Chapter 3: The government’s response
Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada's Democratic Processes and Institutions

80. This chapter outlines the government’s response to the threat of foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions (see Annex C). In this context, the Committee considers the government’s response to include two broad policy initiatives: first, initiatives to protect Canada’s democratic processes and institutions *** adopted by the government between 2018 and 2023 and the implementation of those initiatives; and second, efforts to amend the legislative frameworks for investigating, prohibiting, preventing or countering this threat. This chapter also examines the government’s efforts to brief parliamentarians on the threat of foreign interference, its operational response to threat of foreign interference using existing mandates and authorities, and interdepartmental governance of the file.

Policy initiatives

The Plan to Protect Democracy (*** 2018)

81. Canada’s strategic response to foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions must be understood in the context that brought the issue to the fore. As noted earlier, Russia carried out an influence campaign aimed at the United States (U.S.) in the 2016 presidential election with the goal of undermining public faith in the U.S. democratic process and discrediting the candidacy of Hillary Clinton. ^{Footnote 231} It did so by leveraging social media to provoke and amplify political and social discord in the U.S., including by purchasing political advertisements and staging local political rallies. This influence effort was complemented by targeted cyber hacks and the release of materials damaging to the Clinton campaign. ^{Footnote 232} The U.S. intelligence community was aware of Russian efforts during the presidential campaign, but the central challenge for the U.S. government during those events was how to inform the American public of Russia’s interference without appearing to unduly influence the course of the election. Russia would go on to employ similar “hack-and-leak” and disinformation campaigns in the United Kingdom in 2016, France in 2017, and Germany in 2017. ^{Footnote 233}

82. These events shaped Canada’s early efforts to counter foreign interference in its elections. In February 2017, the Prime Minister tasked the Minister of Democratic Institutions to work in collaboration with the Ministers of Public Safety and National Defence to lead the government’s efforts to defend the Canadian electoral process from cyber threats. ^{Footnote 234} The Minister of Democratic Institutions developed a four-pillar framework, intended to serve as the architecture for Canada’s efforts to combat foreign electoral interference. The four pillars were:

• Combating foreign interference through increased threat awareness and international coordination;
• Promoting institutional resilience by supporting key stakeholders (e.g., government institutions, political parties, media, etc.) to effectively plan for, respond to, and mitigate electoral interference;
• Building citizen resilience by promoting informed and critical thinking about democracy and democratic issues in the digital space; and
• Establishing rules for digital platforms to act with appropriate responsibility in an elections context. ^{Footnote 235}

83. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] In 2018, the Government recognized that additional measures were required to bolster Canada’s electorate and electoral infrastructure, and more comprehensively mitigate cyber and non-cyber threats. ^{Footnote 236} In January 2019, the Government announced the Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy, which sought to address what the government assessed to be the key vulnerabilities at the time, including by:

• Formalizing government responses to foreign interference during an election campaign, and how Canadians would be informed;
• Increasing media literacy programming to help inform and inoculate Canadians against disinformation campaigns;
• Expanding outreach efforts to political parties and diaspora communities to help them protect themselves from foreign human interference and cyber operations;
• Better understanding the spread of disinformation on digital platforms and identifying key foreign perpetrators. ^{Footnote 237}

84. The Plan established or formalized several mechanisms and initiatives, specifically:

• The Critical Election Incident Public Protocol, including the Panel and the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force;
• The Digital Citizen Initiative at Canadian Heritage;
• Increased public engagement by intelligence agencies on the threat of electoral interference;
• Direction for the RCMP to form a team dedicated to investigating foreign interference activities;
• The creation of the Protecting Democracy Unit at PCO; and
• Direction for CSIS, CSE and the RCMP to provide a classified threat briefing to key political party leaders. ^{Footnote 238}

The Committee will describe these initiatives and their implementation below.

85. The Critical Election Incident Public Protocol (the Protocol): Announced by the government on January 30, 2019, the Protocol set out how the government would publicly inform Canadians during the writ period about incidents that threatened Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election. In 2021, the government updated the Protocol after the 43^rd general election to align the Protocol’s application period with the caretaker convention, ^{Footnote 239} which refers to the period between the dissolution of Parliament or when the Government loses a vote of no-confidence and the swearing-in of a new government or when an election result returning an incumbent government is clear. ^{Footnote 240} Implementation of the Protocol is supported by two key mechanisms: the Panel and the Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections (SITE) Task Force.

86. The Panel: Five deputy heads (the Panel) administer the Protocol. Its members are the Clerk of the Privy Council, the National Security and Intelligence Advisor, and the deputy ministers of the Departments of Justice, Foreign Affairs and Public Safety. ^{Footnote 241} The Panel is supported and informed by SITE.

