Chapter 2: The Government Response to Foreign Interference — Part II
National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians Annual Report 2019

Part II: The response to foreign interference

191. The first part of this chapter described the breadth and scope of the threat of foreign interference. It outlined the primary threat actors, and examined the threat posed by those actors to Canada's fundamental institutions and ethnocultural communities. This part assesses the government's response to the threat, including through organizational responsibilities and activities, collaboration and coordination at various levels, and public-facing engagement. As noted in paragraph 116, the Committee's review focuses on traditional foreign interference.

192. The second part of this chapter is divided into four sections. The first provides an overview of the organizations responsible for addressing foreign interference and the tools they have at their disposal. The second examines the extent of coordination and collaboration among these organizations, using three important case studies. The third examines the degree to which the federal government has informed other orders of government, the public and fundamental institutions - all targets of foreign interference. The last section describes government engagement with allies abroad.

Overview of key responding departments and agencies

193. The Committee examined the primary security and intelligence organizations responsible for investigating and countering the threat of foreign interference as characterized by the scope of this review: CSIS, GAC, PCO, Public Safety Canada and the RCMP. The mandates, responsibilities and tools of these organizations shape how they understand and respond to foreign interference, independently or in coordination. Each of the five organizations is discussed below.

194. Other organizations play supporting roles, including CSE, in providing foreign intelligence and securing government cyber systems; Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, in determining the admissibility of individuals to enter Canada; and CBSA, in securing the border. For the purposes of this review, the Committee consulted these organizations for information, but they were not included as part of the entire review process.

Canadian Security Intelligence Service

195. Pursuant to subsection 12(1) of the CSIS Act, CSIS investigates threats to the security of Canada and provides related advice to the government. Section 2 of the CSIS Act defines threats to security of Canada, including: "foreign influenced activities within or relating to Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or involve a threat to any person." ^{Footnote 121} As previously noted, the Committee has adopted the more commonly used term of 'foreign interference' to describe this threat. CSIS's operational activities are prioritized according to the government's intelligence priorities and the assessed national security threat. ^{Footnote 122}

196. CSIS possesses a number of tools and measures to investigate and reduce threats. CSIS's intelligence collection activities may serve to advance investigations, provide advice on the admissibility of people to Canada, or to disseminate intelligence, assessments and advice to the government. ^{Footnote 123} In carrying out investigations, CSIS may deploy a wide array of operational techniques with varying levels of intrusiveness (e.g., interviews with targets, physical surveillance, and warranted powers to intercept communications or enter premises). ^{Footnote 124} When investigations involve Canadian fundamental institutions, CSIS policies and procedures provide specific direction, including ministerial direction, along with special considerations and enhanced approvals. ^{Footnote 125}

197. CSIS may also use a threat reduction measure (TRM) at any stage of an investigation. ^{Footnote 126} The CSIS Act defines the threshold for use of a TRM as "reasonable grounds to believe" that an activity represents a threat to the security of Canada. It also prescribes that the TRM must be reasonable and proportionate to the threat and must consider other means available. ^{Footnote 127} [*** The following two sentences were revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The two sentences describe a CSIS policy. *** ] ^{Footnote 128} *** ^{Footnote 129}

198. CSIS devotes considerable resources to investigating and reporting on foreign interference activities. Between *** CSIS had *** targets related to espionage and foreign interference. Of these, *** targets were subject to a court warrant, which permit CSIS t o use very intrusive tools and are an indication of the significance of the threat. ^{Footnote 130} These figures include espionage and foreign interference given that hostile states will engage in both threat activities. In over four-fifths of these cases, CSIS investigations and warrants address both. In the Committee's review timeframe (January 1, 2015, to August 31, 2018), *** percent of CSIS's intelligence reports were associated with foreign interference. Comparatively, *** percent were associated with terrorism and *** percent with other activities. ^{Footnote 131} CSIS produced *** separate intelligence assessments during the review timeframe examining the range and nature of the threat of foreign interference activity directed against Canada. These products sensitized partners and contextualized the threat *** ^{Footnote 132}

199. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. This paragraph describes CSIS investigative challenges. *** ] ^{Footnote 133} *** ^{Footnote 134} *** ^{Footnote 135} During an appearance before the Committee, the Director of CSIS discussed these considerations:

*** ^{Footnote 136}

200. CSIS engaged a range of other organizations and stakeholders on the nature of the threat. It held regular ongoing discussions with other federal partners, other orders of government, and some public and private institutions. At the federal level and within the review timeframe, “the Service undertook *** briefings to *** different Government of Canada clients. In addition, *** individuals from *** GOC [Government of Canada] departments attended quarterly briefings on ***” ^{Footnote 137}

201. CSIS also contributes to briefing ministers on the nature of the threat. For example, in March 2018, the Director of CSIS briefed the Acting Minister of Democratic Institutions on the overall nature of the threat. ^{Footnote 138} CSIS regularly informs the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness through specific briefings and CSIS's annual report to the Minister on operational activities. In 2016 and 2017, CSIS also provided general briefings or pre-travel briefings that included the topic of foreign interference to the ministers of Environment and Climate Change, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship, Natural Resources, and Canadian Heritage and Multiculturalism. ^{Footnote 139}

Royal Canadian Mounted Police

202. The RCMP is Canada's lead law enforcement body for national security criminal investigations. Its Federal Policing Program is responsible for conducting this work. While National Headquarters centrally coordinates national security criminal investigations, they are typically conducted by the Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) in Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton, Toronto, Ottawa and Montreal and the National Security Enforcement Sections (NSES) in Fredericton, Winnipeg, Halifax and Saskatoon. ^{Footnote 140} The Federal Policing Program has a budget of $905 million (2018-2019) from which it allocates funds for investigations. ^{Footnote 141} The program uses a prioritization matrix to triage incoming investigative files based on the gravity of the threat to initiate investigations and allocate resources. ^{Footnote 142} Police forces of jurisdiction may also investigate activities associated with foreign interference (e.g., harassment or intimidation), but the RCMP noted that “when these cases are confirmed to be foreign interference, the law states that they be referred to the RCMP.” ^{Footnote 143} Similar to CSIS, the RCMP has been given direction concerning its engagement of and investigative activities involving fundamental institutions, including a Ministerial Direction on National Security in Sensitive Sectors. ^{Footnote 144}

