Chapter 2: The Government Response to Foreign Interference — Part I
National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Annual Report 2019

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Part I: The threat from foreign interference

States that engage in foreign interference

120. States engage in foreign interference activities to support their national interests. These interests include regime protection and domestic legitimacy; strategic advantages and spheres of influence (such as their economic, political or security agendas); projection of power and deterrence; and reputation. Footnote 11 *** perpetrators of foreign interference in Canada are the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation. Other states active in this area include *** Footnote 12

121. PCO and CSIS assess that Canada is a target due to its global standing; robust and diverse economy; large ethnocultural communities; membership in key multilateral organizations such as the Five Eyes, Footnote 13 G7 and NATO; and close relationship with the United States. Footnote 14

122. The activities explored in this chapter are illustrative and represent only a portion of hostile state activities that seek to penetrate and manipulate Canada's institutions, economy, polity and society. They should be understood as components of broader strategies directed at Canada by foreign states.

The People's Republic of China

123. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph describes a CSIS assessment. *** ] Footnote 15 *** Footnote 16

124. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph describes the objectives and tools of China's foreign interference. ***] Footnote 17 *** Footnote 18

125. [*** Two sentences were revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The sentences describe tools of Chinese foreign interference. ***] Footnote 21 The PRC utilizes its growing economic wealth to mobilize interference operations: “with deep coffers and the help of Western enablers, the Chinese Communist Party uses money, rather than Communist ideology, as a powerful source of influence, creating parasitic relationships of long-term dependence.” Footnote 22

126. The PRC's legislative framework directs all Chinese entities and individuals to contribute to state security. CSIS assessed that “it is likely that citizens can be compelled to assist PRC state actors in interference efforts if and when those efforts fall under the broader definition of 'national intelligence work' and 'national intelligence efforts' as noted in the Law.” Footnote 23 Passed in June 2017, its National Intelligence Law:

compels Chinese entities, including state and private sector companies, as well as Chinese citizens (regardless of whether or not they are also citizens of other countries) to cooperate with the PRC's Intelligence Services (PRCIS) and government writ-large on national security issues …. The [National Intelligence Law] also applies to Chinese entities and individuals operating outside China …. the [National Intelligence Law] creates an overt and legally enforceable framework for cooperation between the PRCIS and Chinese entities/individuals. Footnote 24

127. This all-encompassing strategy is rooted in China's fundamental approach to statecraft and international relations. As Australian journalist and China expert John Garnaut noted in a speech to an internal Australian government seminar in 2017: “In classical Chinese statecraft there are two tools for gaining and maintaining control over 'the mountains and the rivers': The first is wu (weapons, violence) and the second is wen (language, culture). Chinese leaders have always believed that power derives from controlling both the physical battlefield and the cultural domain. You can't sustain physical power without discursive power. Wu and wen go hand in hand.” Footnote 25

128. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph describes a briefing to the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness. ***] Footnote 26

The Russian Federation

129. The Russian Federation engages in foreign interference activities across Canada's political system with the objective of influencing government decision-making and swaying public opinion. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph describes the objectives of Russian foreign interference activities. ***] Footnote 27

130. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph describes tools of Russian foreign interference. *** ] Footnote 28 Some of Russia's *** intelligence officers under diplomatic cover have engaged in threat-related activities. Footnote 29

131. The nature and extent of Russia's foreign interference threat is significant as these activities form a key component of the broader national security threat posed by Russia. *** Footnote 30

Other states engaged in foreign interference

132. [*** Paragraphs 132, 133, 134 and 135 were revised to remove injurious or privileged information. Those paragraphs describe the activities of other countries which engage in foreign interference in Canada. ***] Footnote 31

133. *** Footnote 32 *** Footnote 33

134. *** Footnote 34 *** Footnote 35

135. *** Footnote 36 ***

Fundamental institutions and ethnocultural communities

136. States that conduct foreign interference activities pose a threat to Canada and its fundamental institutions. The targeting and manipulation of ethnocultural communities is the primary means through which these states control messages and seek to influence decision-making at all levels of government. Some individuals willingly act as agents of a foreign power for a variety of reasons including patriotism or the expectation of reciprocal favours. These states also co-opt individuals inside and outside of ethnocultural communities through flattery, bribery, threats and manipulation. The issue of co-opted individuals will be examined within the section on interference in governance and decision-making.

