Chapter 2: The Government Response to Foreign Interference — Overview of the review
National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Annual Report 2019

Overview of the review

114. On November 6, 2018, the Committee decided to undertake a review of foreign interference in Canada. The Committee was conscious that given the highly sensitive nature of the material, much of the public version will be redacted. On December 6, 2018, the Chair of the Committee provided notification letters to the Prime Minister and the ministers of Foreign Affairs, National Defence, and Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. The review included the following organizations:

• Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA);
• Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS);
• Communications Security Establishment (CSE);
• Global Affairs Canada (GAC);
• Privy Council Office (PCO);
• Public Safety Canada (PS); and
• the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP).

115. The Committee informed the ministers involved that the review would narrow in focus as it progressed, but would begin with an examination of:

• the extent and nature of the threat and the actors involved;
• the mandates and roles of the relevant organizations;
• cooperation and de-confliction with allies and between departments and agencies on investigations and operations, including information sharing among federal organizations, other levels of government or non-governmental organizations;
• resourcing and prioritization of this issue within relevant departments and agencies;
• strategies for and approaches to protecting Canada's fundamental democratic institutions and structures;
• legislative frameworks for investigating, prohibiting, preventing or countering foreign interference and influence activities; and
• the implementation of and support to an intelligence priority.

116. To focus its efforts, the Committee excluded a number of issues from the scope of its review. It did not examine specific interference activities directed at the 2019 federal election given the government's recent and ongoing efforts in this area. Similarly, it did not examine cyber threats: the government has recently implemented a range of measures to counter cyber threats and the Committee decided the timing of such a review would potentially undermine their implementation. Lastly, the Committee excluded elements of the Investment Canada Act process, as this issue alone could form the basis of a review. Under this Act, the government may review the national security implications of foreign acquisitions of Canadian businesses, which may have implications related to foreign interference. ^{Footnote 10} The Committee's approach should not be viewed as discounting the range of threats posed by foreign states to Canada and its interests (e.g., espionage, hostile economic activity); rather, the Committee elected to focus the scope of its inquiry on traditional foreign interference.

117. The Committee principally examined materials produced between January 1, 2015, and August 31, 2018. It also received relevant material outside of this period. The Committee believes that this timeframe provided an appropriate basis for it to sufficiently examine the current threat environment and the government's response.

118. The Committee's review proceeded in two stages. The first was an examination of government material that described the nature and scope of the threat posed to Canada by foreign interference activities and the main states involved. The Committee supplemented this material with academic and public sources of information, as well as discussions with subject matter experts outside of government. The second stage was to assess the government's response to the threat. The Committee requested additional material from government departments and held hearings with officials between March and May, 2019. All together, government organizations provided the Committee with over 620 documents, representing over 4,300 pages of material, and 17 officials appeared before the Committee.

119. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first explains the breadth and scope of the threat of foreign interference by outlining the primary threat actors, and by examining the threat those actors pose to Canada's fundamental institutions and ethnocultural communities. The second describes government efforts to respond to the threat. Each section contains the Committee's assessment. The chapter concludes with the Committee's findings and recommendations.