203. The RCMP may use various tools and measures found in statute to pursue criminal investigations and lay charges for activities associated with foreign interference. These statutes and their notable provisions include the following:

• The Security of Information Act establishes the offence of foreign influence: "Every person commits an offence who, at the direction of, for the benefit of or in association with a foreign entity or a terrorist group, induces or attempts to induce, by threat, accusation, menace or violence, any person to do anything or to cause anything to be done (a) that is for the purpose of increasing the capacity of a foreign entity or a terrorist group to harm Canadian interests, or (b) that is reasonably likely to harm Canadian interests." ^{Footnote 145} Anyone found guilty of this offence can face up to life in prison.
• The Criminal Code includes provisions that address treason; sabotage; interception of private communications; bribery; mischief; criminal harassment; uttering threats; extortion; false messages; indecent or harassing telephone calls; conspiracy; and intimidation. ^{Footnote 146}

204. The Canada Elections Act includes a n offence related to interference by non-residents in elections. Specifically, “[n]o person who does not reside in Canada shall, during an election period, in any way induce electors to vote or refrain from voting or vote or refrain from voting for a particular candidate.” ^{Footnote 147} The Act also sets out other offences associated with interfering in the conduct of federal elections in Canada. As the RCMP stated, “[t]he Commissioner of Canada Elections is the independent Officer that ensures the CEA [Canada Elections Act] is complied with and enforced, and may refer matters under the Act to the Director of Public Prosecutions, who decides whether to initiate a prosecution.” ^{Footnote 148}

205. The RCMP informed the Committee that, between *** and *** it identified *** foreign interference investigations. *** were classified as foreign-influenced threats to a person and another *** as foreign-influenced threats to a person or organization(s). ^{Footnote 149} Of these, *** files were cleared by the RCMP without charges as there was insufficient evidence to proceed. *** of the cleared files *** tier 1 priority investigations, that is, highest-priority files requiring significant oversight and direction from National Headquarters. ^{Footnote 150} The remaining *** foreign interference investigations are ongoing. The RCMP also identified an additional *** investigations in the review timeframe, though these focused on espionage rather than foreign interference.

206. Under the terms of the CSIS-RCMP One Vision framework, CSIS may disclose information and intelligence to the RCMP to initiate a criminal investigation. ^{Footnote 151} CSIS provided the RCMP *** disclosure letters within the review timeframe. Of these disclosures, the RCMP determined that *** included no reasonable grounds to open a criminal investigation; *** was a corrected version of a previous disclosure; and *** ^{Footnote 152}

207. The RCMP described a number of challenges *** including:

• RCMP national security operations continue to be primarily focused on counter-terrorism *** ^{Footnote 153} *** ^{Footnote 154} .
• *** ^{Footnote 155}
• The RCMP struggles to use intelligence provided by CSIS as evidence to support criminal investigations, where court disclosure obligations may reveal *** ^{Footnote 156}
• *** ^{Footnote 157}
• *** ^{Footnote 158}

208. In characterizing its perspective of the threat, the RCMP provided investigative summaries, presentations and outreach material to the Committee. However, [*** these focused on issues unrelated to foreign interference ***] ^{Footnote 159} The RCMP also stated that “[f]oreign interference is an umbrella term under which a number of activities (such as espionage) fall across a spectrum from criminal to non-criminal.” ^{Footnote 160} For example, RCMP officials cited the case of Jeffrey Delisle, an officer of the Canadian Navy who was charged and convicted in 2013 of communicating safeguarded information to a foreign entity (Russian Federation) without lawful authority, as a clear example of foreign interference during an appearance before the Committee. ^{Footnote 161}

Global Affairs Canada

209. GAC represents Canada's interests abroad. It manages Canada's diplomatic relations, provides consular services to Canadians, promotes the country's international trade, and leads Canada's international development and humanitarian assistance. Each bilateral and multilateral relationship is unique: depending on the partner, a bilateral relationship may include areas of cooperation, agreement, disagreement and even hostile behaviour. This requires GAC to make an ongoing calculation of complex interests and risks (e.g., trade, security, legal, political, values) when managing Canada's international relationships. [*** The remainder of this paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information and to ensure readability. It discusses two countries with which Canada has important bilateral interests and which also conduct foreign interference activities in Canada. ***] In each of these cases, GAC must consider the range of its responsibilities when considering how to manage its bilateral relations. ^{Footnote 162}

210. GAC is therefore a key player in countering foreign interference activities in Canada. When presented with evidence of interference from partners in the security and intelligence community, it must determine, usually in coordination with those partners, what tools it may use to respond. As stated by GAC officials, the objective of such measures is to “impose a cost - economic, political, reputational - to problematic behaviour in an attempt to induce behavioural change. If successful, this can deter and ultimately prevent future similar aggressive behaviour.” ^{Footnote 163} The tools or measures available to GAC are either bilateral or multilateral, including the following:

Bilateral tools

• Informally raise problematic behaviours with the country's officials;
• Formally demarche a country to raise problematic behaviours and state consequences for similar actions in the future;
• Publicly attribute a country's unacceptable behaviour;
• Reduce or suspend engagement with a country;
• Impose unilateral sanctions against a country, its officials or its proxies;
• Deny admissibility to diplomatic officials;
• Withdraw Canadian diplomatic staff; and
• Declare diplomats in Canada personae non gratae and have them removed.