Communities

137. Canada is a multicultural society, home to large ethnocultural communities. For example, there are approximately 1.8 million Canadians of Chinese background and 1.2 mil lion Canadians of Indian background in Canada, Footnote 37 1 in 5 Canadians were born abroad, and over 22 percent of Canadians identify their mother tongue as a language other than English, French or Indigenous languages. Footnote 38 Some of these ethnocultural communities are vulnerable to foreign interference either as targets or as a means of undermining Canadian values and freedoms, and threatening the personal liberties of Canadians and landed immigrants.

138. A great deal of foreign interference has the goal of creating a single narrative or consistent message that helps to ensure the survival and prosperity of the foreign state. As CSIS notes, *** Footnote 39 However, ethnocultural communities are not homogeneous and individuals or groups may not want to get involved or do not support the foreign state's goals. Therefore, foreign states utilize a range of tactics to enforce a single narrative. Those tactics *** include:

  • threats;
  • harassment;
  • detention of family members abroad; and
  • refusal to issue travel documents or visas. Footnote 40

139. Many ethnocultural community members are also monitored for what the foreign state considers to be dissident views or activities. For example, [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph describes the foreign interference activities of a specific country in Canada and their implications for a specific ethnocultural group. ***] Footnote 41

140. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph describes the foreign interference activities of a specific country in Canada and their implications for a specific ethnocultural group. ***]

*** Footnote 42

141. [*** Paragraphs 141 and 142 were revised to remove injurious or privileged information. These paragraphs describe the foreign interference activities of a specific country in Canada and their implications for a specific ethnocultural group. ***]

*** Footnote 43

142. ***

*** Footnote 45

143. GAC has noted [*** that a specific state ***] is increasingly monitoring and harassing human rights defenders in Canada and interfering with freedom of assembly and media. These activities have "a chilling effect on human rights activism and freedom of expression." *** Footnote 46

144. Similarly, the PRC is conducting covert repatriation activities targeting apparent economic fugitives and corrupt officials under its global campaign entitled Fox Hunt. The repatriation activities include clandestine and coercive measures that target and threaten individuals across the globe, including those residing in Canada. Footnote 47 This issue is considered in detail in Part II of this chapter.

Governance and decision-making

145. Canada's system of government allows Canadians to elect their representatives and for all members of Canadian society to engage in free and open debate about the direction of the country. However, this system and the sovereignty of Canadian decision-making is under direct threat from interference activities of foreign states and their proxies.

146. The threat faced by Canada's governance and decision-making institutions is not only a federal problem. Elected and public officials across all orders of government are targeted: members of the executive branch, members of Parliament, senators, members of provincial legislative assemblies, municipal officials and representatives of Indigenous governments. This targeting occurs regardless of an official's status in government or opposition. Beyond elected officials, individuals who may influence government decision-making are also targeted. While the majority of elected and appointed officials conduct their business with genuine integrity, some are wittingly or unwittingly subject to foreign interference activities, jeopardizing the integrity of Canada's system of government. Foreign interference activities are targeted at three key areas: the electoral process at all stages; elected officials and their staff; and sub-national areas of government. Footnote 48

Targeting the electoral process at all stages

147. Foreign interference operations target the electoral process at all stages. (*** Paragraphs 147 and 148 were revised to remove injurious or privileged information. These paragraphs describe how states interfere in various aspects of Canada's electoral process. ***)

148. ***

149. The following examples illustrate the threats described above.

150. In each of these examples, the activities of the foreign state were clandestine or deceptive and clearly detrimental to the integrity of the democratic process.

Targeting elected officials and their staff

151. Once holding public office, elected and appointed officials, their staff, and employees of the legislative assemblies can also be targeted by foreign states. At the federal level, this includes all three major political parties.

152. Foreign states will seek to influence deliberations and decision-making, and to curb initiatives deemed contrary to their interests. They will seek leverage over officials that can be used to apply pressure to enhance their interests. In other instances, foreign states will mobilize third parties, proxies and lobby groups to carry out interference activities, and in some cases the target is unaware of the nature of the activity directed at them. In other cases, foreign states may seek to interfere with policy actions by attempting to discredit or attack senior public officials.