87. SITE: Consisting of CSIS, GAC, the RCMP, and CSE, SITE is an operational task force that “aims to improve awareness, collection, coordination and action in countering Foreign Interference in Canada’s federal election[s].” ^{Footnote 242} SITE focuses its efforts on covert, clandestine, or criminal activities interfering with or influencing electoral processes in Canada. ^{Footnote 243} SITE also offered briefings to Secret-cleared representatives of each political party represented in the House of Commons during the election period (discussed below). ^{Footnote 244} In the period under review, SITE operated throughout the phases of the electoral process. In the pre-writ periods, SITE met frequently, including with Elections Canada (EC) and the Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections, and provided threat briefings to the Panel, EC and the Office of the Commissioner, and to those Secret-cleared representatives of federal political parties. ^{Footnote 245} During the writ period and on election day, SITE met daily and produced a daily situation report for the Panel, was on call 24/7, and provided threat briefings to political party representatives (see paragraph 96 below). After election day, SITE remained on call 24/7 for one week and then prepared an after action report. ^{Footnote 246} Since the 2019 election, SITE has remained a standing task force. ^{Footnote 247}

88. The Protocol requires preparation of an independent report after each election to assess the Protocol’s implementation and effectiveness in addressing threats. Two reports have been released to date: the Judd Report released in May 2020 and the Rosenberg Report released in February 2023. ^{Footnote 248} The Judd report concluded that the Protocol was implemented successfully and suggested recommendations for improvement to resolve challenges that had been encountered, which were addressed by *** the Government in 2021, as noted earlier. ^{Footnote 249} (The Cabinet Directive on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol requires that the independent report on the Protocol’s implementation be shared with the Committee. The Committee supported the author’s key recommendations and flagged several considerations in a letter to the Prime Minister in December 2020). ^{Footnote 250} The Rosenberg report found that while there had been foreign interference efforts, they did not meet the Protocol’s threshold for the Panel to advise the public. The Rosenberg report also stressed that “the government’s plan and public communications should acknowledge that the problem of interference occurs both before the election is called and during the caretaker period.” ^{Footnote 251}

89. Digital Citizen Initiative: Based at Canadian Heritage, the initiative aims to build citizen resilience against online disinformation and build partnerships to support a healthy information ecosystem, by supporting projects to promote critical thinking and digital media literacy. ^{Footnote 252} The government reports that the initiative has spent over $15 million on 96 projects by civil society and academic organizations “to build citizen resilience against disinformation.” ^{Footnote 253} For example, in 2019-2020, the government contributed $7 million to bolster civic, news and digital media literacy, ranging from awareness sessions and workshops to the development of learning materials. According to the Digital Citizen Initiative, these projects reached more than 12 million Canadians. ^{Footnote 254}

90. G7 Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM): Announced at the June 2018 G7 Summit in Charlevoix, this Canada-led initiative works to strengthen coordination across G7 countries to respond to foreign interference by sharing information and identifying opportunities for coordinated responses in response to disinformation campaigns. ^{Footnote 255} Housed within GAC, RRM Canada, which is the permanent secretariat to the RRM, also monitors the digital information environment for foreign state-sponsored disinformation, including during general elections. ^{Footnote 256} RRM Canada leads GAC’s participation in SITE, and began evaluating the Canadian digital information ecosystem in the year prior to the 2019 Election. RRM Canada regularly informed SITE of online and media activities, including disinformation, aimed at discouraging Canadians from supporting certain political parties, and discrediting Canadian politicians and institutions. An example of RRM Canada’s contribution is described in paragraph 35.

91. Increased Public Engagement by Intelligence Agencies: *** The Plan to Protect Canada’s Democracy also provided the authority for Canada’s intelligence agencies to increase engagement with Canadians on the threat of electoral interference. For CSIS, this meant the authorization to make sustained investments in its capacity to investigate, analyse and provide advice on foreign influenced activity targeting Canada’s democratic institutions, and to raise awareness of threats to key stakeholders involved in the democratic process. Similarly, the Plan enabled CSE to provide technical advice, guidance and services to Canadian political parties and elections administrators, and enhance public engagement efforts on cyber threats to Canada’s democratic processes. ^{Footnote 257} In July 2021, CSIS publicly released its report, “Foreign Interference: Threats to Canada’s Democratic Process,” which lays out foreign state motivations and techniques, key targets in Canada and government efforts to address the threat. ^{Footnote 258} For its part, CSE built on a 2017 report to publish a report in 2019 on cyber threats to Canada’s democratic processes, detailing key targets and trends and an assessment of the Canadian context. ^{Footnote 259} CSE released an updated version of this report in July 2021.

92. RCMP: Under the *** Plan to Protect Democracy, *** the Government directed the RCMP to form a temporary team dedicated to investigating foreign interference activities in order to investigate and disrupt any criminal acts that may be conducted as a part of interference, including hacking, intimidation, and the bribery of public officials. ^{Footnote 260} Initially based in the Ottawa Integrated National Security Enforcement Team, its activities were “informally” transferred to the Foreign Actor Interference Team (FAIT) within the Federal Policing National Security Program at National Headquarters (NHQ) in 2020. ^{Footnote 261} According to the RCMP, the “informal establishment of the FAIT at NHQ was a short-term solution to address the most immediate foreign interference-related needs identified at the time.” ^{Footnote 262} The team consists of seven police officers who provide oversight of the RCMP's foreign interference investigations across Canada, but who do not directly conduct these investigations. ^{Footnote 263}