Multilateral tools

• Coordinate diplomatic responses with like-minded states;
• Develop multilateral coalitions with like-minded partners to establish consistent and coordinated approaches to address foreign interference, including imposing multilateral sanctions; and
• Raise a country's behaviour for consideration by international organizations. ^{Footnote 164}

211. Determining when to respond and what tools to use is rarely easy. As GAC officials noted, “measures taken to counter foreign interference present a number of trade-offs which can impact Canada's relationships and interests… action is not taken in a void; any response has spillover and trade-offs.” ^{Footnote 165} Not only must GAC consider the possible implications of acting before taking measures to counter foreign interference (among other threats), it must also manage the target's response thereafter, which may include unexpected forms of retaliation and countermeasures. In characterizing the threats posed by foreign interference, a senior GAC official cited 'cyber' as the most significant form of interference. ^{Footnote 166} This perspective is reflected in the work of GAC's Digital Inclusion Lab in 2018 and the ensuing development of the Rapid Response Mechanism. ^{Footnote 167}

Privy Council Office

212. PCO plays a central role in government. It provides advice on matters of national and international interest; coordinates responses to issues facing the government and the country; supports the effective operation of Cabinet; and supports the development and implementation of the government's policy and legislative agendas, among other responsibilities. ^{Footnote 168} As described in Chapter 2 of the Committee's 2018 Annual Report, within PCO the National Security and Intelligence Advisor (NSIA) plays a critical role in the areas of national security and intelligence. The NSIA is responsible for coordinating and providing leadership to the security and intelligence community, and providing advice to the prime minister, ministers and senior government officials on security and intelligence issues. Three secretariats within PCO report to the NSIA: the Security and Intelligence Secretariat, the Foreign and Defence Policy Secretariat, and the Intelligence Assessment Secretariat. These secretariats assist in coordinating the operational, policy and assessment activities of the security and intelligence community.

213. The NSIA co-chairs a number of deputy minister-level committees, including on national security and operations. These committees receive support from mirror committees at the assistant deputy minister (ADM) level (e.g., ADM National Security Policy and ADM National Security Operations). *** From an international perspective, PCO officials play an important role in engaging international partners on security and intelligence issues. For example, PCO is the lead Canadian organization at the *** ^{Footnote 169}

214. During the review period, PCO provided or supported briefings on the issue of foreign interference to various Cabinet ministers. With regard to the Prime Minister, PCO provided five briefings on specific threat activities occurring in Canada, including on *** ^{Footnote 170} In an appearance before the Committee, the NSIA also spoke to the more recent roles and responsibilities of supporting the new Minister of Democratic lnstitutions. ^{Footnote 171} For example, PCO officials provided the Minister of Democratic Institutions a preliminary in-person briefing on foreign electoral interference (i.e., threats to elections in other countries) and hostile state activity in January 2018, and a three-page summary of intelligence assessments on foreign interference in the spring of 2018. ^{Footnote 172}

215. In addition to PCO's support to the Prime Minister and Minister of Democratic Institutions, the NSIA briefed the *** Ministers of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Foreign Affairs, and National Defence *** ^{Footnote 173} Also of note, the NSIA briefed the Minister of Foreign Affairs on foreign interference prior to international travel in January 2017. ^{Footnote 174}

216. PCO recently started coordination activities on the development of policy approaches, including two policy papers describing “hostile state activity.” PCO defines hostile state activity as "activities carried out by foreign states (and/or associated non-state actors) to influence or interfere in the political, economic and security affairs of Canada through overt or covert means." ^{Footnote 175} While the review will cover interdepartmental coordination in greater depth in the forthcoming section, PCO started to focus its attention in early 2018 on coordinating the government's response to foreign interference. For example, records from two meetings of the Deputy Minister National Security Committee (September 2017 and March 2018) show very preliminary conversations on the need to develop a government-wide approach to foreign interference. PCO also continued to *** where foreign interference has been identified as a government-wide priority for the past few decades.

Sécurité publique Canada

217. In supporting the responsibilities of the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Public Safety Canada exercises three roles:

• support the Minister's responsibility for all matters related to public safety and emergency management not assigned to another federal organization;
• exercise leadership at the national level for national security and emergency preparedness; and
• support the Minister's responsibilities for the coordination of entities within the Public Safety portfolio. ^{Footnote 176}

218. Public Safety Canada has only recently identified and dedicated specific resources to the issue of foreign interference. These resources contributed to the community's broader work on hostile state activity. ^{Footnote 177}

Interdepartmental coordination

219. As discussed in Part I of this review, the threat to Canada from foreign interference is increasing. The perpetrators have become more brazen and their activities more entrenched. While the tools at the government's disposal to fight or counter foreign interference and to mitigate it through transparency are organization- and activity-specific, the size and scope of the threat from foreign interference requires a coordinated and informed response. In a briefing to the government's Executive Leadership Development Program, the Director of CSIS stated that the government “must … seek to respond from a whole-of-government perspective, which requires cooperation across several government departments, some who may have competing priorities and mandates.” ^{Footnote 178} This section examines the extent to which the security and intelligence community works in concert.

220. Over the course of the period under review, the government's approach to coordination on foreign interference evolved. Up until mid to late 2017, interdepartmental coordination and collaboration on foreign interference was issue-specific and ad hoc. In general, the department or agency that was the most implicated or had the most information on a specific incident of foreign interference was the organization to lead on the coordination of response. ***

[*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph describes high-level considerations. ***] ^{Footnote 179}

221. PCO's depiction is reflected in the records of the ADM national security committees, which show few discussions of issue-specific incidents or challenges. It is also reflected in two committees struck specifically to deal with discrete incidents of foreign interference: the *** committee to address the PRC's efforts to repatriate so-called economic fugitives and the *** committee on the Canadian response to Russian Actions. These are discussed in case studies (paragraphs 228-254).

