Annex B: Terms of Reference
Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada's Democratic Processes and Institutions

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Review: Foreign interference in Canada’s federal democratic processes

Overview

On March 6, 2023, the Prime Minister requested that the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP, or the Committee) “complete a review to assess the state of foreign interference in federal electoral processes” with respect to “foreign interference attempts that occurred in the 43rd and 44th federal general elections, including potential effects on Canada’s democracy and institutions.”

The Committee met on March 7, 2023 and considered the Prime Minister’s request. It decided on a broader review under paragraph 8(1)(a) of the NSICOP Act of the state of foreign interference in Canada’s federal democratic processes, from 2018 to the present, and may examine other periods, where relevant. The Committee will consider the latest independent assessment of the Critical Election Incident Public Protocol.

On March 8, 2023, the Committee announced its Review of Foreign interference in Canada’s federal democratic processes, 2018 – present. The review will build on the Committee’s 2019 review of the government’s response to foreign interference, which focused on the period January 1, 2015 to August 31, 2018.

Definitions

The Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act describes “foreign influenced activities” as “activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person.” The term “foreign influence” also appears in the Security of Information Security Act.

That said, the term “foreign interference” has become common in Canada and among its allies to better distinguish between acceptable diplomatic practices and hostile or unlawful practices. The Committee uses “foreign interference,” but emphasizes that its definition is identical to that of “foreign influenced activities,” as described in the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

Democratic processes and institutions include the candidate nomination process, fundraising and donations, the campaign, and the election itself, and key actors such as voters, political parties, lobby groups, community organizations and the media.

Foreign interference in democratic processes and institutions can include using deceptive means to “cultivate relationships with elected officials and others perceived to possess influence in the political process; seek to influence the reporting of Canadian media outlets; seek, in some cases, to affect the outcome of elections; and coerce or induce diaspora communities to advance foreign interests in Canada.” It can also include the spread of false narratives through disinformation campaigns.

Objectives

This review has two primary objectives. The first is to examine the state of foreign interference in Canada’s federal democratic processes and institutions.

The second objective is to examine the federal government’s response to the threat of foreign interference in Canada’s federal democratic processes and institutions, including:

  • Strategies, policies, and approaches to protecting Canada’s federal democratic processes and institutions from this threat;
  • The implementation and resourcing of the operational response to the threat;
  • Interdepartmental coordination of the policy and operational response to the threat;
  • The legislative frameworks for investigating, prohibiting, preventing or countering this threat;
  • The engagement by relevant organizations with ministers or their offices on related threats, issues, or challenges, or in the use of organizational authorities to investigate, disrupt, or collect information on such threats.

As with previous reviews, the Committee will arrive at findings and make recommendations. Officials and others will be called, as required.

The review may provide an update about the government responses of the other countries to foreign interference in national democratic processes and institutions.

Cooperation with NSIRA

Consistent with paragraph 9 of the NSICOP Act, the Committee will take all reasonable steps to cooperate with the National Security and Intelligence Review Agency to avoid unnecessary duplication of work in relation to the fulfilment of their respective mandates. This will include regular coordination meetings between Secretariats and may include shared document requests and information briefings.

Appearances

Consistent with paragraph 18 of the NSICOP Act, government officials will be invited to appear before the Committee in private. The Committee will publish a list of senior officials who appear.

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