Chapter 2: The threat of foreign interference in Canada’s democratic processes and institutions
Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada's Democratic Processes and Institutions

23. This chapter describes the primary threat actors and outlines the four main tactics that these states have used since 2018, specifically:

• covertly influencing the opinions and positions of voters, ethnocultural communities and parliamentarians;
• leveraging relationships with influential Canadians;
• exploiting vulnerabilities in political party governance and administration; and
• deploying a variety of cyber tools to attain specific objectives.

Throughout this chapter, the Committee includes examples and case studies to illustrate the threat.

24. Foreign interference activities in Canada’s democratic processes and institutions in the period under review were conducted predominantly through person-to-person interaction. ^{Footnote 28} Foreign states also used mainstream and social media, and other digital means, to conduct interference activities. Interference activities in democratic processes and institutions were conducted by foreign diplomats, intelligence officers, state proxies and co-optees, and targeted all orders of government, civil society groups, ethnocultural communities, community organizations, businesspersons and journalists.

Key threat actors

25. In its 2019 review of the Government Response to Foreign Interference, the Committee noted that the most significant perpetrators of foreign interference in Canada were the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation, with the PRC representing the greatest foreign interference threat. The Committee also noted that other states, including India, ***, Pakistan and Iran engaged in foreign interference activities. The Committee found that these activities posed a significant risk to national security, principally by undermining Canada’s fundamental institutions and eroding the rights and freedoms of people in Canada. ^{Footnote 29}

26. Between September 1, 2018 and November 7, 2023, foreign interference targeting democratic institutions and processes remained largely consistent with the broader trends the Committee identified in its previous review. Most notably, the PRC remained the largest foreign interference threat to Canada, including to its democratic institutions and processes. ^{Footnote 30} The PRC's foreign interference efforts continue to be sophisticated, persistent and multi-dimensional, targeting all orders of Canadian government and various facets of society and relying upon a number of methods. ^{Footnote 31}

27. However, contrary to its assessment in 2019, which noted that Russia was the second most significant foreign interference threat, the Committee observed that Russia did not engage in foreign interference activities within the more narrow context of Canadian democratic institutions and processes. In this period of review, Canada was a lower-level priority for Russia, which focused its efforts instead on other strategic priorities and its adversarial competition with the United States. ^{Footnote 32} In short, while Russia maintained the capability to engage in foreign interference generally against Canada, it lacked the intent to do so. ^{Footnote 33}

28. Instead, India emerged as the second-most significant foreign interference threat to Canada’s democratic institutions and processes. While India’s foreign interference efforts have slowly increased ***, ^{Footnote 34} it became clear during the period of this review that its efforts had extended beyond countering what it perceived as pro-Khalistani efforts in Canada to include interfering in Canadian democratic processes and institutions, including through the targeting of Canadian politicians, ethnic media and Indo-Canadian ethnocultural communities. ^{Footnote 35} The Committee notes that Pakistan also targeted democratic institutions and processes in the early phase of the period under review, ***. ^{Footnote 36}

29. A number of states conducted activities that undermined the democratic rights and freedoms of Canadians during the time under review. In addition to the foreign states mentioned above, *** and Iran continued to monitor and repress respective ethnocultural communities in Canada (see textbox on transnational repression below). ^{Footnote 37} However, the Committee did not observe any intelligence reporting about these three states engaging in foreign interference activities targeting Canadian democratic processes and institutions. ^{Footnote 38}

Key tactics

Covertly influencing the opinions and positions of voters, ethnocultural communities and parliamentarians

30. Foreign states relied on a range of tactics to covertly influence opinions and positions. They sought to manipulate public opinion through traditional and social media, including through disinformation campaigns; sought to covertly exploit ethnocultural communities, most notably to influence their voting preference; and targeted and attempted to intimidate parliamentarians. The Committee describes each of these methods below, focusing on federal democratic processes and institutions while also providing several examples from other orders of government.