222. By late 2017, the community recognized that it needed better coordination to respond effectively to foreign interference. In a background memo for the *** Meeting on *** the RCMP noted that:

There are currently a number [of] inter-related … initiatives/working groups including, but not limited to: Hostile State Actors; Protecting Democratic Institutions; and Economic Security. It has been identified that this is becoming burdensome, and that groups may not be appropriately leveraging discussions underway in other fora. ^{Footnote 180}

223. In March 2018, the Deputy Ministers of National Security attended a retreat to discuss hostile state activity. ^{Footnote 181} In his opening remarks, the NSIA noted that hostile state activity *** ^{Footnote 182}

224. In preparation for the retreat, PCO provided participants with a background paper. It noted that:

[*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph describes considerations. ***] ^{Footnote 183}

225. The security and intelligence community identified areas it needed to address for Canada to be more effective in countering foreign interference. These included:

• prioritizing those sectors and areas of concern that are most important to Canada and Canadian interests;
• better educating the public;
• ***
• ***
• ***
• *** ^{Footnote 184}

226. Work in this regard is in the early stages. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph describes several measures that were put in place. ***] ^{Footnote 185} *** ^{Footnote 186}

227. Table 12 lists the interdepartmental committees working on hostile state activities during the period under review.

Source: PCO, ***, August 2018 and a PCO follow-up email on August 28, 2019.

Case studies of Canadian responses to instances of foreign interference in Canada

228. The Committee examined the measures Canada took to address foreign interference activities in three instances during the course of the period under review (January 1, 2015, to August 31, 2018). In each case, the activities were long-standing and part of a broader range of hostile activities detrimental to Canadian interests. These cases involve *** foreign interference threats to Canada: PRC, the Russian Federation and *** They demonstrate in concrete terms the roles played by organizations in the security and intelligence community, the challenges they face in responding to threats and coordinating their own activities, and the considerations that went into deciding if, when and how to act.

China and its Operation Fox Hunt

229. Since coming to power in late 2012, Chinese president Xi Jinping has made fighting government corruption a cornerstone of his policy to re-establish the legitimacy of the CCP. This policy resulted in significant changes to China's machinery of government, refocused the work of its security and police apparatus, and has proven politically popular. ^{Footnote 187} A key part has been a campaign to track down and return allegedly corrupt individuals (economic fugitives) who had fled abroad, most commonly to Canada, the United States and Australia. ^{Footnote 188} Known as Operation Fox Hunt (later, Sky Net), this campaign is important for President Xi to demonstrate to the Chinese people the CCP's sincerity in cleaning up government corruption. ^{Footnote 189}

230. Chinese security officials have taken a number of measures to conduct Operation Fox Hunt, including diplomatic pressure on foreign states to cooperate with their investigations and covert trips to persuade or coerce fugitives to return. ^{Footnote 190} They employ these measures with Canada. On a diplomatic level, Chinese police and prosecutors work with the RCMP to arrange to meet fugitives in Canada, ostensibly to gather evidence and to discuss the case against them. Chinese authorities agree to seek permission from the RCMP prior to travelling to Canada and to abide by the terms of the Protocol on Foreign Criminal Investigators in Canada, including that meetings are held in RCMP facilities and monitored by an RCMP officer. ^{Footnote 191} (*** The remainder of this paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. It discusses Chinese tactics. ***] ^{Footnote 192} *** ^{Footnote 193}

231. A number of organizations responded to Operation Fox Hunt based on their respective mandates. In 2015, GAC took the lead *** ^{Footnote 194} GAC established an interdepartmental working group with CSIS, the RCMP, the Department of Justice and CBSA that met regularly (every two to three months) to discuss Fox Hunt. ^{Footnote 195} *** ^{Footnote 196}

232. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. This paragraph describes the objectives of one government department in attending coordination meetings. ***] ^{Footnote 197}

233. The RCMP worked with Chinese officials to support their investigations of corrupt officials. RCMP officials obtained information to substantiate the allegations against the alleged fugitives, facilitate Chinese requests to travel to Canada to interview the individuals and, in Canada, monitor the interviews. The RCMP imposed increasingly stringent criteria on PRC investigators as time passed. [*** The remainder of this paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. It describes challenges raised by the RCMP. ***] ^{Footnote 198}

234. [*** Paragraphs 234 and 235 were revised to remove injurious or privileged information. These paragraphs describe various government measures to address Chinese Fox Hunt activities. ***] ^{Footnote 199} *** ^{Footnote 200} *** ^{Footnote 201}

*** ^{Footnote 202}

235. ***

236. Despite these interventions, Chinese *** activities to advance Operation Fox Hunt continued. [*** The remainder of this paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. It describes a specific instance of covert foreign interference. ***] ^{Footnote 203} No action was taken at that time or, more generally, since.

237. [*** Paragraphs 237 and 238 were revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraphs describe CSIS communications with a number of government departments about challenges in addressing Fox Hunt activities. ***]

*** ^{Footnote 204}

238. *** ^{Footnote 205}

239. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph describes a briefing note to the Prime Minister. ***] ^{Footnote 206}

240. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. This paragraph describes how Interdepartmental coordination on Fox Hunt appears to have waned. ***] ^{Footnote 207} *** ^{Footnote 208}

Russia and the Salisbury incident

241. As discussed in the first part of this chapter, the Russian Federation has conducted foreign interference activities in Canada *** The objectives of its activities include advancing its geopolitical interests, ensuring regime legitimacy and survival, countering the policies and interests of Western states, and weakening democratic institutions. [*** The rest of this paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. It discusses Russian tools of interference. ***]

242. On March 4, 2018, former Russian spy Sergei Skripal and his daughter, Yulia, were found unconscious on a park bench in Salisbury, United Kingdom. A British investigation revealed that they had been poisoned by a nerve agent smeared on their front door by Russian intelligence agents. President Vladimir Putin denied any Russian involvement in the incident. On March 20, the United Kingdom expelled 23 Russian diplomats and their families. ^{Footnote 209} During this period, ***

