationwide shutdown disrupted the Committee's operations and forced the Committee to adjust its work plan for 2020. Public health guidance prevented the Committee from meeting in person, and the sensitive nature of the Committee's work and its security requirements limited the Committee's ability to meet virtually. The NSICOP Secretariat continued work on the Committee's behalf through April, May and June. During this period, the Committee met three times to discuss and determine its intentions for its 2020 annual report and its review plan for 2021. Members' flexibility during this period allowed the Committee's work to continue, albeit at a slower pace, until conditions were in place for a safe return to secure meetings.

5. Since the start of the pandemic, the Committee has reduced the frequency and duration of its meetings. Nonetheless, with technological and accommodation support from CSIS, the Committee met 16 times over the course of 2020 for a total of 54 hours. During this time, the Committee launched two reviews, met with senior officiais in the security and intelligence community, held three hearings and prepared this annual report. The Committee has an ambitious plan for 2021 and work on those reviews is well under way.

Update on the government's response to the Committee's recommendations

6. When it was reconstituted in 2020, the Committee took time to reflect on the government's response to the Committee's first two years of work. Since the tabling of its first special report in December 2018, the Committee has made 23 recommendations to the government aimed at increasing the effectiveness and accountability of the security and intelligence community. ^{Footnote 1}

7. The government's response to the Committee's reports has been limited. Immediately prior to its dissolution in September 2019, the Committee received a letter from the Prime Minister acknowledging the Committee's work and stating that the Committee's recommendations were under consideration. The Prime Minister's December 2019 mandate letters to the ministers of National Defence and of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness directed them to "introduce a new framework governing how Canada gathers, manages and uses defence intelligence, as recommended by the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians." ^{Footnote 2} The Committee received a copy of a letter from the Office of the Privacy Commissioner to the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces (DND/CAF) offering assistance and privacy expertise to DND/CAF for the implementation of that commitment. The Committee and its Secretariat have also received informai feedback from senior officiais on aspects of the Committee's reviews.

8. The Committee spends considerable time deliberating on its recommendations to ensure they are reasonable, actionable and effective. Its reviews are the product of significant work by bath the Committee and organizations in the security and intelligence community. The Committee recognizes that the government is not required to respond to its recommendations; however, the Committee believes that regular and substantive responses would contribute to strengthening the accountability and increasing the transparency of the security and intelligence community. In that respect, it is noteworthy that NSICOP's international counterpart, the United Kingdom's Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, receives regular government responses toits reports. The Committee therefore asks the government to consider formally responding to Committee reviews, as it does for organizations like the Office of the Auditor Generai and for parliamentary committees.

Looking ahead

9. The Committee has an ambitious agenda and announced its upcoming reviews in September 2020. The second iteration of the Committee will continue conducting "framework" reviews (under paragraph 8(a) of the NSICOP Act) and "activity" reviews (under paragraph 8(b)). For its framework review, the Committee will examine the government's framework to defend its systems and networks from cyber attacks. For its activity review, the Committee will examine the national security and intelligence activities of Global Affairs Canada. Work is already under way for bath reviews and the Committee is looking forward to exploring these issues in the year ahead. The Committee also remains committed to engaging civil society and academics to ensure that its work is informed by a multitude of perspectives.

Reporting requirements

10. The NSICOP Act imposes a number of reporting obligations on the Committee. Subsection 21(1) requires the Committee to note in its annual report its findings and recommendations from the preceding year. As noted earlier, the Committee did not complete a review in 2020 and has no findings or recommendations to report. The NSICOP Act also requires the Committee to note the number of times in the preceding year that an appropriate minister determined that a review proposed by the Committee under its activity review mandate would be injurious to national security. The Committee must also report the number of times an appropriate minister refused to provide information to the Committee due to his or her opinion that the information constituted special operational information and that providing it would be injurious to national security. In 2020, no reviews proposed by the Committee were deemed injurious to national security and no information requested by the Committee was refused by a minister on the grounds that it constituted special operational information and that providing it would be injurious to national security.