Exploiting traditional and social media

31. During the period under review, the intelligence community observed states manipulating traditional media to disseminate propaganda in what otherwise appeared to be independent news publications. ^{Footnote 58} Foreign states also spread disinformation to promote their agendas and consequently challenge Canadian interests, ^{Footnote 59} which posed the greatest cyber threat activity to voters during the time under review. ^{Footnote 60} These tactics attempt to influence public discourse and policymakers’ choices, compromise the reputations of politicians, delegitimize democracy or exacerbate existing frictions in society. ^{Footnote 61}

32. According to the intelligence community, the PRC was the most capable actor in this context, interfering with Canadian media content via direct engagement with Canadian media executives and journalists. ^{Footnote 62} [*** Six sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described examples of the PRC paying to publish media articles without attribution, sponsoring media travel to the PRC, pressuring journalists to withdraw articles and creating false accounts on social media to spread disinformation. ***] ^{Footnote 63 Footnote 64 Footnote 65}

33. Online influence and information operations were some of the more difficult tactics for Canadian intelligence agencies to link to the PRC, or indeed any foreign state. ^{Footnote 66} Intelligence agencies refer to this as the attribution problem. ^{Footnote 67} For example, during the 2021 federal election, the government’s Security and Intelligence Threats to Elections Task Force (SITE), an intelligence coordination mechanism created in 2018 to support implementation of the Critical Elections Incident Public Protocol (both SITE and the Protocol are described in Chapter 3), observed online and media activities aimed at discouraging Canadians, particularly of Chinese heritage, from supporting the Conservative Party of Canada. ^{Footnote 68} The Conservative Party flagged related concerns to SITE about these developments. ^{Footnote 69} While SITE was unable to find clear evidence that linked this activity to specific direction from the PRC government, ^{Footnote 70} it did observe indicators of a coordinated campaign. ^{Footnote 71} Specifically, different Chinese-language media outlets in Canada adopted the language of a PRC state media article, without specifically attributing it. Most of these media outlets were linked to the PRC via partnership agreements with the China News Service, the Chinese Communist Party’s primary media entity servicing Chinese ethnocultural communities, which reports directly to the United Front Work Department, the Chinese Communist Party’s central coordinating body for foreign interference activities (see textbox below). ^{Footnote 72} Moreover, Chinese social media, notably WeChat, is heavily censored by the PRC. CSIS assesses that messages which appear and remain on WeChat have at least tacit support from the government. ^{Footnote 73}

34. The SITE Task Force briefed the Panel for the Critical Elections Incident Public Protocol on these developments. The Protocol sets out the process by which Canadians would be notified of a threat to the integrity of a general election. ^{Footnote 74} The Task Force advised the Panel that it could not definitively determine a link to the PRC nor measure the impact of such foreign interference attempts on the election, and noted the difficulty in definitively concluding whether foreign interference took place, given that third parties can proactively further PRC interests with little-to-no tasking. ^{Footnote 75} The five deputy ministers on the Panel determined that the threshold for a public announcement was not met as the incident did not threaten Canada’s ability to have a free and fair election. ^{Footnote 76}

35. More recently, the government identified an information operation targeting the Member of Parliament for Wellington-Halton Hills, Michael Chong. While monitoring digital platforms for the June 2023 federal by-elections, GAC's Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), established in 2018 as part of a G7 initiative to counter threats to democracy, observed that the operation involved a coordinated network on WeChat, which shared and amplified a large volume of false or misleading narratives about Mr. Chong’s identity, background, political stances and family heritage. GAC publicly stated that “…while China’s role in the information operation is highly probable, unequivocal proof that China ordered and directed the operation is not possible to determine due to the covert nature of how social media networks are leveraged in this type of information campaign.” ^{Footnote 77}

36. During the period under review, India also demonstrated the intent and capability to engage in this type of foreign interference through media manipulation. ^{Footnote 78} [*** Three sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described an example of efforts to discredit a political party leader using materials drafted by Indian intelligence organizations. ***] ^{Footnote 79}

Exploiting ethnocultural communities

37. In the period under review, foreign states sought to exploit cultural and linguistic ties with ethnocultural communities and groups in Canada to interfere in Canada’s democratic processes and institutions. The PRC was the most prolific actor, supported by its United Front Work Department (see following text box). ^{Footnote 80} According to CSIS, members of Chinese ethnocultural communities are primary targets for influence work, relating to the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to control overseas Chinese diaspora populations and co-opt Canadian civil society for its own benefit. [*** One sentence was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentence described an example. ***] ^{Footnote 81}

38. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] The UFWD operates through a large network that includes front organizations which do not declare their affiliation to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and have an additional overt and legal function. These front organizations tasked state-owned enterprises, Chinese-registered private companies, Chinese student organizations, foreign cultural organizations, foreign media, members of Chinese ethnocultural communities, and prominent businesspersons and political figures to engage in democratic institutions and processes in a way that supports the goals of the CCP. ^{Footnote 90} During the period under review, a security and intelligence organization took measures to counter these efforts.

39. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] According to CSIS, the PRC views community associations in particular as an important means through which PRC-linked officials can approach the Canadian government and elected officials. CSIS assesses that the UFWD has established community organizations to facilitate influence operations against specific members of Parliament and infiltrated existing community associations to reorient them towards supporting CCP policies and narratives.

40. Not all entities targeted by the UFWD were aware that they were being used or that what they were doing was problematic. ^{Footnote 93} Indeed, CSIS emphasized *** that only a small number of people within community associations are witting co-optees or proxies. ^{Footnote 94} These organizations often have close relationships with the PRC Embassy and consulates and may rely on financial support for their activities, may benefit from reciprocal favours, including financial and economic incentives or other honours and awards to cooperate with PRC authorities, or may simply support the PRC because of a sense of national pride. ^{Footnote 95}

41. That said, there are clear examples of witting and co-opted community organizations engaging in foreign interference in democratic institutions and processes. [*** Six sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described an example of the PRC creating an organization to conduct foreign interference, its work in a specific federal riding, and an unsuccessful effort by a security and intelligence organization to counter these activities. ***] ^{Footnote 96}

42. Community organizations and events can be valuable sources of fundraising and help build community support for candidates for political office. [*** Three sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described examples of how the PRC used community organizations to support or undermine candidates in specific electoral districts and at different levels of government. ***] ^{Footnote 97 Footnote 98}

43. Community organizations can also be used in a practice known as “astro-turfing,” by which a foreign state can conceal its involvement and instead have it appear that influential Canadians or grass-roots organizations are expressing their own opinions on the issues. ^{Footnote 99} For example, CSIS stated, “[b]y co-opting major community associations and leaders, the [Chinese Communist Party] is able to give the impression that the overseas Chinese community, much like the citizens of the PRC, speak with one voice – a voice that supports CCP policies.” ^{Footnote 100} [*** One sentence was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentence described an example of PRC efforts to interfere with Parliament’s 2021 motion to declare the PRC's treatment of its Uyghur population as a genocide and to express concern about the deterioration of Canada-PRC relations. ***] ^{Footnote 101}

Targeting parliamentarians for coercion or suppression

44. CSIS and CSE have produced a body of intelligence that demonstrates that foreign actors have targeted federal parliamentarians to collect information to support potential future efforts to coerce them. Foreign actors have also intimidated or pressured parliamentarians who they perceived as having taken political positions counter to theirs. ^{Footnote 102}

45. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] The PRC in particular employs this strategy. According to CSIS, the PRC is committed to a wide-scale influence campaign against Canadian federal actors, which is coordinated and executed by PRC officials (see Case Study #1). ^{Footnote 103} The PRC's goal is to cultivate and increase the impact of pro-PRC voices in Canada and to marginalize individuals viewed as anti-PRC. CSIS assesses that the PRC categorizes its targets into groups based on their perceived level of support for the PRC. ^{Footnote 104 Footnote 105 Footnote 106}

46. [*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described PRC efforts to collect information, including compromising information, on numerous federal actors, including from all political parties and both houses of Parliament. ***] ^{Footnote 116 Footnote 117 Footnote 118 Footnote 119}

47. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] According to some intelligence reporting, the PRC collected detailed information to produce profiles on some Chinese-Canadian members of Parliament in order to exert influence on them through various people and groups, in Canada and abroad. ^{Footnote 120}

48. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] Federal actors of Chinese descent are a particular target of the PRC, due to the expectation that these individuals are or should be more sympathetic to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) goals and perspectives. ^{Footnote 121} According to CSIS, the PRC could punish Chinese-Canadian legislators who had behaved in ways deemed unacceptable by PRC officials to deter such behaviour in others. Conversely, the PRC could reward Chinese-Canadian legislators for behaviour deemed appropriate by PRC officials by providing benefits both in Canada and the PRC, directly or indirectly (e.g., via family members). In short, the use of rewards and punishments is a routine part of the CCP'scoercive approach to manage dissent and influence, within the PRC and abroad. ^{Footnote 122}

49. One of the key examples of this practice was the PRC's targeting of Conservative Party of Canada Member of Parliament Michael Chong. In February 2021, Mr. Chong sponsored a vote in the House of Commons to identify the PRC's treatment of its Uyghur population as genocide. ^{Footnote 213} [*** One sentence was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentence described efforts by the PRC to collect information on Mr. Chong and his family. ***] ^{Footnote 124} According to CSIS, at no time did the intelligence reporting indicate a threat to life, physical harm, or detention of Mr. Chong or his family members. ^{Footnote 125} The PRC's objective was to make an example of Mr. Chong in order to deter other parliamentarians from taking “anti-China” positions. ^{Footnote 126}

