Annex D: Foreign interference-related findings and recommendations from NSICOP’s 2019 annual report
Special Report on Foreign Interference in Canada's Democratic Processes and Institutions

F8.

Some foreign states conduct sophisticated and pervasive foreign interference activities against Canada. Those activities pose a significant risk to national security, principally by undermining Canada's fundamental institutions and eroding the rights and freedoms of Canadians. (Paragraphs 136-175)

F9.

CSIS has consistently conducted investigations and provided advice to government on foreign interference. (Paragraphs 195-201)

F10.

Throughout the period under review, the interdepartmental coordination and collaboration on foreign interference was case-specific and ad hoc. Canada's ability to address foreign interference is limited by the absence of a holistic approach to consider relevant risks, appropriate tools and possible implications of responses to state behaviours. (Paragraphs 219-227 and 280-285)

F11.

Foreign interference has received historically less attention in Canada than other national security threats. This is beginning to change with the government's nascent focus on "hostile state activities." Nonetheless, the security and intelligence community's approach to addressing the threat is still marked by a number of conditions:

• There are significant differences in how individual security and intelligence organizations interpret the gravity and prevalence of the threat, and prioritize their resources. (Paragraphs 276-279)
• In determining the measures the government may use to address instances of foreign interference, responses address specific activities and not patterns of behaviour. Furthermore, the government's approach gives greater weight to short-term interests (e.g., foreign policy) than longer-term considerations (e.g., risks to freedoms, rights and sovereignty). (Paragraphs 281-285)

F12.

Government engagement on foreign interference has been limited.

• With the exception of CSIS outreach activities, the government's interactions with sub-national levels of government and civil society on foreign interference is minimal. (Paragraphs 256-267)
• Engagement is limited in part by the lack of security-cleared individuals at the sub-national level. (Paragraph 261)
• There is no public foreign interference strategy or public report similar to those developed for terrorism or cyber security. (Paragraphs 289–291)

F13.

Canada is working increasingly with its closest allies and partners to address foreign interference. This is essential for Canada. (Paragraphs 268–274)

R5.

The Government of Canada develop a comprehensive strategy to counter foreign interference and build institutional and public resiliency. Drawing from the Committee's review and findings, such a strategy should:

1. identify the short- and long-term risks and harms to Canadian institutions and rights and freedoms posed by the threat of foreign interference;
2. examine and address the full range of institutional vulnerabilities targeted by hostile foreign states, including areas expressly omitted in the Committee's review;
3. assess the adequacy of existing legislation that deals with foreign interference, such as the Security of Information Act or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act, and make proposals for changes if required;
4. develop practical, whole-of-government operational and policy mechanisms to identify and respond to the activities of hostile states;
5. establish regular mechanisms to work with sub-national levels of government and law enforcement organizations, including to provide necessary security clearances;
6. include an approach for ministers and senior officials to engage with fundamental institutions and the public; and
7. guide cooperation with allies on foreign interference.

R6.

The Government of Canada support this comprehensive strategy through sustained central leadership and coordination. As an example of a centralized coordinating entity to address foreign interference, the Committee refers to the appointment and mandate of the Australian National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator.

In the interest of national security, members of the House of Commons and Senate should be briefed upon being sworn-in and regularly thereafter on the risks of foreign interference and extremism in Canada. In addition, Cabinet Ministers should be reminded of the expectations described in the Government's Open and Accountable Government, including that Ministers exercise discretion with whom they meet or associate, and clearly distinguish between official and private media messaging, and be reminded that, consistent with the Conflict of Interest Act, public office holders must always place the public interest before private interests.