153. Examples that illustrate foreign interference activities directed at elected officials and their staff include the following:

Targeting sub-national orders of government

154. Provincial, municipal and Indigenous governments wield important power in areas that are of interest to states engaged in foreign interference activities. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph describes a CSIS assessment. ***] Footnote 58

155. Many of the same tactics used to target elected officials at the federal level are replicated with provincial, municipal and Indigenous officials. Illustrative examples from the last decade include the following:

Media

156. A free and independent press is the fourth estate of democratic societies. Ethical journalism rooted in accurate, fair, independent and transparent reporting helps to develop a well-informed citizenry and hold decision-makers accountable, while supporting knowledge, debate and transparency. However, foreign states may use mass media to play a role in "amplifying targeted messages, propagating disinformation, and discrediting credible news and journalists." Footnote 66

157. Foreign interference in the media can take a variety of forms, from distorting messages and encouraging self-censorship to hostile takeovers and foreign control of media outlets. Foreign states use ethnic and mainstream media to spread messages and forward their own agendas. *** The PRC and the Russian Federation both manipulate mainstream and ethnic media. Footnote 67

Mainstream Canadian media

158. Traditionally, the PRC took a defensive approach to the media, through domestic censorship and by expelling critical foreign journalists. More recently, the PRC has added a more assertive approach by “trying to reshape the global information environment with massive infusions of money-funding paid for advertorials, sponsored journalistic coverage and heavily massaged positive messages from boosters. While within China the press is increasingly tightly controlled, abroad Beijing has sought to exploit the vulnerabilities of the free press to its advantage.” Footnote 68

159. The PRC uses a strategy referred to as “borrowing a boat to go out into the ocean.” This strategy involves using mainstream international media to push the messages of the PRC. This often takes the form of strategic partnerships with media to provide free PRC-approved messages for China-related news, similar to a wire service. Footnote 69 Sometimes, the content is supplemental and paid for through advertisement. For example, the China Daily paid for multi-page supplements in large newspapers including the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Post and the UK Telegraph. These inserts, called “China Watch,” look like part of the newspaper, but are propaganda for which the Telegraph alone reportedly receives £750,000 (approximately C$1.3 million) annually. Footnote 70

160. [*** Paragraphs 160, 161 and 162 were revised to remove injurious or privileged information. These paragraphs describe how certain countries manipulate and control mainstream and ethnic media. ***] Footnote 71 *** Footnote 72

161. ***

162. *** Footnote 74

Canadian foreign-language media

163. Currently, there are approximately 650 publications and 120 radio and television programs in Canada that are in languages other than French and English. Footnote 75 Some of these are heavily influenced and manipulated, either wittingly or unwittingly, by foreign states.

164. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. This paragraph describes a CSIS assessment of the objectives of a country which conducts foreign interference activities in Canada to control media. ***] Footnote 76 *** Footnote 77

165. The PRC has several state-owned media outlets that operate in Canada including Xinhua News, People's Daily and the China News Service. *** Footnote 78 The PRC is seeking to “harmonize” international Chinese-language media with its own by attempting to merge the editorial boards of those outlets with PRC media. Footnote 79 This would result in the PRC controlling the message in Chinese-language media, thereby undermining the free and independent media in Canada.

166. [*** Paragraphs 166, 167 and 168 were revised to remove injurious or privileged information. These paragraphs describe why and how countries that conduct foreign interference activities in Canada seek to control media. ***] Footnote 80 *** Footnote 81

167. *** Footnote 82 This policy uses both traditional media and social media.

