Introduction
Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada's Democratic Processes and Institutions

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1. Beginning in the fall of 2022, media reports allegedly based on leaked intelligence brought the question of foreign interference squarely into the public discourse. They raised questions about what the Prime Minister knew and when, and whether the Government ignored intelligence for partisan advantage. The reports also prompted questions about what the government had done more broadly to respond to interference by the People’s Republic of China and other countries in the federal elections of 2019 and 2021, including whether larger systemic negligence was at play. Some parliamentarians and commentators called for a public inquiry.

2. On November 1, 2022, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs initiated a study of foreign interference. The Standing Committee called on Ministers and senior officials to explain how the government has responded to foreign interference activities. It also heard from subject matter experts, interested organizations and community groups about the threat from states conducting interference activities. Footnote 1 The House of Commons Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics launched a similar study on December 7, 2022. Neither standing committee had access to classified information. Footnote 2

3. On March 6, 2023, the Prime Minister requested or announced a number of independent reviews. The Prime Minister asked the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency (NSIRA) to conduct a review of the flow of information from national security agencies to decision-makers during the 43rd and 44th general elections. Footnote 3 NSIRA's review focused on the production and dissemination of intelligence on foreign interference, including how it was communicated across the government. Footnote 4 (NSIRA submitted its review to the Prime Minister on March 5, 2024.) Footnote 5 The Prime Minister also appointed an Independent Special Rapporteur to determine, among other things, whether the government should call a public inquiry into allegations of foreign interference. Footnote 6 (The Special Rapporteur concluded that a public inquiry should not be pursued; Footnote 7 however, the government ultimately established a public inquiry on September 7, 2023.) Footnote 8 Finally, the Prime Minister requested that the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (the Committee) “complete a review to assess the state of foreign interference in federal election processes” with respect to “foreign interference attempts that occurred in the 43rd and 44th federal general elections, including potential effects on Canada’s democracy and institutions.” Footnote 9

4. In response to the Prime Minister’s request, the Committee decided to conduct a broader review, expanding its scope beyond the federal election process to Canada’s federal democratic processes and institutions (defined at paragraph 7, below). Footnote 10 It did so for two reasons. First, the Committee had already completed a review of foreign interference in 2019 and was well aware of how states try to manipulate Canadian politics and society in support of their own national interests. As such, the Committee understood that elections, while critical, are part of a broader continuum of effort aimed at interfering with Canadian democratic processes and institutions. Second, the Committee wanted to focus its efforts where it has greatest value: access to highly classified information that cannot be discussed in public. The Committee relied in large part on classified materials, briefings and appearances to inform its understanding of the state of foreign interference in Canada’s democratic processes and institutions and the government’s response.

Scope

5. This report builds on the Committee’s 2019 review, which was a broader examination of foreign interference in Canada. It included a detailed review of the main threat actors, their motivations, and foreign interference tactics and targets, and an examination of the government’s response to the threat, including cooperation and deconfliction, resourcing and prioritization, and legislative frameworks. The 2019 review did not specifically examine foreign interference activities directed at the 43rd federal election given the government’s nascent efforts in this area at the time.

6. This review seeks to avoid duplicating the Committee’s previous work. It is clear to the Committee that foreign actors continue to carry out interference activities in Canada. The key threat actors, including their motivations, tactics and techniques, largely remain the same, although this review describes what has evolved and what intelligence agencies reported in the time period in question. Moreover, the mandates and legislative authorities of the departments and agencies responsible for responding to foreign interference are also largely unchanged; this review will discuss where there are exceptions.

7. As a result, this review narrowly focuses on the specific threat to Canada’s democratic processes and institutions as a subset of the larger foreign interference challenge (see Annex B, Committee Terms of Reference). The Committee defines democratic processes and institutions as those processes, actors and stakeholders with an integral role in influencing or determining how Canada governs itself. In this respect, key actors and stakeholders include:

  • voters;
  • political parties, candidates and their staff;
  • Parliamentarians and their staff;
  • public servants;
  • the media;
  • lobbyists; and
  • community groups.

Key processes include:

  • the election itself; Footnote 11
  • nomination processes, including leadership races;
  • parliamentary business, including parliamentary motions and the legislative process;
  • campaigns; and
  • fundraising.

8. This review examined information from September 1, 2018 to March 15, 2024, and included the following organizations:

  • Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS);
  • Communications Security Establishment (CSE);
  • Department of Justice (DoJ);
  • Elections Canada;
  • Global Affairs Canada (GAC);
  • The Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections;
  • Privy Council Office (PCO);
  • Public Prosecution Service of Canada (PPSC);
  • Public Safety Canada (PS); and
  • Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).

9. This review does not examine the impact of foreign interference on democratic principles writ large. Footnote 12 This concept was covered in the Committee’s previous report, which concluded that the consequences of foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions were clear: it undermines the democratic rights and fundamental freedoms of Canadians; the fairness and openness of Canada’s public institutions; the ability of Canadians to make informed decisions and participate in civic discourse; the integrity and credibility of Canada’s parliamentary process; and public trust in the policy decisions made by the government. Footnote 13 The Committee deliberated at length about this distinction, but ultimately decided that given its previous work and the ongoing efforts by other parliamentary committees to study foreign interference, its value lay in a more focused review of democratic processes and institutions drawing on highly classified materials.

Methodology

10. In support of the review, the Committee requested material from CSIS, CSE, the RCMP, PS, GAC and PCO, examining approximately 4000 documents totalling over 33,000 pages. It also relied on secretarial briefings and departmental responses to written questions. Senior officials appeared before the Committee, sometimes more than once, from CSIS, CSE, the RCMP, PS, GAC and PCO. Given their important roles in addressing aspects of foreign interference, senior officials from the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, Elections Canada and the Office of the Commissioner for Canada Elections also briefed the Committee. In the final stage of its review, the Committee held appearances with the Minister of Justice; the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs; the Minister of Foreign Affairs; and the Prime Minister. The Committee extends its gratitude to Ministers and officials for their time, candour and expertise.

11. In considering information received for this review and conclusions from its previous review of foreign interference, the Committee noted the intelligence community’s consistent assessment that threat actors continue to consider Canada a permissive environment, viewing interference activities as a low-risk, high reward way to pursue strategic interests. Footnote 14 This assessment has informed the Committee’s analysis of review appearances and materials, raising several key questions:

  • Has the government’s response to this threat contributed toward the perception by foreign states that Canada’s democratic processes and institutions are an easy target?
  • If effective threat mitigation seeks to counter a hostile actor’s intent, capability and opportunity to act, how and where are Canada’s democratic processes and institutions most vulnerable?

The Committee used this analytical lens to develop its assessment, findings and recommendations, which are intended to provide the government clarity on where gaps persist and where action must be taken.

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