93. PCO Protecting Democracy Unit: In 2018, the government established the Protecting Democracy Unit within the Privy Council Office to coordinate, develop and implement “government-wide measures designed to combat disinformation and to protect Canada’s democratic institutions.” ^{Footnote 264} The Unit was established to act as the central hub to lead and to coordinate all work across the Government with regards to strengthening and protecting Canada’s democratic institutions from emergent threats, working with other government departments and agencies, and other domestic and international stakeholders, as appropriate. ^{Footnote 265} Funding for the unit was not provided until Budget 2022. ^{Footnote 266}

94. Briefing political parties: *** The Government authorized CSIS, CSE and the RCMP to provide leaders from the political parties represented in the House of Commons with in-depth, classified threat briefings to encourage them to strengthen their internal security practices and behaviours and build their awareness of foreign-influenced activities in Canada. To facilitate these briefings, PCO sponsored security clearances for individuals from each of the political parties represented in the House of Commons. ^{Footnote 267} Ultimately, these briefings were provided under SITE's remit to SECRET-cleared party representatives from July 2019 to September 2019 for the 43^rd general election, and from July 2021 to September 2021 for the 44^th general election. ^{Footnote 268}

95. In February 2023, the Rosenberg report concluded that the “political party representatives were generally pleased with the information sharing with government.” ^{Footnote 269} However, in April and May 2023, Conservative Party of Canada and Liberal Party of Canada representatives testified at the House of Commons Standing Committee on Procedure and House Affairs that they received very little threat information from the government, and what they did receive was “vague” and lacked specificity. The Conservative Party of Canada also testified that SITE did not take seriously its concerns about foreign interference in 13 ridings in the 2021 election (noted in paragraph 33). Both parties’ representatives testified that they thought that SITE would provide them with actionable threat information, such as about their own party’s candidates or volunteers, so that they could keep an eye on issues or conduct their own investigations. Party representatives also testified that SITE members repeatedly cited legislative challenges as a reason the task force could not share more information, although they reportedly did not specify what those challenges were. ^{Footnote 270} Party representatives also noted other challenges of working with SITE. On the one hand, party representatives testified that SITE members’ knowledge of political parties and how campaigns are conducted was low. On the other hand, party representatives acknowledged that their intelligence literacy was low, but noted that SITE did little to explain intelligence concepts to them. ^{Footnote 271} In its capacity as former Chair of SITE, CSE advised the Committee that it “had no recollection of specific discussions with political parties where SITE discussed political parties and campaigns or conversations on the finer points of intelligence collection/concepts.” ^{Footnote 272}

Strategy to Counter Hostile Activities by State Actors (HASA)

96. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] The security and intelligence community recognized that work to counter foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions needed to extend beyond securing elections. ^{Footnote 273} Indeed, in 2018 the Government acknowledged that the threat of foreign interference was multi-pronged so Canada requires a multi-faceted, nimble approach, acknowledging that traditional human interference activity, long-tracked by intelligence agencies, continues to be perpetrated in Canada. ^{Footnote 274}

97. In March 2018, Public Safety first briefed Deputy Ministers on the threat of hostile activities by state actors (HASA), defined as “actions by hostile states or their proxies that are deceptive, coercive, corruptive, covert, threatening or illegal, yet fall below the threshold of armed conflict, and which undermine Canada’s national interests.” ^{Footnote 275} In July 2018, Public Safety subsequently began efforts to develop a strategy ***, which was discussed and debated over the ensuing four years. ^{Footnote 276} By the fall of 2019, departments and agencies had identified areas for reform across the security and intelligence community. ^{Footnote 277}

98. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] It would take the Government over two and a half years to put in place a plan of reform. The plan included a classified, internal-to-government countering HASA strategy; the creation of a HASA coordinator; an unclassified, public-facing strategy; consultations on legislative amendments; and new resources and activities for the RCMP. These initiatives are described below. ^{Footnote 278 Footnote 279 Footnote 280}

99. A classified internal-to-government Countering HASA Strategy: The Strategy prioritized defending the following five sectors: democratic processes and institutions, Canadian communities vulnerable to harassment and intimidation, economic prosperity and research security, international affairs and defence, and critical infrastructure. These sectors are underpinned by three pillars of action:

• Detect: Understanding the threat environment and establishing a common operating picture as a prerequisite for an effective whole-of-government response;
• Strengthen: Building resilience, reducing vulnerabilities and the perception of Canada being a permissive environment, making Canada a harder target;
• Act: Deploying coordinated mechanisms to respond to HASA, based on evidence gathered through threat detection and in accordance with all applicable laws. ^{Footnote 281}

100. The creation of a new National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator: [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] The Government endorsed the creation of a coordination role to implement the Strategy and to convene federal departments and agencies to address emerging HASA issues through the creation of a “Counter-HASA Coordinator,” beginning in the 2023-24 fiscal year. The Coordinator’s role would not alter the mandates of national security agencies and departments, nor would it grant Public Safety the authority to operationally direct others. Rather, its mandate would be limited to better leveraging PS's existing coordination role to ensure that HASA threats are jointly examined and addressed. ^{Footnote 282} This coordination role is also distinct from PCO's Protecting Democracy Unit, which focuses almost exclusively on implementing the Plan to Protect Democracy, notably on countering disinformation.