11. The Committee also notes that it received annual reports from twelve of thirteen organizations on their application of Ministerial Direction on Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities, pursuant to section 8(1) of the Avoiding Complicity in Mistreatment by Foreign Entities Act. That direction requires departments and agencies to put in place or update policies and procedures to ensure compliance with the Act. The Committee received reports from the Canada Border Services Agency; the Canada Revenue Agency; CSIS; the Communications Security Establishment; the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Armed Forces; the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada; Fisheries and Oceans Canada; Global Affairs Canada; Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada; the Royal Canadian Mounted Police; Public Safety Canada; and Transport Canada. A report was not received from the Privy Council Office.

12. In September 2020, the government provided the Committee with the classified Report on the Assessment of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol. The Protocol and the report were mandated by a July 2019 Cabinet directive that laid out an approach for informing the public about incidents of foreign interference that threatened the integrity of the 2019 federal election. Part of the approach included the creation of a panel of five senior public servants who would be responsible for determining whether to inform Canadians of any such incident. The directive included a requirement for an independent review of the Protocol to assess its implementation and its effectiveness, and to determine whether it should be permanently established and how it could be improved. The directive also included a requirement to provide the Committee with the final report of this review. Jim Judd, a former director of CSIS and a former Deputy Minister of National Defence, conducted this review.

13. The Committee carefully considered Mr. Judd's report. It was heartened to see the government take concrete measures to respond to the issue of foreign interference. As documented in the Committee's 2019 annual report, Canada is the target of significant and sustained foreign interference activities. Foreign actors seek to interfere in Canada's political process across all levels of government, effectively threatening our sovereignty and the integrity of our democratic institutions. The Committee therefore supports key recommendations in Mr. Judd's report, notably that the Protocol mechanism be re-established well in advance of the next federal election and that its mandate be extended to include the pre-writ period.

14. The Committee believes the government should consider four issues as it deliberates the report's recommendations:

• First, the Protocol's mandate should capture all forms of foreign interference, from cyber interference to more traditional methods. In its 2019 review, the Committee found that traditional forms of foreign interference are pervasive across the Canadian polity and pose a significant threat to the rights and freedoms of Canadians.
• Second, the membership of the Panel may benefit from the inclusion of eminent Canadians, potentially including retired jurists. The Committee is concerned that senior public servants appointed to the panel may be preoccupied with transition preparations during the writ period, and notes that an intervention by a non-partisan and high-profile group that includes prominent Canadians may carry more weight in the highly politicized context of an election.
• Third, the government should engage frequently and substantively with political parties on the Protocol's purpose and operation to ensure the widest understanding of the Panel's non partisan role and the process for intervention.
• Finally, further thought should be given to how the panel would inform Canadians of an incident of foreign interference, including issues of attribution.

15. The Committee communicated its views on the Judd report in a letter to the Prime Minister in December 2020, and will pursue its discussions on the Protocol with the Clerk of the Privy Council in his capacity as Chair of the Panel.

Format of the annual report

16. The 2020 annual report is different from the Committee's past reports. Given the reconstitution of the Committee in February 2020 and the disruption caused by the pandemic, the Committee could not finish a substantive review in 2020 for inclusion in the annual report. After lengthy deliberation, the Committee decided to provide an update to the 2018 threat assessment included in the Committee's first annual report. It decided to do so for several reasons. First, the government does not produce a publicly accessible overview of the main national security threats to Canada. The Committee identified this gap in its 2018 annual report and it continues to believe that such an overview will increase the public's awareness of security threats to Canada. Second, the Committee expects that its 2020 update will continue to contribute to a more informed debate on security and intelligence issues in Canada. Finally, the past two years have seen important shifts in the domestic and international security environments, including challenges arising from the COVID-19 pandemic.

17. The following chapter provides an update on the main national security threats facing Canada. These are terrorism, espionage and foreign interference, malicious cyber activities, major organized crime, and weapons of mass destruction. This update will set the stage for the Committee's reviews in the years to corne.

18. NSICOP's 2018 overview of national security threats did not include military threats facing the country. The Committee notes that DND/CAF requested that the 2020 overview include a description of their assessment of these threats. According to DND/CAF, "over the past years, our adversaries, notably Russia and China, have heavily prioritized their defence apparatus and have become increasingly assertive in their efforts to change the international rules-based order, with the clear intent to counter Western influence and interests. Canada's adversaries have studied our military capabilities and developed weapons specifically designed to counter our defences and exploit our vulnerabilities." ^{Footnote 3} In order to better understand the nature and extent of military threats to Canada's security, the Committee may follow up with DND/CAF and other security organizations in the near future.