50. Mr. Chong was provided with increasingly detailed information on the PRC's efforts over time. In June 2021, CSIS briefed Mr. Chong on foreign interference threat activities, ^{Footnote 127} but could not in its briefing provide classified information owing to the restrictions of s. 19 (1) of the CSIS Act, which limits the sharing of classified information to the federal government. In other words, CSIS was unable to share intelligence with Mr. Chong about the research by the PRC ***. Mr. Chong first became aware of the reported threats to his family on May 1, 2023, in the media. ^{Footnote 128} On May 2, at the direction of the Prime Minister, the Director of CSIS provided Mr. Chong with a classified briefing by way of a Threat Reduction Measure under “exigent circumstances.” ^{Footnote 129} On May 16, 2023, the Minister of Public Safety issued the Ministerial Direction on Threats to the Security of Canada Directed at Parliament and Parliamentarians, which directed CSIS to inform parliamentarians of such threats without delay. ^{Footnote 130}

51. [*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described PRC efforts to collect and use compromising material on federal politicians to intimidate or silence them. ***] ^{Footnote 131 Footnote 132 Footnote 133 Footnote 134}

Leveraging relationships with influential Canadians

52. This section explores four means by which threat actors employ “traditional” foreign interference through human-to-human relationships. This primarily involves establishing reciprocal relationships with influential Canadians, using clandestine networks, employing proxies, and covertly buying influence with candidates and elected officials. In the period under review, threat actors used all of these levers, often at the same time.

Establishing reciprocal relationships

53. In the period under review, CSIS and CSE produced a body of intelligence that showed that foreign actors used deceptive or clandestine methods to cultivate relationships with Canadians who they believed would be useful in advancing their interests — particularly members of Parliament and senators — with a view to having the Canadian act in favour of the foreign actor and against Canada’s interests. In this respect, their efforts extended beyond normal diplomatic activities.

54. In some cases, parliamentarians were unaware they were the target of foreign interference. [*** Two sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described an example of India’s financial support to some candidates from two political parties, and CSIS's assessment that the candidates were unaware of the source of the funds. ***] ^{Footnote 135 Footnote 136}

55. Some elected officials, however, began wittingly assisting foreign state actors soon after their election. [*** Three sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described examples of members of Parliament who worked to influence their colleagues on India’s behalf and proactively provided confidential information to Indian officials. ***] ^{Footnote 137 Footnote 138 Footnote 139}

56. [*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described a textbook example of foreign interference that saw a foreign state support a witting politician. CSIS provided specific intelligence to the secret-cleared representatives of the party shortly before the election and to the Prime Minister shortly after. The Prime Minister discussed this incident with the Committee and the steps he took in response to intelligence reporting. ***] ^{Footnote 140 Footnote 141 Footnote 142 Footnote 143}

57. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] In this context, CSIS assessed that the PRC believes that its relationship with some members of Parliament rests on a quid pro quo that any member’s engagement with the PRC will result in the PRC mobilizing its network in the member’s favour. The PRC would show support for lawmakers in ridings with large numbers of ethnic Chinese voters and who maintain close relationships with the Chinese ethnocultural community, including through Chinese leaders and business people. ^{Footnote 144 Footnote 145}

Clandestine networks

58. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] In the period under review, foreign states developed clandestine networks surrounding candidates and elected officials to gain undisclosed influence and leverage over nomination processes, elections, parliamentary business and government decision-making. Run by foreign states’ officials, these informal networks consisted of Canadian ethnocultural community leaders and prominent businesspersons, political staffers, candidates and elected officials. Foreign officials conveyed their candidate preferences to their networks, after which co-optees or proxies promoted the chosen slate to targeted groups of voters. ^{Footnote 149}

59. For example, *** the PRC had established an informal foreign interference network in ***, understood in this context to describe complex, overlapping and extensive personal and professional connections. ^{Footnote 150} The *** network worked in loose coordination with one another and with guidance from the consulate *** to covertly support or oppose candidates in the 2019 federal election. The *** network had some contact with at least 11 candidates and 13 campaign staffers, some of whom appeared to be wittingly working for the PRC. ^{Footnote 151} [*** Two sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described the network’s efforts to keep federal political candidates away from events that the PRC considered to be “anti-China,” such as a pro-Hong Kong rally; noted similar activities by another network in the riding of Don Valley North; and identified specific individuals involved. ***] ^{Footnote 152 Footnote 153}