101. The Prime Minister announced the creation of the renamed National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator on March 6, 2023. ^{Footnote 283} This brought Canada partially in line with Australia, which appointed a National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator in 2018 to administer a national, whole-of-government strategy with objectives similar to the HASA Strategy. ^{Footnote 284} (Australia also has a Counter-Foreign Interference Taskforce, which includes the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Australian Federal Police, which is responsible for detecting, disrupting and investigating foreign interference activities.) ^{Footnote 285} Since the Coordinator was named, his efforts have primarily focused on establishing governance mechanisms, including a new ad hoc Deputy Minister Committee on Foreign Interference for urgent decisions. ^{Footnote 286}

102. An unclassified public-facing Countering HASA Strategy: [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] The Government considered a whole-of-government strategic communications and engagement strategy, intended to help coordinate government communications with the public and key stakeholders (e.g., industry, ethnocultural communities, historically marginalized groups and other orders of government, etc.) regarding HASA threats. This approach was aligned with counter-disinformation efforts led by the Privy Council Office Democratic Institutions Secretariat. ^{Footnote 287} Public Safety subsequently noted that while the principles underpinning the public strategy remain valid, it has been challenging to find the right timing for its release in light of the media reports of leaked intelligence and the ensuing public debate about foreign interference, and is now considering whether to substitute this strategy with an educational approach. ^{Footnote 288}

103. Mandate to conduct consultations on proposed legislative amendments: *** In 2023, the Government launched consultations on a potential foreign influence transparency registry and potential amendments to the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (CSIS Act), the Criminal Code, and the Security of Information Act (SOIA). ^{Footnote 289} The following section provides an update on these efforts.

104. CSIS Act Amendments: Enacted in 1984, the CSIS Act has not been comprehensively reviewed since its initial five-year review completed in 1990. *** Despite amendments like the introduction of threat reduction measures in 2015 and the dataset regime in 2019, significant deficiencies in CSIS's authorities remain, which have an impact on its ability to respond to foreign interference. Specific shortcomings include CSIS's ability to collect foreign intelligence and to share classified information (i.e., with elected officials or other orders of government). ^{Footnote 290} On November 24, 2023, the government launched public consultations on legislative amendments to the CSIS Act, including whether to amend the Act to enable CSIS to disclose classified intelligence outside the federal government. ^{Footnote 291}

105. Criminal Code and SOIA Amendments: [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] These are two statutes that address a broad range of conduct related to HASA. The Criminal Code criminalizes, among other things, treason, sabotage, trading in influence and the unauthorized use of a computer, while SOIA focuses on information-related conduct harmful to, or likely to harm, Canada. The Government believed that these provisions could benefit from modernization, such as the Criminal Code’s dated prohibition against treason, and the SOIA's provision regarding unauthorized disclosure of official information in section 4, which was struck down by the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in 2006. ^{Footnote 292} In April 2023, the government committed “to explore if further amendments to existing provisions are needed and whether to create new offences … to facilitate prosecution of foreign interference activities.” ^{Footnote 293} Public Safety also informed the Committee that the Canada Evidence Act would now be part of this consultation exercise. ^{Footnote 294}

106. On November 24, 2023, the government launched public consultations on legislative amendments to the Criminal Code, the Security of Information Act and the Canada Evidence Act. ^{Footnote 295} The consultations sought input on whether to define foreign interference in criminal law and create related offences to protect democratic processes at all orders of government and at all times, including outside an election period. Of relevance to foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions specifically, the consultations also sought views on whether to increase the maximum penalties (from two to five years imprisonment) for anyone convicted of preparing, conspiring, or attempting to commit an existing or new foreign interference offence. Additionally, the consultations sought input on whether to implement a single regime for safeguarding sensitive information in judicial reviews and statutory appeals, and reforms to how national security information is protected and used in criminal proceedings. The Committee understands this as an attempt to address the “intelligence and evidence” challenge. This challenge refers to the risk of the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive collection techniques, confidential sources or intelligence shared from allies in a criminal trial.

107. Foreign Influence Transparency Registry: As outlined in the previous chapter, some foreign governments or their proxies use individuals or entities to influence government policies or public discourse covertly or in a non-transparent manner. Three of Canada’s closest allies have adopted foreign agents’ registries, which prescribe the registration of persons acting as agents of foreign principals and requires public disclosure of one’s status as a foreign agent, to respond to this activity: notably the U.S. (1938), ^{Footnote 296} Australia (2018), ^{Footnote 297} and the United Kingdom (U.K.) (2023). ^{Footnote 298} Registries serve two purposes: they promote transparency (similar to lobbying registries) and they enable criminal investigations into foreign interference. Under U.S. law, a person who works for or on behalf of a foreign government but has not registered with the U.S. Attorney General is liable to criminal prosecution, and this has enabled the FBI to investigate and lay charges in relation to election interference and transnational repression. ^{Footnote 299} This is also the case in Australia (since 2018) and the U.K. (legislation creating a registry received royal assent in 2023).