168. *** Footnote 83

Efforts to control international media

169. In New Zealand, academic research suggests that the PRC has overall political control over the various Chinese media companies that own New Zealand-based Chinese-language outlets, resulting in a form of “media supervision.” Over many years, PRC state media companies have invested in strategic mergers and acquisitions of Chinese-language media outlets, centralizing and controlling the messages that are available for dissemination to Chinese communities outside of the PRC. Footnote 84

170. PRC efforts extend far beyond the short term and far beyond the West. According to The Guardian newspaper, the PRC's efforts also encompass

longer-term programmes for reporters from developing countries. These moves were formalized under the auspices of the China Public Diplomacy Association, established in 2012. The targets are extraordinarily ambitious: the training of 500 Latin American and Caribbean journalists over five years, and 1,000 African journalists a year by 2020. Through these schemes, foreign reporters are schooled not just on China, but also on its view of journalism. To China's leaders, journalistic ideals such as critical reporting and objectivity are not just hostile, they pose an existential threat… China's own media imperialism is on the rise, and the ultimate battle may not be for the means of news production, but for journalism itself. Footnote 85

Interference with academic institutions

171. Some states carry out foreign interference activities on Canadian postsecondary education campuses. Footnote 86 They seek to utilize the open and innovative features of these institutions to further their own objectives, which include interference activities but also other actions with hostile intent (e.g., espionage and intellectual property theft). Foreign interference activity seeks to influence public opinion and debate, thereby obstructing fundamental freedoms such as speech and assembly, and the independence of academic institutions. In trying to influence public debate at academic institutions, foreign states may sponsor specific events to shape discussion rather than engage in free debate and dialogue. They may also directly or indirectly attempt to disrupt public events or other activities perceived as problematic.

172. CSIS assesses that the PRC and the Russian Federation are the primary threat actors on Canadian campuses. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. This paragraph describes Russian foreign interference activities on Canadian campuses. ***]

173. [*** Two sentences were revised to remove injurious or privileged information. ***] Footnote 89 Academic research indicates that one such student group is the Chinese Students and Scholars Associations (CSSAs). As CSIS noted, the CSSAs are an important support mechanism for international students studying abroad and “provide a social and professional network for students … they are not nefarious in and of themselves.” Footnote 90 However, there is growing public concern about the relationship between the associations and the PRC's embassies and consulates as the CSSAs are “one of the main means the Chinese authorities use to guide Chinese students and scholars on short-term study abroad.” Footnote 91 In the United States, CSSAs are “mobilized to protest campus events that threatened to show China in a negative light …. Though ties with the Chinese government vary from chapter to chapter, there is reportedly 'growing ideological pressure from the embassy and consulates'. Some CSSAs already mandate loyalty to the Party line.” Footnote 92 *** Footnote 93 CSSA behaviour may also pose a threat to freedom of speech and assembly. For example, a media report discussed a Toronto-based chapter of the CSSAs that immediately informed the Chinese consulate and publicly condemned a presentation at McMaster University by Rukiye Turdush, a critic of the PRC's internment of Uyghurs. Footnote 94

174. As part of the PRC's cultural influence efforts abroad, the Chinese government funds Confucius Institutes that “teach Chinese language and culture, including calligraphy, food and dance.” Footnote 95 For example, there are now more Confucius Institutes in Africa than the number of cultural centres of any other government except France. Footnote 96 In Canada, these institutes are typically affiliated with postsecondary education institutes and K-12 schools. Footnote 97 CSIS notes that New Brunswick recently shut down a Confucius Institute due to com m unity complaints related to foreign interference. Footnote 98 In the United States, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations for the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs recently completed a review of these institutes in a report entitled “China's Impact on the U.S. Education System.” The report noted that,

Confucius Institute funding comes with strings that can compromise academic freedom. The Chinese government approves all teachers, events, and speakers. Some U.S. schools contractually agree that both Chinese and U.S. laws will apply…. The Chinese teachers sign contracts with the Chinese government pledging they will not damage the national interests of China. Such limitations attempt to export China's censorship of political debate and prevent discussion of potentially politically sensitive topics. Footnote 99

175. Recent Canadian media reports have highlighted similar concerns, including a January 2019 article that discussed the rejection of a Confucius Institute agreement by a Toronto school board. Footnote 100

Allied institutions also under threat

176. Canada is not alone in facing the threat posed by foreign interference. Canada's close allies and some like-minded states are subject to foreign interference activities that target their respective institutions.

Australia

177. Australia appears to be at the forefront of Western nations in addressing the threat of foreign interference. In testimony to the Australian Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security, Australian Security Intelligence Organization officials stated that the threat from espionage and foreign interference in Australia is “unprecedented” and that it is “extensive, unrelenting and increasingly sophisticated.” Footnote 101 In its 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, the Australian government noted that it is guarding against foreign influence.