60. Officials from the PRC also used clandestine networks to conduct foreign interference in Greater Vancouver. [*** Six sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described the PRC's efforts to leverage its network to support a specific political candidate, noted the work of certain organizations and individuals within the network, and noted an effort by a security and intelligence organization to counter the work of one of the individuals. ***] ^{Footnote 154 Footnote 155}

61. [*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described how India also takes advantage of networks and developed and built a network of contacts through whom it conducts interference activities, including journalists, members of ethnocultural communities and some members of Parliament. ***] ^{Footnote 156}

62. [*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described how Pakistan has engaged in foreign interference in provincial and federal politics. The paragraph described how Pakistan interfered in candidate nominations, worked to support a preferred candidate’s election, including to mobilize voters and to fundraise, and efforts by a security and intelligence organization to counter these activities. ***] ^{Footnote 157 Footnote 158 Footnote 159}

The use of proxies

63. As noted in Chapter 1, foreign states use Canadians as proxies who act at their behest, creating a separation between the threat activity and the foreign actor. As reported elsewhere in this chapter, the PRC also relies on a network of proxies, including prominent businesspeople and community leaders, in major urban centres like Greater Vancouver (see paragraph 60), Greater Toronto (see ***) and ***. The PRC proxy considered by the security and intelligence community to be the most egregious case of foreign interference *** (see Case Study #2).

64. For its part, India has an active proxy, who has proactively looked for ways to further India’s interests by monitoring and attempting to influence politicians, ***. ^{Footnote 160} [*** Two sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged inf ormation. The sentences described the importance India ascribes to the proxy, how Indian officials developed and built a network of contacts through whom India conducts interference activities, including journalists, members of ethnocultural communities and some members of Parliament. ***] (***) ^{Footnote 161 Footnote 162}

65. Political staffers in particular are a sought-after proxy for foreign actors. Staffers can influence or exert some measure of control over a politician by influencing messaging and controlling the calendar of the elected official for whom they work to covertly support the interests of the foreign state. ^{Footnote 163} They have also been used to monitor their employers and report back to foreign state actors. ^{Footnote 164} [*** One sentence was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentence described an example of a political staffer passing confidential information to a contact of a foreign state about a politician’s activities and donors. ***] ^{Footnote 165}

Covertly buying influence with candidates and elected officials

66. In the period under review, intelligence reporting from CSIS and CSE showed that foreign states attempted to covertly buy influence with candidates and elected officials. [*** Five sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described an example of the PRC using intermediaries to provide funds likely to support candidates in the 2019 federal election, including two transfers of funds approximating $250,000 through a prominent community leader, a political staffer and then an Ontario member of Provincial Parliament. CSIS could not confirm that the funds reached any candidate. ***] ^{Footnote 189 Footnote 190 Footnote 191 Footnote 192}

67. In another example, *** Canadians believed to be proxies for the PRC covertly encouraged individuals to donate money to the campaigns of candidates that the PRC favoured and promised to pay them back, which is an offence under the Canada Elections Act. ^{Footnote 193} [*** Two sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences noted that the RCMP and the Office of the Commissioner for Canada Elections were apprised of this intelligence. ***] ^{Footnote 194 Footnote 195}

68. [*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described CSIS information that an Indian proxy claims to have repeatedly transferred funds from India to politicians at all levels of government in return for political favours, including raising issues in Parliament at the proxy’s request. CSIS did not share this information with the RCMP or with the Commissioner of Canada Elections. ***] ^{Footnote 196 Footnote 197 Footnote 198}

Exploiting vulnerabilities in political party governance and administration

69. In the period under review, foreign actors covertly supported or opposed candidates by exploiting vulnerabilities in political party governance and administration. This included interfering with nomination processes or attempting to influence or control electoral district associations. CSIS considers the nomination process to be a particularly soft target for several reasons. ^{Footnote 207} First, many ridings are considered ‘safe seats,’ so winning the nomination is akin to winning the subsequent election without having to interfere in the election itself. Second, nomination processes are not directly regulated or safeguarded by federal, provincial, or territorial legislation or enforcement bodies, such as the Commissioner of Canada Elections. As a result, the likelihood and consequences of the detection of such activities are low. Unlike Australia and the United Kingdom, Canada does not criminalize interfering in nominations, leadership races, or any other political party process. ^{Footnote 208}