243. GAC was the principal organization responsible for providing options to respond to Russia's behaviour. In response to a request from the United Kingdom for solidarity in addressing Russia's problematic behaviour, ^{Footnote 210} [*** The rest of this paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. It discusses advice given by GAC officials to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. ***] ^{Footnote 211}

244. Following a formal request from the United Kingdom to expel Russian diplomats on March 23, 2018, the Minister of Foreign Affairs released a March 26 statement announcing the expulsion of four Russian diplomats from Canada and the denial of an application for three additional Russian diplomatic staff. The Minister stated that the four diplomats were "intelligence officers or individuals who have used their diplomatic status to undermine Canada's security or interfere in our democracy." The Minister called the poisoning "part of a wider pattern of unacceptable behaviour by Russia" and stated that "Canada fervently supports the measures that the United Kingdom has taken so far and remains resolutely committed to acting in concert with its allies." ^{Footnote 212} Ultimately, 29 countries expelled a total of 145 Russian officials. ^{Footnote 213}

245. Security and intelligence organizations considered the Salisbury incident in a number of interdepartmental fora. The ADM Committee on National Security Operations was scheduled to discuss the incident on March 20 as part of a wider agenda. The agenda item included two parts: a presentation by the RCMP and the Canadian Armed Forces on how the government would respond to an attack using chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear material inside of Canada, *** ^{Footnote 214}

246. In early April 2018, GAC convened a *** group on Russia that continued meeting through June of that year. Participation consisted of a core group of officials from *** and a secondary group of officials from *** [*** The rest of this paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraph describes the objectives of the interdepartmental meeting. ***] ^{Footnote 215}

247. In June 2018, the *** Interdepartmental Meeting on Potential Canadian Responses to Russian Actions became the *** Interdepartmental Meeting on Canadian Responses to Hostile State Activities. The focus of the group was expanded beyond Russia to begin dealing with the G7 Rapid Response Mechanism and mapping of hostile state activities, both of which will be discussed later in this review. ^{Footnote 216} The Committee has no information that this group met after its initial June 2018 meeting.

***

248. [*** Paragraphs 248 to 254 were revised to remove injurious or privileged information. The paragraphs describe a government response to a specific country which had conducted foreign interference activities in Canada. ***] ^{Footnote 217}

249. ***

• ***
• ***
• ***
• ***
• *** ^{Footnote 218}

250. *** ^{Footnote 219}

251. *** ^{Footnote 220}

252. *** ^{Footnote 221} *** ^{Footnote 222}

253. ***

254. *** ^{Footnote 223} *** ^{Footnote 224}

Intergovernmental and public engagement

255. Informing vulnerable institutions and the public can help to build resiliency against foreign interference. Actors within civil society and non-federal levels of government are frequent targets of foreign states' hostile activities, *** This section examines the government's efforts to engage these actors.

Intergovernmental engagement

256. PCO holds the federal portfolio for intergovernmental relations. During the period under review, PCO officials engaged in limited and ad hoc domestic engagement and outreach on the issue of foreign interference. In a four-month window in 2017, the NSIA attended the Federal, Provincial and Territorial Clerks and Cabinet Secretaries Meeting to brief on national security issues. In discussing foreign interference during the April meeting, the NSIA delivered a Secret-level presentation that provided preliminary information on threats and mitigation measures for the leaders of Canada's various bureaucracies. During the July meeting with the same audience, the NSIA used many of the same talking points. ^{Footnote 225}

257. In April 2018, the Ontario Security Advisor organized a conference for provincial security advisors entitled "Global Threats, Local Impacts: Provincial Security Matters." The NSIA delivered the keynote address and highlighted a number of high-level security concerns associated with foreign interference, including threats to democratic institutions, the targeting of diaspora communities, and the need to increase domestic collaboration.

258. Public Safety Canada is responsible for supporting the Federal, Provincial and Territorial Meetings of Ministers Responsible for Justice and Public Safety. The issue of foreign interference was not brought forward for federal, provincial and territorial consideration at any point in the review timeframe. Public Safety Canada provided no other material associated with any outreach or engagement activities.

259. CSIS conducts significant outreach to non-federal governments and organizations on the range of threats to Canada. These activities are widespread and are led by all levels of the organization, including by the Director, and carried out across all regions of the country. However, CSIS's engagement with the public appears to be ad hoc. Depending on priorities, investigations and capacity, each region engages institutions within their jurisdiction. There is no consistent strategy to identify organizations for engagement. For example, CSIS briefed [*** a specific municipality in 2018 ***] but has no formalized plan to engage other municipalities or orders of government in Ontario or elsewhere.

260. Additionally, CSIS primarily shares general information on foreign interference outside of the federal government. These meetings and briefings typically provide an overview of CCSIS's mandate, key threats to the security of Canada or pre-travel briefings, with a cursory discussion of foreign interference. [*** This sentence was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. This sentence describes a CSIS brief to officials of a province and notes the scarcity of information in a presentation on foreign interference. *** ] ^{Footnote 226} Similar text is found in many of the other briefing and outreach documents.

261. CSIS is limited in the quantity and depth of information it can share due to the sensitivity of the issue and the classification of material. Many of the other organizations meeting with CSIS, most notably representatives from other orders of government, do not have the necessary security clearance to see classified material. Where the ability to engage at a classified level exists, CSIS has provided more detailed briefings to key partners. [*** This sentence was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. This sentence describes a CSIS brief to officials of a province and notes that significant information was provided on foreign interference. *** ] ^{Footnote 227}

262. The RCMP’s coordination and outreach activities on foreign interference are preliminary. In an August 2018 briefing note to the NSIA, the RCMP highlighted future opportunities for domestic partner coordination and engagement:

The RCMP is in a unique position to facilitate Government of Canada efforts to combat FAI [foreign actor interference]. For example, citizens would likely report acts of intimidation to local law enforcement, which allows the RCMP and its police of jurisdiction partners to investigate and potentially disrupt the activity, and also to report such activities to the broader security and intelligence community. The RCMP can also engage in proactive prevention activities by helping inform industry and academia of potential vulnerabilities, and building strong relationships with diaspora communities. The RCMP is engaging with the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP) to help inform POJs [police of jurisdiction] of the threat, and establish mechanisms for reporting incidents. ^{Footnote 228}

263. The RCMP organized a foreign interference workshop with select domestic law enforcement partners in March 2019. The RCMP’s post-event summary notes that "[a]cross all of the discussions, one clear area for further work emerged - a need to raise awareness of [foreign actor interference] with frontline police. Participants communicated that, in general, police either have not heard of [foreign actor interference], or vaguely understand it." ^{Footnote 229} However, much of the information delivered to domestic law enforcement at this workshop characterized the threat as both foreign interference and espionage.