178. In discussing the threat to Australia's political leadership, China expert John Garnaut stated that:

Reports have shown that the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] is systematically silencing critics in Australia and co-opting Chinese-language media here to present favourable views. The party is 'astroturfing' grassroots political movements to give the impression of Chinese community support for Beijing's policies and leaders, while drowning out opponents. CCP-linked organizations are crowding out independent opportunities for ethnic Chinese political representation…. In 2015 the Australian Security Intelligence Organization reportedly warned the major political parties that two of Australia's most generous donors had 'strong connections to the Chinese Communist Party' and that their 'donations might come with strings attached'. Footnote 102

179. In 2017, an investigation by Four Corners and Fairfax media reported that two PRC-associated individuals donated AUS$6.7 million to the Liberal, Labour and National parties over the period of a decade. Footnote 103 The investigative series, including its reporting on the suspected influence ties between these donors and former Senator Sam Dastyari, led to increased public pressure on the Australian government to address the issue. [*** The following sentence was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. This sentence describes a memorandum from PCO to the Prime Minister. ***] Footnote 104

180. Australia has taken a number of measures to respond. In the past 18 months, Australia has passed a suite of legislative tools to further address the threat, including the introduction of new offences in that country's Criminal Code in relation to espionage and foreign interference, and amendments to other offences such as treason and treachery. New provisions pertaining to foreign interference provide a high degree of specificity on offences and threat activities, including on whether the activity was in the planning stages, intentional, reckless or funded by a foreign intelligence service. The penalties range from 10 to 20 years' imprisonment. Footnote 105 The legislation creates a new transparency scheme that prescribes the registration of persons acting as agents of foreign principals and requires regular public disclosures. Australia also established a National Counter Foreign Interference Coordinator charged with delivering an "effective, efficient and consistent national response to foreign interference by providing a focal point for coordinating policy and program development and leading engagement with private sector areas." Footnote 106

New Zealand

181. As part of the New Zealand Parliament's Justice Select's Inquiry into the 2016 and 2017 elections, the Director General of Security for the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service and the Director General of the Government Communications Security Bureau provided a briefing on foreign interference activities. During the unclassified portion of the briefing, the Director General of the Security Intelligence Service stated that "[t]he challenge of foreign interference to our democracy is also not just about what occurs around the election itself. Motivated state actors will work assiduously over many years, including in New Zealand, to covertly garner influence, access and leverage." Footnote 107 The submission also highlighted vectors of foreign interference, including cyber threats to the election, use of social and traditional media to spread disinformation, building covert influence and leverage, and the exertion of pressure on or control of diaspora communities.

182. Professor Anne-Marie Brady's internationally recognized review of PRC interference activities highlights the threat posed to New Zealand's sovereignty. Based on public and open source information, Dr. Brady's paper explains the many tools and avenues through which the PRC conducts interference activities in New Zealand, including the co-optation of individuals and members of the political class. Footnote 108 One noted example includes a member of Parliament reportedly working in the interests of a foreign state. Following the publication of her paper, Dr. Brady became the subject of targeted harassment. Footnote 109

United States

183. The United States is also the target of foreign interference activities. The most prominent example is the extensively documented Russian foreign interference activities directed against the 2016 presidential election. On January 6, 2017, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence published a comprehensive intelligence community assessment entitled "Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections." The report found that

Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election represent the most recent expression of Moscow's longstanding desire to undermine the US-led liberal democratic order . . . [and that] Russia's goals were to undermine public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm her electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and the Russian Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump. We have high confidence in these judgments. Footnote 110

184. The United States has also been the target of PRC-led interference campaigns. In a speech on October 4, 2018, the U.S. Vice President highlighted the range of PRC threat activities directed at the United States:

I come before you today because the American people deserve to know that, as we speak, Beijing is employing a whole-of-government approach, using political, economic, and military tools, as well as propaganda, to advance its influence and benefit its interests in the United States. China is also applying this power in more proactive ways than ever before, to exert influence and interfere in the domestic pol icy and politics of this country. Footnote 111

185. The United States has employed a foreign agent registration scheme since 1938. While a recent audit of the Foreign Agents Registration Act presented a number of recommendations to improve its use and functions, it still requires “persons acting as agents of foreign principals in a political or quasi-political capacity to make periodic public disclosure of their relationship with the foreign principal, as well as activities, receipts, and disbursements in support of those activities.” Footnote 112