108. On March 6, 2023, the Prime Minister announced the launch of public consultations on the potential scope and configuration of a Foreign Influence Transparency Registry, intended to “ensure transparency and accountability from people who advocate on behalf of a foreign government.” ^{Footnote 300} Public Safety held these consultations between March 10, 2023 and May 9, 2023. ^{Footnote 301} In November 2023, both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Public Safety advised the Committee that they expected to introduce legislation imminently. ^{Footnote 302}

Intelligence priorities

109. Cabinet approves national intelligence priorities every two years through the Intelligence Priorities Memorandum to Cabinet, the primary mechanism available to the Prime Minister, Cabinet, and senior security and intelligence officials for control, accountability, and oversight of Canada’s intelligence collection and assessment priorities. ^{Footnote 303} Once approved by Cabinet, the Ministers of Public Safety, Foreign Affairs and National Defence issue Ministerial Directives to the relevant organizations in their portfolios to guide intelligence collection and assessment over the ensuing two years. ^{Footnote 304} Officials then use the intelligence priorities to inform the creation of intelligence requirements outlining specific issues or entities of interest to intelligence consumers. ^{Footnote 305}

110. In the period under review, Cabinet set intelligence priorities for the years 2017-2019, 2019-2021 and 2021-2023. During this period, foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions featured regularly and prominently in Canada’s intelligence requirements:

• 2017-2019: The government sought intelligence on how foreign states and their non-state proxies are using espionage, interference or sabotage to undermine the effective functioning and integrity of Canada’s democratic institutions, governance and associated processes. ^{Footnote 306} More specifically, officials sought intelligence on covert or malign efforts to influence or compromise Canadian (federal, provincial/territorial, municipal) politicians, elections, governance, policy, political institutions or infrastructure (including the media). ^{Footnote 307} Officials cited specific concerns relating to social media platforms; agents of influence (journalists, academics, businesspersons, government officials); interference or malign pressure on Canadian media or public policy figures; and any other covert, deceptive or malign use of Canadian proxies. ^{Footnote 308}
• 2019-2021 and 2021-2023: Cabinet approved intelligence priorities for 2019-2021 and 2021-2023 that specifically included foreign interference, which in turn informed intelligence requirements related to the plans, intentions, and capabilities of hostile state actors (or their proxies) to conduct interference activities against Canadian strategic interests. ^{Footnote 309} Clients specifically sought intelligence on:
  • Influence of Canadian officials, and threats to Canadian elections, democracy and civil society;
  • Intimidation and influence of diaspora and dissidents in Canada; and
  • Misinformation and disinformation campaigns, and cyber-enabled interference. ^{Footnote 310}

PCO updates Cabinet annually on how each organization of the security and intelligence community has supported the intelligence priorities using the National Intelligence Expenditure Review (NIER). The NIER informs Cabinet Ministers of variances in annual expenditures over time. ^{Footnote 311} Between 2019-2020 and 2021-2022, organizations increased their expenditures on intelligence collection and assessment for espionage, foreign interference and sabotage, the priority which includes foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions, by approximately $***, bringing it closer to expenditures for terrorism and extremism, the community’s top priority. ^{Footnote 312} Although the NIER methodology changed for the next year, this trend stayed steady in fiscal year 2021-2022. ^{Footnote 313}

Legislative changes

111. Elections Modernization Act: The government enacted legislative changes through the Elections Modernization Act, which received royal assent in December 2018. The Act made amendments to the Canada Elections Act, which governs elections to the House of Commons and protects the rights of Canadian citizens to participate in Canada’s democratic processes. The Elections Modernization Act added three offences: undue influence of electors to vote or refrain from voting by a foreigner; intimidation of voters to vote for or refrain from voting for a particular candidate or party; and prohibitions on the use of foreign contributions for partisan activities, advertising, elections advertising and election surveys. The Act also gave the Commissioner of Canada Elections the power to seek a court order to compel testimony to address serious instances of alleged non-compliance with the Canada Elections Act. ^{Footnote 314}

112. Communications Security Establishment Act: The government enacted further legislative change with the passage of the National Security Act, which received royal assent in June 2019. The act made a number of changes, notably the creation of the Communications Security Establishment Act, which provided CSE the authorities to conduct defensive and active cyber operations to protect Canadians and Canadian interests and critical infrastructure, including electoral infrastructure. These authorities permitted CSE to respond operationally to foreign interference threats (*** examined further in paragraph 116 below).

Operational responses

113. The following section outlines how departments and agencies used their existing authorities to investigate, disrupt and deter foreign interference in Canada’s democratic processes and institutions in the period under review. This section does not provide an exhaustive account of all operational activity; rather, it illustrates the various lines of effort that contributed toward the government’s overall operational response to the threat. These include disruption operations; efforts by law enforcement bodies; and diplomatic activities.

Disruption operations

114. While the primary role of CSIS and CSE is to collect and report intelligence to the government, both organizations have the authority to disrupt or counter threats to Canada’s national security. The following section outlines how those tools were used to respond to foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions.

