Chapter 2: The Government Response to Foreign Interference — Introduction
National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Annual Report 2019

Introduction

106. For almost 20 years, the government has rightly focused on terrorism as the greatest threat to public safety. While that threat persists, the Director of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) recently identified foreign interference and espionage as the greatest threat to Canadian prosperity and national interests. He stated that “activities by hostile states can have a corrosive effect on our democratic system and institutions.” ^{Footnote 1}

107. Foreign states attempt to influence Canada, its decision-making and its people through activities ranging from overt and often friendly forms of normal diplomatic conduct on the one hand to covert and hostile actions on the other. The CSIS Act makes the distinction between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour of foreign states by defining foreign influence as activities that are “detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person.” The term “foreign influence” is also used in other legislation, including the Security of Information Act. That said, the term “foreign interference” has become common in Canada and among its allies to better distinguish between acceptable diplomatic practices and hostile or illegal practices. This report uses “foreign interference,” but emphasizes that its definition is identical to that of “foreign influence” in the CSIS Act.

108. Foreign interference activities can include using deceptive means to “cultivate relationships with elected officials and others perceived to possess influence in the political process; seek to influence the reporting of Canadian media outlets; seek, in some cases, to affect the outcome of elections; and coerce or induce diaspora communities to advance foreign interests in Canada.” ^{Footnote 2} There are multiple consequences of foreign interference, including undermining:

• democratic rights and fundamental freedoms of Canadians;
• the fairness and openness of Canada's public institutions;
• the ability of Canadians to make informed decisions and participate in civic discourse;
• the integrity and credibility of Canada's parliamentary process; and
• public trust in the policy decisions made by the government of the day. ^{Footnote 3}

109. While the use of cyber tools as a form of foreign interference has received significant media attention, [*** person-to-person foreign interference remains a common practice ***], ^{Footnote 4} which the Committee characterizes as traditional foreign interference. As a multicultural society with an open and democratic system, Canada is vulnerable to foreign actors seeking to interfere with its political and economic processes. As will be demonstrated throughout the report, hostile states exploit or threaten rights and freedoms that are protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of thought and expression, freedom of the press, freedom of association, democratic rights, mobility rights, security of the person, and the rule of law. In short, foreign interference threatens the fundamental values of our country. In many cases, foreign states target Canadian communities, particularly diaspora or ethnocultural communities, to influence Canada's position domestically and internationally on political, economic or social issues. The report will highlight that some foreign states “threaten to compromise Canadian sovereignty when [their] interests are judged to differ from Canada's.” ^{Footnote 5}

110. Canada's allies have identified foreign interference as a significant threat and have initiated various countermeasures. Notably, foreign interference in Australia, New Zealand and the United States has been the subject of significant public discussion and academic research. In contrast, foreign interference in Canada has received minimal media and academic coverage, and is not part of wider public discourse.

111. This has resulted in the assumption that foreign interference is not a significant problem in Canada. For example, in examining foreign interference from the People's Republic of China, a 2018 report by the Hoover Institution in the United States stated that “Canadian experiences with Chinese interference are less intense than those documented in Australia and New Zealand.” It also noted that “the view in Ottawa is that China is definitely trying to influence Canadian opinion and opinion-makers but is not making much headway at present.” ^{Footnote 6}

112. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph describes a CSIS assessment. ***] ^{Footnote 7} *** ^{Footnote 8}

113. Foreign interference activities predominantly threaten the fundamental building blocks of Canada's democracy. These include “an independent media that follows journalistic ethics and editorial accountability; an empowered and protected civil society; and civic education to build a resilient citizenry.” ^{Footnote 9} These fundamental principles and institutions support effective, accountable and transparent government but also represent vulnerabilities through which foreign states seek to covertly and inappropriately interfere with Canada.