United Kingdom

186. The United Kingdom is also the target of foreign interference activity. In testimony to the Intelligence and Security Committee in January 2017, officials from the Government Communications Headquarters briefed on Russian interference activities and noted that these are likely to continue and grow. Footnote 113 The United Kingdom recently announced a range of new measures to address electoral interference, disinformation and intimidation. On May 5, 2019, the Minister for the Constitution announced the government's commitment to introducing a new electoral offence of intimidating a candidate or campaigner during the run-up to an election, either in person or on line; preparing legislation that would clarify the electoral offence of undue influence of a voter; requiring online election material to clearly indicate the individual or group that produced it; and initiating a consultation on electoral integrity, which would include strengthening laws on foreign donations. Footnote 114

Like-minded nations

187. Beyond Canada's partners in the Five Eyes, close allies and like-minded states are also subject to foreign interference activities. For example, the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service discussed various forms of covert and harmful foreign interference activities occurring in the Netherlands in its 2018 Annual Report. Notable concerns included Russian and Chinese political interference activities and their efforts, along with those of Iran and Turkey, to influence and intimidate ethnocultural communities. Footnote 115 The German Ministry of the Interior highlighted that Russian intelligence services deploy broad-based efforts to exercise influence, and that these services have been working at “high intensity” against German interests for many years. Footnote 116 Media reports suggest that Russian actors deployed efforts to interfere with the most recent presidential election in France, including a cyber attack against French cyber infrastructure. Footnote 117 Another report stated that Russia sought to influence Marine Le Pen's far-right party with a €9.4 million loan through an obscure Russian bank. Footnote 118

International multilateral organizations

188. International multilateral organizations are also the subject of foreign interference activities. As the U.S. Director of National Intelligence noted in the 2019 Worldwide Threat Assessment,

China has become the second-largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping budget and the third-largest contributor to the UN regular budget…. Beijing has stepped up efforts to reshape international discourse around human rights, especially within the UN system. Beijing has sought not only to block criticism of its own system but also to erode norms, such as the notion that the international community has a legitimate role in scrutinizing other countries' behavior on human rights (e.g. initiatives to proscribe country-specific resolutions), and to advance narrow definitions of human rights based on economic standards. Footnote 119

PRC efforts to interfere in the United Nations included bribes made by a PRC-linked consultant to the then President of the United Nations General Assembly. Footnote 120

The Committee's assessment of the threat from foreign interference

189. The Committee believes there is ample evidence *** that Canada is the target of significant and sustained foreign interference activities. *** The PRC, the Russian Federation *** other states ***. The Committee believes that these states target Canada for a variety of reasons, but all seek to exploit the openness of our society and penetrate our fundamental institutions to meet their objectives. They target ethnocultural communities, seek to corrupt the political process, manipulate the media, and attempt to curate debate on postsecondary campuses. Each of these activities poses a significant risk to the rights and freedoms of Canadians and to the country's sovereignty: they are a clear threat to the security of Canada.

190. Canada is not alone in facing this threat. Its closest security and intelligence allies, including those within the Five Eyes and NATO, are targeted by many of the same foreign states using many of the same techniques. Like terrorism, the threat of foreign interference is increasingly seen by states as a growing threat requiring a common response.

189. The Committee believes there is ample evidence *** that Canada is the target of significant and sustained foreign interference activities. *** The PRC, the Russian Federation *** other states ***. The Committee believes that these states target Canada for a variety of reasons, but all seek to exploit the openness of our society and penetrate our fundamental institutions to meet their objectives. They target ethnocultural communities, seek to corrupt the political process, manipulate the media, and attempt to curate debate on postsecondary campuses. Each of these activities poses a significant risk to the rights and freedoms of Canadians and to the country's sovereignty: they are a clear threat to the security of Canada.

190. Canada is not alone in facing this threat. Its closest security and intelligence allies, including those within the Five Eyes and NATO, are targeted by many of the same foreign states using many of the same techniques. Like terrorism, the threat of foreign interference is increasingly seen by states as a growing threat requiring a common response.

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