115. CSE Active and Defensive Cyber Operations: Under the CSE Act, CSE may conduct defensive cyber operations to protect federal systems and non-federal systems designated of importance to the Government of Canada, including critical infrastructure, as well as active cyber operations to protect and pursue Canadian international affairs, defence and security interests. Under these authorities, CSE uses a variety of techniques, such as ***. ^{Footnote 315} As noted in Chapter 2, under the period of review the Minister of Defence authorized two Defensive Cyber Operations to allow CSE to conduct activities that could disrupt malicious cyber operations targeting Canada’s democratic processes and institutions, including the development of defensive measures to protect Elections Canada’s infrastructure. ^{Footnote 316} [*** Two sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described how CSE selected its targets, and described a Ministerial Authorization for a CSE Active Cyber Operation to counter foreign interference. ***] ^{Footnote 317 Footnote 318}

116. CSIS Threat Reduction Measures (TRMs): Under the CSIS Act, CSIS may take measures to reduce a threat to the security of Canada if the measures are reasonable and proportional to the severity of the threat, among other requirements. ^{Footnote 319} Between September 2018 and September 2023, CSIS conducted seven TRMs responding to foreign interference in Canada’s democratic institutions and processes by the PRC, Russia, India, and Pakistan (see Table 1 below). ^{Footnote 320} The TRMs sought to either disrupt foreign interference networks in Canada, ^{Footnote 321} diminish the influence of a threat actor, ^{Footnote 322} or brief individuals who were the victims of foreign interference. ^{Footnote 323}

Table 1: CSIS Threat Reduction Measures against foreign interference in democratic institutions and processes, September 1, 2018 to September 30, 2023

117. *** TRMs were developed in anticipation of the federal elections in 2019 and 2021. [*** Six sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described Threat Reduction Measures taken to address the foreign interference activities of specific countries and the success of those measures. ***] ^{Footnote 331 Footnote 332 Footnote 333}

118. On May 18, 2023, CSIS carried out a TRM under exigent circumstances to brief Member of Parliament Michael Chong (see paragraph 50). Later that month, CSIS used its TRM authority to provide threat briefings to two other members of Parliament, and one former member of Parliament in September 2023. ^{Footnote 334} This TRM was notable in that CSIS described in its briefing to the Minister that the *** overall operational, reputational, legal and foreign policy risk for this TRM was high ***. ^{Footnote 335} CSIS also noted that it had limited ability to prevent later disclosure of the classified information by the members of Parliament, and underlined the legal, policy and procedural implications of disclosing classified information to individuals who did not hold the requisite security clearance and were not bound by the Security of Information Act. ^{Footnote 336}

Efforts by law enforcement

119. Canada has two federal organizations responsible for investigating criminal offences related to foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions: the Office of the Commissioner for Canada Elections and the RCMP. Section 14 (d) of the NSICOP Act limits the Committee’s access to information relating directly to an ongoing investigation carried out by a law enforcement agency that may lead to a prosecution. For this reason, the Committee was unable to discern a clear picture of the investigations that may have been underway in the time period under review. However, it was able to learn the following information.

120. Office of the Commissioner for Canada Elections: The Office of the Commissioner of Canada Elections (OCCE) is mandated to ensure compliance with and enforcement of the Canada Elections Act. ^{Footnote 337} While the Act does not define “foreign interference,” it does prohibit the involvement of foreigners in specific ways, such as prohibiting foreigners from making political contributions. ^{Footnote 338} The OCCE is a relatively small organization and its 20 investigators work almost entirely based on complaints received. ^{Footnote 339} The maximum penalties for those committed of an offence under the Act are five years imprisonment, a fine of $50,000 for an individual and $100,000 for an entity, or a prohibition from sitting or being elected to Parliament for seven years. ^{Footnote 340} The Commissioner of Canada Elections advised the Committee that her office was reviewing 174 foreign interference-related complaints it received about the 2019 and 2021 elections, almost all of which (148 or 85%) were received in 2023 after the leaks of classified information. ^{Footnote 341} As of June 16, 2023, the OCCE had received 158 foreign interference-related complaints concerning the 2019 election (out of a total of 8,000 complaints for that election), ^{Footnote 342} and 16 concerning the 2021 election. ^{Footnote 343} The Commissioner noted that the key external challenges faced by the OCCE included the intelligence-to-evidence dilemma, technological limitations (e.g., encryption), information sharing within the federal government and the difficulty in obtaining evidence located in other countries. ^{Footnote 344}

121. RCMP: In 2020, the RCMP established a Foreign Actor Interference Team to coordinate and oversee its foreign interference investigations (paragraph 93). The unit was established using resources from other national security priorities and the RCMP advised the Committee that it will be unsustainable without new resources. ^{Footnote 345} Despite the creation of this unit, the RCMP was unable to tell the Committee exactly how many foreign interference investigations it had undertaken in the review period — it could only calculate the number of “occurrences,” defined as a record of a call for service or self-generated work (according to the RCMP, an investigation involves one or more occurrences, but “not all occurrences are investigations”). Between 2018 and 2022, the RCMP had six occurrences linked to foreign interference in democratic institutions and processes, all of which required the RCMP to determine whether suspicious events or allegations of foreign interference were potential offences under existing criminal law, such as breach of trust or intimidation. ^{Footnote 346}