264. The RCMP also raised the threat of foreign interference with the Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police (CACP). In 2018, the RCMP outlined a starting point for a coordinated domestic approach by law enforcement: "The RCMP continues to examine how to improve its ability to responds [sic] to the threat of foreign interference. As these efforts continue, CACP members are asked to report incidents of potential foreign interference to Federal Policing…. This would enhance our collective understanding of the magnitude and scope of this threat and assist in the development of mitigation strategies in the future." ^{Footnote 230}

Public engagement

265. The Minister of Democratic Institutions has spoken publicly about the government's efforts to safeguard the 2019 election. ^{Footnote 231} In January 2019, together with the Ministers of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and National Defence, the Minister of Democratic Institutions announced a plan to combat foreign interference; strengthen organizational readiness; encourage social media platforms to act; and enhance citizen preparedness. The announcement included a statement that key members of national political campaigns will now receive "regular security briefings including classified information on the foreign interference activities both cyber and human that target Canadian democratic institutions." ^{Footnote 232} While the Committee's review excludes efforts to safeguard the 2019 federal election, the Committee received no information from PCO on initiatives to engage political parties as it relates to the review's scope more generally. In that context, the Committee highlights its recommendation from the Special Report on the Prime Minister's February 2018 trip to India, which stated that "[i]n the interest of national security, members of the House of Commons and Senate should be briefed upon being sworn-in and regularly thereafter on the risks of foreign interference and extremism in Canada." ^{Footnote 233}

266. CSIS also conducts public outreach. In April 2018, the Director spoke to the U15, a group of some of Canada's most research-intensive universities on threats facing their campuses. Because these remarks were unclassified they represent the most public discussion and articulation of the threat, including attribution of threat actors, of foreign interference reviewed by the Committee. For example, the Director's remarks highlighted that:

Certain foreign intelligence services and government officials (especially those of China and Russia), are also involved in the monitoring and/or coercion of students, faculty and other university officials. In some instances, students are pressured to participate in activities (e.g., demonstrations, spying on other students, etc.) which are covertly organised by a foreign power to further its political influence. Universities can also be used as venues for "talent-spotting" and intelligence collection, in specific circumstances… [and] Chinese threat actors have aggressively engaged in foreign influenced activities in Canada, as they have in Australia, the United States, and New Zealand. ^{Footnote 234}

The Assistant Director of Intelligence delivered similar remarks to York University in June 2018. In December 2018, the Director of CSIS delivered a speech to the Economic Club of Canada in which he provided an overview of Canada's threat environment, including a description of the threat posed by other states to Canada's democratic systems and institutions. ^{Footnote 235}

267. CSIS is increasingly preparing unclassified material drawing on open source information to further expand these briefings; ^{Footnote 236} however, in the Canadian context, there is a shallow pool of publicly available information. In addressing this gap, CSIS's Academic Outreach Branch has held a number of workshops and expert briefings with academics, representatives from numerous federal departments and agencies, and other international experts. The Branch published two reports from workshops during the period under review that considered foreign interference: Rethinking Security: China and the Age of Strategic Rivalry and Who Said What?: The Security Challenges of Modern Disinformation.

International collaboration and coordination

268. Canada and its allies have started to examine ways they can develop comprehensive and multilateral strategies to identify and counter the threat of foreign interference. During Canada's most recent G7 presidency in June 2018, leaders collectively articulated the principled footings among economic partners to address foreign interference:

The G7 share common democratic values of respect for fundamental freedoms, human rights and the rule of law. We are committed to a rules-based international order, which is central to the maintenance and development of free, open, well-governed, pluralistic, peaceful, and prosperous societies, together with cooperation and security among states. Foreign actors seeking to undermine democratic institutions and processes through coercive, corrupt, covert or malicious means constitute a strategic threat, which we commit to confront together, and with other countries that share democratic values. Effectively responding to this threat will require a coordinated, multi-dimensional approach that respects human rights and fundamental freedoms and is developed in consultation with government and nongovernment stakeholders, including civil society and the private sector…. We commit to exchange information, coordinate action and develop strategies to reinforce our democracies and strengthen our societies' resilience. ^{Footnote 237}

269. In support of this commitment, G7 leaders announced a "Rapid Response Mechanism" at the G7 Summit in June 2018, which was conceptualized during the Foreign and Security Ministers Meeting of the G7 in April 2018 in Toronto. The Rapid Response Mechanism's purpose is to "strengthen national and international capacities to work in a coordinated manner to reinforce our democracies, strengthen our societies' resilience and uphold freedom of expression and a free and independent media." ^{Footnote 238} The Rapid Response Mechanism's primary mandate is to monitor, identify and compile information on foreign interference, coordinate efforts, actively share information, and identify opportunities for action. ^{Footnote 239} GAC noted that like-minded nations could also be added to the Rapid Response Mechanism, and that the Netherlands, Australia and New Zealand had been added recently. ^{Footnote 240}

270. Members of the Five Eyes have collectively recognized the threat posed by foreign interference throughout the alliance. In August 2018, the Five Eyes ministers of Public Safety, Immigration and Justice collectively announced their intention to collaborate in countering foreign interference:

We agreed to draw upon the strengths of our cohesive societies, our public and private institutions, and our global partnerships to reduce the risk that foreign interference poses to domestic and global prosperity and stability. We committed to establish a mechanism for the five countries to share developments in our respective approaches to confronting the foreign interference challenge. We undertook to share information on foreign interference activities with a view to advancing our collective knowledge of how to counter such threats. In the event of a severe foreign interference incident within our sovereign nations we agreed the five countries would coordinate on appropriate responses and attribution. ^{Footnote 241}

271. These high-level commitments inform the international engagement by Canada's security and intelligence community. [ *** This sentence was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. This sentence describes an example of CSE and CSIS international engagement. *** ] ^{Footnote 242}

272. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. This paragraph describes PCO international engagement. ***]

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273. The RCMP has also started contributing to the international law enforcement dialogue on foreign interference. [*** This paragraph was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. This paragraph describes an instance of RCMP international engagement. ***]

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274. In addition to supporting the government's efforts on G7 commitments and implementing the Rapid Response Mechanism, working-level officials from GAC contributed to a coalition of like-minded states on addressing the *** Countries in this forum shared information on specific cases of *** ^{Footnote 245} Working-level officials also contributed to issue-specific meetings with like-minded states. Representatives from GAC, the RCMP and the Department of Justice attended a June 2018 meeting organized by the U.S. State Department with like-minded nations to examine institutional vulnerabilities and areas of collaboration (e.g., political, media, education, law enforcement). ^{Footnote 246} Notable commitments from this meeting included an agreement to share information, tools and *** engagement strategies. ^{Footnote 247}

The Committee's assessment of the response to foreign interference

275. As it responds to all threats to its national security, Canada takes measures to protect itself from the threat of foreign interference. A number of organizations within the security and intelligence community have specific mandates and tools to investigate and counter this threat. They coordinate their activities through established interdepartmental mechanisms and engage sub-national levels of government, the public and like-minded states to advance key policy objectives. The Committee provides its assessment of each of these activities below.

Differences in how the threat of foreign interference is understood

276. Security and intelligence organizations do not share a common understanding of the threat, including its gravity in Canada and its most common manifestations. Over the years, CSIS has investigated foreign interference and provided other government organizations with numerous assessments on the aggressive and pervasive nature of the threat in Canada. [*** The following two sentences were revised to remove injurious or privileged information. They describe CSIS assessments of foreign interference in Canada. ***] ^{Footnote 248} *** ^{Footnote 249} Despite these clear and consistent assessments, there are differences in how key organizations, such as PCO and the RCMP, understand the threat from foreign interference. ^{Footnote 250}

277. Another key challenge is differences in definitions. While the CSIS Act defines and distinguishes between foreign influence and espionage as separate threats to the security of Canada, section 20 of the Security of Information Act does not make such a distinction. ^{Footnote 251} This is most significant for the RCMP, the organization responsible for conducting criminal investigations of foreign interference. In its documentation and appearance before the Committee, the RCMP does not distinguish between espionage and foreign interference. The Committee recognizes that hostile foreign states will engage in both espionage and foreign interference, but it also notes that there is a clear distinction between espionage (i.e., exfiltration or stealing of information) and foreign interference (i.e., use of clandestine means or threats to promote a certain position or objective). While from a criminal investigation perspective the difference may not be essential, it is essential to establishing a common understanding and response to the threat from an interdepartmental perspective. As Michael Cole notes:

Sharp power activities such as co-optation, censorship and disinformation are undoubtedly unethical, but our legal systems are ill-equipped to address those. Those activities therefore fall between the cracks in our systems, leaving law enforcement, counterintelligence agencies, and the courts at a loss as to jurisdictions. ^{Footnote 252}

278. Another issue is the prominence that 'cyber' has taken as a form of interference. There is little doubt that cyber threats, including the use of cyber means to conduct interference, have become both publicly known and increasingly important to the protection of government operations and private networks. In that context, the Committee notes the substantial investments in CSE cyber security operations, the implementation of measures to protect the 2019 federal election, and the creation of specific organizational units, such as the Rapid Response Mechanism Coordination Unit at GAC. The Elections Modernization Act seeks to address foreign interference through advertising, including on on line platforms like Google and Facebook. ^{Footnote 253} It is instructive, however, that these measures all address the same mechanism of interference; a similar level of attention has not been paid to more longstanding and widespread mechanisms associated with traditional foreign interference.

279. It is essential that the government respond to the threat of foreign interference. To do so, the Committee believes that security and intelligence organizations should, at a minimum, have a common understanding of the threat, its magnitude and the various ways it manifests itself in Canada.

Interdepartmental coordination

280. Canada has been slow to react to the threat of foreign interference. A key turning point appears to have been the Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, which clearly and publicly demonstrated potential vulnerabilities in democratic processes. Thereafter, the government established a number of interdepartmental fora to address electoral security and hostile state actors in late 2017 and 2018: heretofore, most of that activity has involved policy processes to define and understand the problem and the tools available to respond. Before that, government efforts to respond to discrete acts of foreign interference were conducted and coordinated on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. The Committee reviewed three cases that occurred during the period under review. These cases revealed the strengths and weaknesses of Canada's current approach to addressing foreign interference.

281. Security and intelligence organizations have taken tangible measures to address instances of foreign interference. This is both a strength and a weakness: action is being taken, but usually against only one aspect of a state's foreign interference. In each of the cases reviewed by the Committee, individual organizations developed measures to address or counter a hostile state, engaged other members of the security and intelligence community, and implemented those measures, albeit with varying degrees of success. [*** The following sentence was revised to remove injurious or privileged information. It describes a government response to a state's foreign interference. *** ] By contrast, the case of the government's response to China's Operation Fox Hunt *** focused on *** Chinese interference, *** to support criminal investigations of other states and to properly identify and remove persons ineligible to be in Canada. Similarly, the government's response to the Salisbury incident was in part based on Russian interference in Canada's democracy, but would only have occurred in the context of Russia's assassination attempt in the United Kingdom. In short, government responses were piecemeal, responding to specific instances of foreign interference but leaving unaddressed the many other areas where Canadian institutions and fundamental rights and freedoms continue to be undermined by hostile states.