70. Third, nomination processes are governed by the different rules of each political party: breaking these rules is not illegal. Each political party has its own rules and requirements for participating in a nomination, such as a minimum age or residency requirement, or whether a membership fee is required to join the party and vote. For example, some parties allow non-citizens to register as party members and vote in a nomination, as long as they live in the riding. *** CSIS assesses that it is relatively easy to fraudulently add voters who live outside a riding to a nomination process’s voter list with inaccurate addresses. It is also reportedly relatively easy to show an altered phone bill with the wrong address, or a fraudulent letter from a school, in order to vote in a nomination. ^{Footnote 209}

71. *** PRC-linked proxies involved in provincial politics engaged in efforts to control the federal Electoral District Association in ***. In addition to trying to influence the riding’s nomination processes (***), they also sought to control the riding’s finances. *** Their actions demonstrate how threat actors work across multiple orders of government: the proxies here worked at the provincial and federal levels, and the riding association they targeted was federal. ^{Footnote 210}

72. Foreign actors also targeted party leadership campaigns. [*** Three sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described two specific instances where PRC officials allegedly interfered in the leadership races of the Conservative Party of Canada. ***] ^{Footnote 220 Footnote 221}

73. [*** This paragraph was deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph described India’s alleged interference in a Conservative Party of Canada leadership race. ***] ^{Footnote 222}

74. Foreign actors did not limit their activities to the federal level. [*** Two sentences were deleted to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences described PRC offers of support to a provincial politician, and its subsequent signalling of that support to trusted contacts, who took specific measures to support the politician. ***] ^{Footnote 223}

Use of cyber tools to attain specific objectives

75. Threat actors deploy a variety of cyber tools to interfere in democratic processes and institutions. They do so for three main reasons: to undermine the integrity of an election, either directly by corrupting the digital infrastructure on which it depends or indirectly by sowing doubt in the minds of voters; to embarrass political parties and elected officials through the leak of information; and to manipulate voters through disinformation to exploit political fissures. (Online foreign influence posed the greatest cyber threat activity to voters during the time under review, as discussed earlier in paragraph 31).

Cyber attacks on electoral infrastructure

76. Cyber threat activity against electoral infrastructure is largely conducted by state-sponsored actors. These activities include targeting information technology systems that support the election process, owners and operators of elections systems, individuals accountable for elections (e.g., election officials), and vendors of election system hardware and software. ^{Footnote 224} States and their proxies engage in this activity to undermine democratic institutions or sabotage election results. This may take the form of targeting electoral processes and infrastructure, altering content on websites and social media accounts of election management bodies, stealing information such as voter registration databases, or compromising the systems or communications underlying the election. ^{Footnote 225}

77. Under CSE's Defensive Cyber Operations Ministerial Authorization, CSE planned a defensive cyber operation in anticipation of the 2019 federal election, and again for the 2021 election. In both 2019 and 2021, the threat that the operations would have countered ultimately failed to materialize and CSE did not need to conduct the operations. CSE also advised the Committee that for both the 2019 and 2021 federal elections, there was no indication that any foreign cyber threat activity targeted electoral infrastructure. ^{Footnote 226}

Cyber attacks on political parties and parliamentarians

78. Foreign states and their proxies also attempt to engage in cyber threat activity to breach the information systems of political parties, candidates and their staff. ^{Footnote 227} They do this to disrupt engagement with the public for financial gain, to harm the political party or candidate, or for publicity; to steal sensitive or proprietary information; or to interfere with political party procedures undertaken online. ^{Footnote 228} The Canadian intelligence community observed cyber threat activity during the 2019 and 2021 federal elections. However, there was no indication that any threat activity specifically targeted Canadian political parties or elected officials in relation to the federal election. Instead, this activity was likely part of broader, ongoing cyber espionage campaigns. ^{Footnote 229}

79. That said, CSE detected state-directed cyber threat activity targeting democratic institutions and processes outside of the election period. For example, a PRC state-directed cyber group started targeting eight members of Parliament and one senator in early 2021. All targeted Parliamentarians were members of the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China, an international multi-party group of legislators focused on how democracies should collectively approach issues related to the PRC. The cyber group’s reconnaissance activity against Canadian politicians was most likely carried out in an attempt to obtain information on their personal and work devices; however, this cyber activity was unsuccessful. This type of activity is consistent with that in 19 European countries, which have reported similar cyber activity against their legislatures since early 2020. ^{Footnote 230}