122. The RCMP conducted no investigations into foreign interference-related activities in the context of the 2019 and 2021 federal elections. ^{Footnote 347} The SITE Task Force’s post-election reports for the 2019 and 2021 elections noted that there was no information shared with SITE that could have led to a criminal investigation. ^{Footnote 348} Additionally, the RCMP stated that CSIS likely did not provide it with any leads linked to foreign interference in democratic institutions and processes between 2018 and 2023 (the RCMP does not track CSIS leads by threat type, e.g., foreign interference, espionage). ^{Footnote 349}

123. The RCMP has been taking other steps to respond to foreign interference. In 2020, the RCMP added foreign interference to the duties of an “all source” intelligence unit to brief senior RCMP officials for their situational awareness, but not for investigation. In 2021, the RCMP drafted a Foreign Actor Interference Strategy intended for the public; as of January 2024, the document remained unpublished. ^{Footnote 350}

Diplomatic efforts

124. GAC contributed to several government initiatives aimed at protecting the 2019 and 2021 federal elections. As noted earlier, GAC's Rapid Response Mechanism Coordination Unit participated in the SITE Task Force and the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs sat on the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol Panel. ^{Footnote 351} In advance of the 2019 and 2021 federal elections, GAC also sent a formal notice to all foreign diplomatic missions in Canada to remind heads of mission of their obligation to ensure “diplomatic and consular representatives do not conduct activities, which may either be perceived as inducing electors to vote for a particular candidate, or prohibiting them from voting for a particular candidate in any way during an election period. Furthermore, accredited foreign representatives should not — directly or indirectly — make any financial contribution to a candidate, political party or political event.” ^{Footnote 352}

125. Outside of the context of the federal elections and, as noted in the Committee’s previous report, GAC's responsibility for managing Canada’s bilateral and multilateral relationships renders it a key decision-maker in determining how to respond to a state’s attempts at interfering in domestic affairs. GAC has a number of diplomatic tools at its disposal to induce behavioural change in other states. These include bilateral measures, such as cancelling important visits, denying admissibility to diplomatic officials, closing diplomatic missions, closing cultural centres, public attribution of hostile activities by foreign actors, sanctions and declaring a foreign diplomat persona non grata. GAC also employs multilateral approaches, such as sharing best practices and lessons-learned with likeminded partners on how to counter foreign interference, developing diplomatic responses with like-minded states or raising a country’s behaviour for consideration by international organizations. ^{Footnote 353} When considering possible measures, GAC calibrates the government’s response against broader foreign policy interests. ^{Footnote 354} A recent example of GAC's use of one of its tools is provided in Case Study #5, below.

Briefing parliamentarians

126. In its 2018 report on the Prime Minister’s visit to India, the Committee recommended that “Members of the House of Commons and Senate should be briefed upon being sworn-in and regularly thereafter on the risks of foreign interference and extremism in Canada.” ^{Footnote 372} The Committee repeated this recommendation in its 2019 report on foreign interference. ^{Footnote 373} In December 2019, the Clerk of the Privy Council sought the Prime Minister’s authorization to implement the Committee’s recommendations by having CSIS brief parliamentarians in the early weeks of the 43rd Parliament. ^{Footnote 374} The Prime Minister’s Office never replied formally to the recommendation. In December 2020, the NSIA returned to the Prime Minister to seek authorization for CSIS to brief parliamentarians, including unclassified briefings to all members of Parliament and Senators, and classified briefings to opposition party leaders. ^{Footnote 375} The package for the Prime Minister included draft instruction letters to the Ministers of Public Safety and Defence to coordinate the briefings, as well as draft letters to the opposition leaders offering classified briefings. The Prime Minister’s Office did not reply. In February 2022, the NSIA revived the initiative in another memorandum to the Prime Minister, following December 2021 media articles about the Conservative Party of Canada’s concerns with 13 ridings in the most recent federal election (*** this memorandum was ultimately not provided to the Prime Minister). ^{Footnote 376} The memorandum noted a similar proposal had been submitted in December 2020, but did not go forward as a result of the 2021 election and proposed the same steps as the 2020 proposal. ^{Footnote 377} When asked by the Committee why he had not proceeded with this initiative, the Prime Minister responded that he thought that the Parliamentary Protective Service already briefs new parliamentarians about foreign interference. ^{Footnote 378}

127. That said, CSIS conducted briefings for select parliamentarians on an ad hoc basis. In 2021 the Minister of Public Safety instructed CSIS to brief parliamentarians who CSIS believed had been the target of espionage, intimidation or foreign interference. ^{Footnote 379} In the summer of 2021, CSIS provided a series of classified and unclassified briefings to 25 members of Parliament from the Conservative Party of Canada, New Democratic Party and Liberal Party of Canada. ^{Footnote 380} The unclassified briefings were about the PRC's foreign interference activities against parliamentarians. CSIS conducted these briefings using open source information, while the classified briefings, which CSIS conducted under the authority of a Threat Reduction Measure, specifically mentioned *** foreign interference activities against parliamentarians (see paragraph 118). ^{Footnote 381}