282. The responsibilities of individual departments play a significant role in shaping government responses to foreign interference. That is to be expected: Canada's system of ministerial accountability gives individual ministers and departments significant autonomy over their respective mandates. The most important outcome is that individual organizations are generally responsible for determining when a threat should be addressed and the means to do so. As shown in the case studies -and to their credit -both CSIS and GAC have done so *** In each case, those organizations engaged others in the security and intelligence community prior to acting. However, this approach has limitations.

283. The most important limitation is inherent in the mandate and responsibilities of each organization. The Committee is concerned that having any one organization take the lead on determining if and how to respond to foreign interference will mean that considerations related to that organization's mandate will take precedence over other considerations. For example, GAC's mandate is to represent Canada's interests abroad. Among other things, it is responsible for managing diplomatic relations, addressing consular issues and promoting international trade. It also possesses and implements the majority of Canada's tools to respond to foreign interference, a threat that manifests itself in a domestic context.

284. In short, GAC is on the foreign policy end of a domestic security problem. Its leadership on determining if and how to respond to foreign interference means that foreign policy considerations, which are often clear and immediate (e.g., *** a state will not import a commodity from Canada), will take precedence over considerations of domestic harms, which are often vague and long term (e.g., *** a state's activities undermine free speech).

285. The Committee is also concerned that ad hoc coordination on specific instances of foreign interference is too narrow. Focusing on one issue risks not considering the broader challenges posed to ethnocultural groups and fundamental institutions. It also risks not considering all available tools and options. In that context, the Committee supports the government's recent analysis of the value of a broader approach to hostile state activity:

Facilitating the participation of the full range of policy and operational capacity within and outside the federal system would support a more comprehensive analysis of an increasingly complex and ever-evolving threat, assessment of risks and opportunities of action, implications of inaction, the role of deterrence, and the levers and authorities available. ^{Footnote 254}

Intergovernmental and public engagement

286. To advance their interests, foreign states target sub-national governments, specific ethnocultural communities and the public more generally. It is therefore essential that the government engage fundamental institutions and the public to raise their awareness of the threat posed by foreign interference and to start building a 'whole of Canada' defence. The importance of this engagement has been recognized for some time. In 1981, the McDonald Commission recommended:

Ministers and Parliamentarians with responsibilities relating to security and intelligence should endeavour to provide the public with all information possible about the security of Canada, the threats to it and steps taken to counter those threats so that a more informed public opinion can address with some understanding the major issues relating to the work of a security intelligence agency. ^{Footnote 255}

287. The government's engagement with sub-national levels of government has been inconsistent and uninformative. In 2017, the NSIA gave essentially the same high-level presentation to the clerks of the provinces and territories on national security threats, including foreign interference, on two separate occasions. The Committee believes this was a missed opportunity to increase formal engagement and coordination with sub-national levels of government. The presentations lacked the level of detail provided by the NSIA to Ontario provincial security advisors in a 2018 speech, which more fully explained the threats facing Canada's society and institutions. For its part, Public Safety Canada is essentially absent in this field.

288. Individual departments conduct outreach to sub-national counterparts. CSIS is particularly active in this respect, engaging provincial and municipal governments and individual police services. Its ability to share information is limited, however, by the absence of Secret-level clearances in most sub-national organizations. Moreover, CSIS efforts are conducted for the most part at the regional level and are not part of a strategic program of outreach. For its part, the RCMP has begun to engage local police forces on the threat posed by foreign interference. The RCMP’s approach is hindered, however, because it does not make a distinction between espionage and foreign interference, *** ^{Footnote 256} As a result, the Committee is concerned that foreign interference investigations will continue to be conducted on a one-off or ad hoc basis, in many cases by local police, and will not inform a broader understanding of the threat to national security, domestic sovereignty and the rights of Canadians.

289. These limitations are reflected in the public's perception of the government's response. For example, in a spring 2019 presentation to the Standing Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the Secretary General of Amnesty International Canada noted that those who are targeted do not know whether to turn to CSIS, the RCMP or municipal police, and that they rarely receive a coherent response from officials. ^{Footnote 257}

290. The government's public engagement on foreign interference has also been limited. Public pronouncements by ministers have focused on efforts to ensure the integrity of the 2019 federal election, but not the broader threats and risks to Canadian society. There are no strategies or threat assessments to inform Canadians of foreign interference analogous to the yearly reports on terrorism. Similarly, there is almost no public engagement by senior levels of government. The exception is the Director of CSIS, who has engaged in an open and frank dialogue on the nature of the threat in a public setting. Through its academic outreach and unclassified publications, CSIS has also tried to increase public awareness and better inform government research and analysis. These activities are essential to strengthen public awareness of threats to Canada.

291. The Committee acknowledges the challenges in communicating information to fundamental institutions due to the sensitive nature of the information and the necessary independence of these institutions. However, these challenges should not impede government organizations from engaging Canadian institutions more thoroughly on the significant threats they face.

International cooperation

292. Canada's engagement with its allies and like-minded states to establish common principles to define and respond to the threat of foreign interference is in its early stages. Its efforts should continue for at least two reasons. First, Canada's approach supports the international rules-based order, particularly to clarify acceptable and unacceptable state behaviour. Second, it undermines efforts by hostile states to divide and isolate their targets by developing a common front. The PRC and the Russian Federation are *** perpetrators of foreign interference against Canada and its allies, and have proven particularly adept at using rewards and punishments to keep states in line with their interests. While Canada and its allies will always have different economic and political interests with these states, commonly agreed red lines and responses would serve to protect all. This is particularly important for Canada as a global middle power.