128. The briefings covered three topics: CSIS's mandate, the definition of foreign interference, and how members of Parliament and their staff can protect themselves from specific tactics. The information about tactics was general in the unclassified briefings and specific in the classified ones. CSIS provided members of Parliament with two infographics and contact information for who to contact at CSIS and the RCMP to report an act of foreign interference in the upcoming election. ^{Footnote 382} CSIS conducted all of the summer 2021 briefings before the issuance of the writs on August 15, 2021. ^{Footnote 383} CSIS did not provide briefings during the writ period in order to adhere to the caretaker convention. ^{Footnote 384} Since the 2021 election, CSIS increased the number of briefings provided to parliamentarians. In 2022, CSIS briefed 49 MPs and five Senators. ^{Footnote 385}

129. On April 6, 2023, the government responded to NSICOP's recommendations on briefings for parliamentarians. It noted:

• The Parliamentary Protective Service provides security briefings to incoming members of Parliament. ^{Footnote 386}
• The Security and Intelligence Threats to Election Task Force (SITE) offers briefings to political party representatives during the writ period.
• The Privy Council Office Security Operations Division briefs all incoming Ministers and Parliamentary Secretaries on the spectrum of threats, including foreign interference. CSIS also provides briefings to Parliamentarians upon request.
• Briefings for members of Parliament and the Senate will be provided upon their swearing-in and on a regular basis. ^{Footnote 387}

As of February 2024, this approach appears to be unchanged, with no specific briefing program for all parliamentarians on the threat of foreign interference, per the Committee’s recommendations in 2018 and 2020. ^{Footnote 388}

Interdepartmental governance

130. During the review period, the government created two deputy ministerial committees and one Cabinet committee — the National Security Council — to improve its assessment of intelligence and response to national security threats, including foreign interference.

131. The Deputy Minister Intelligence Committee (DMIC): In 2020, the NSIA created and chaired DMIC, whose mandate was to flag important strategic intelligence assessments to deputy ministers and ensure a coordinated response. ^{Footnote 389} Its core membership includes PCO, CSE, CSIS, GAC, Public Safety, the RCMP, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA), and the Canadian Armed Forces and Department of National Defence (CAF/DND). ^{Footnote 390} The governance structure was designed for getting policy decisions to Cabinet instead of driving the work of the national security community, and the intelligence discussed often lacked the level of detail needed to understand a threat issue. ^{Footnote 391} The Committee is only aware of one DMIC meeting in which members discussed intelligence on foreign interference against democratic institutions and processes. ^{Footnote 391} DMIC ceased meeting in June 2021, but reconvened in March 2023.

132. The Deputy Ministers’ Committee on Intelligence Response (DMCIR): In summer 2023, the NSIA created DMCIR. ^{Footnote 394} DMCIR is mandated to review more operational and tactical intelligence reporting that requires a timely response. ^{Footnote 395} It also identifies intelligence that should be briefed to Ministers, Cabinet or the Prime Minister and any intelligence already identified for briefing via other means. ^{Footnote 396} Membership includes CSE, CSIS, GAC, Public Safety, RCMP and PCO. ^{Footnote 397} According to its Terms of Reference, DMCIR began by focusing only on foreign interference issues, but may broaden its scope to include other appropriate issues. ^{Footnote 398} PCO advised the Committee that DMCIR meets weekly, with formal tracking of discussions including the production of meeting minutes. ^{Footnote 399}

133. The National Security Council: On September 27, 2023, the Prime Minister announced the creation of the National Security Council, a new committee of Cabinet. ^{Footnote 400} The Council first met in October 2023, ^{Footnote 401} and is mandated to serve “as a forum for strategic decision-making and for sharing analysis of intelligence in its strategic context.” ^{Footnote 402} Chaired by the Prime Minister, who stated that he wished to convene it on a regular basis, ^{Footnote 403} the members of the Council are the following:

1. Deputy Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance
2. Minister of Defence
3. Minister of Emergency Preparedness
4. Minister of Foreign Affairs
5. Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry
6. Minister of Justice and the Attorney General
7. Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs. ^{Footnote 404}

Parliamentary ethics officers

134. In its review of the Prime Minister’s official visit to India in 2018, the Committee recommended that “Ministers exercise discretion with whom they meet or associate, and clearly distinguish between official and private media messaging, and be reminded that, consistent with the Conflict of Interest Act, public office holders must always place the public interest before private interests.” ^{Footnote 405} Two independent and non-partisan officers of Parliament support compliance with the Act. The Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner provides members of the House of Commons and federal public office holders with direction and advice about ethics and conflicts of interest with a view to avoid conflicts of interest before they occur. The Senate Ethics Officer plays the same role for Senators. Both officers of Parliament also investigate potential breaches of the Conflict of Interest Act and the conflict of interest codes of each chamber. ^{Footnote 406}

135. Currently, foreign interference is not defined in the Conflict of Interest Act or in the conflict of interest code of either chamber. This being the case, the Conflict of Interest and Ethics Commissioner and the Senate Ethics Officer are not currently expressly empowered to provide parliamentarians and federal public office holders with advice on how to avoid potential exposure to foreign interference and to investigate conflicts of interest linked or potentially linked to foreign interference as such.